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ABSTRACT 
Providing access to finance to the poor has been proposed as a tool for economic 
development and poverty reduction. Our research aims to provide a deep analysis of how to 
enhance access to finance on a sustainable basis, focussing on rural Vietnam. It analyzes four 
main areas: (i) why access to financial markets by low-income households is severely 
constrained; (ii) how policy makers deal with the absence of financial markets for the poor; 
(iii) who are actually excluded from formal financial system; and (iv) the relationship between 
access to finance and poverty reduction. 
It is demonstrated that market imperfections (such as asymmetric information and 
transaction costs) can explain the lack of access for the poor. However, the development of 
financial technologies, such as joint-liability group lending or lending through partnership 
with social/information intermediaries may enhance information availability and reduce 
transaction costs. The poverty reduction approach that many policy makers have been 
following has failed to generate finance for the poor on a sustainable basis. We suggest that a 
mixed approach which combines the poverty reduction with financial systems approach (i.e. 
recognises a balance between social and financial goals) may be appropriate.  
This proposition is supported by empirical evidence from rural Vietnam where it is 
shown that the poverty reduction approach that the government has followed has not enabled 
financial institutions to achieve financial-self-sufficiency and this has reduced the outreach 
capacity. Moreover, we find that under the poverty reduction approach, the better-off 
households, rather than the very poor households, are more likely to gain access to formal 
financial sector. We also find that having access to finance has a positive impact on poverty 
reduction; but this impact is very small, suggesting that it may not be cost-effective.  
 vi 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 The inspiration 
 Providing access to finance to the poor or microfinance has been considered as a tool 
for economic development and poverty reduction (ADB, 2000a; Morduch and Haley, 2002; 
Khandker, 2003). It is the interest of many policy makers and researchers in recent years. 
Although there are several different perceptions of microfinance (Rhyne, 1998; Robinson, 
2001), it is commonly agreed that the central issue in microfinance has been the question of 
how to provide financial services to the poor and low-income households on a sustainable 
basis (Rhyne, 1998; Robinson, 2001; Gonzalez Vega 2003).  
 To answer this question, economists focus on understanding the dynamics of the 
financial markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Callomiris and Hubbard, 1990; Williamson, 
1987; De Meza and Webb, 1987, 1992) in general and explain why financial markets for the 
poor and low income households have been absent (Ed Mayo and Mullineux, 1998; 
Binswanger and McIntire, 1987). The widely used literature on this issue is the theory of 
asymmetric information (Alkerlof, 1970) which results in problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Mishkin, 2001). Given costly screening and monitoring (Spence, 1973a, 1973b; 
Rothchild and Stiglitz, 1976; Townsend, 1979), asymmetric information based studies 
suppose that in the cases of excess demand for financial services, financial institutions cannot 
increase interest rates to clear the market but ration credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The 
asymmetric information based studies also suggest that the use of collateral could be a 
solution to credit rationing (Bester; 1985, 1987, 1994). 
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 The problem of asymmetric information in the financial markets for the poor and low 
income households is seen more serious for several reasons such as they are new markets and 
the costs of screening and monitoring are extremely high (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2004; Yaron, 1998; Ed Mayo and Mullineux, 1998). Moreover, most of the poor possess a 
low education background and cannot provide standard collateral as required by the financial 
institutions (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987). As a result, they are excluded from the 
financial sector and in most cases must rely on the informal sector at extremely high costs 
(Meyer and Nagarajan, 1992, 2000). 
 Given the absence of financial markets for the poor, policy makers focus on the debate 
of to subsidize or not to subsidize financial institutions in providing financial services to the 
poor (Rhyne, 1998; Robinson, 2001; Gonzalez Vega, 2003). This debate leads to two 
approaches in microfinance: the poverty reduction approach and the financial system 
approach. The poverty reduction approach aims at providing cheap financial services to the 
poor, especially the very poor, through governmental subsidies with the main expectation that 
financial services could contribute to poverty reduction. The financial system approach on 
another hand aims at applying commercial finance principles and building a financial 
intermediation system for the poor without ongoing subsidy. 
 In Vietnam, the economic reform initiated in 1986 has transformed the nation from the 
central planning to a market oriented economy (Dao, 2001a, 2002). The reform has attained 
major achievements in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. However, there has 
been a large gap between rural and urban areas. Therefore, rural development and agriculture 
are considered as a priory goal in the national development strategy. In this strategy, 
microfinance, which aims at ensuring rural households having access to financial services, is 
considered as an important component (SRV, 2002). 
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 The poverty reduction approach to microfinance with major subsidy from the 
government has increased the access of the rural households to financial services (Dao, 2002; 
McCarty, 2001). However, microfinance in rural Vietnam is not sustainable for a number of 
reasons (Quach, 2002): (i) subsidy approach has not allowed financial institutions to attain 
financial self-sufficiency; (ii) legal framework has not recognised the importance of various 
types of microfinance institutions in the process of microfinance development; (iii) there is a 
lack of innovations in financial technologies in accordance with international best practices; 
and (iv) government supports have ignored the role of social intermediation which is seen 
necessary to microfinance. 
 All of the above issues have impressed us much and encouraged us to follow this 
research. With a belief that microfinance can be sustainable and that sustainable microfinance 
is important to the poverty reduction, our research expects to recognize the ways to attain 
sustainability and provide supports to our arguments with theoretical and empirical proof. 
1.2 What is microfinance? 
1.2.1 Concept of microfinance 
 There have been several different understandings of microfinance concepts. The main 
difference among definitions is about the range of services and the targeted clients. For 
example, ADB (2000a) defines microfinance as the provision of a broad range of financial 
services such as loans, deposits, payment services, money transfers, and insurance to poor and 
low-income households and their micro-enterprises. The CGAP (World Bank) in their website 
basically defines microfinance as providing very poor families with very small loans 
(microcredit) to help them engage in productive activities or grow their tiny businesses. They 
however also indicate that overtime, microfinance has come to include a broader range of 
services (credit, savings, insurance, etc.) as it has been realized that the poor and the poorest 
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those who lack access to traditional formal financial institutions require a variety of financial 
products.  
 Legerwood (1999) proposes microfinance as a development approach, which 
comprises of financial and social intermediation, intended to benefit the low-income 
households. Financial services generally include savings and credit but some microfinance 
organizations also provide insurance and payment services. In addition to financial 
intermediation, Legerwood further supposes that many MFIs provide social intermediation 
services such as group formation, development of self-confidence, and training in financial 
literacy and management capabilities among members of a group. Thus, the definition of 
microfinance includes both financial intermediation and social intermediation. Microfinance 
is thus not simply a banking tool but also a development tool. 
Box 1.1 - Concept of microfinance 
 
 Though there is somewhat different in the definitions of microfinance, it shows a 
comprehensive picture of the microfinance industry around the world. In our ideas, 
microfinance implies financial intermediation among the poor and low income households. 
The primary financial services include credit and savings, but other financial services such as 
insurance and payments to the poor and low-income households are also included together 
with the development of microfinance industry. Social intermediation such as trainings which 
aims at building capacity to the poor and low income households should be regarded as a 
• Provision of financial services, primarily credit and savings, but also other services such as 
insurance and payments to micro clients 
• Micro clients are the poor and low-income households and enterprises having business 
opportunity (economically active) but lack access to formal financial services 
• Social intermediation such as development of self-confidence and training in financial 
literacy and management skills and informational intermediation such as credit rating 
agencies are essential in microfinance 
 
Source: Drawn from ADB (2002a) and Legerwood (1999) 
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supporting process, along with but not integrated in microfinance. We also introduce the 
concept of informational intermediation to include any supporting agencies (such as credit 
rating agency or Local People Committee in Vietnam) that enhance information on the low-
income households. 
1.2.2 Microfinance system 
 According to a study by Meyer and Nagarajan (1992, 2000), the microfinance system 
includes three core sectors: formal, semi-formal and informal sector. The formal sector 
includes various kinds of banks such as commercial banks, development banks, specialized 
savings banks, cooperative banks, and unit and regional rural banks; postal savings system; 
insurance companies; social security schemes; pension funds, and in some countries, capital 
markets. The formal sector is regulated and supervised by the regulatory authority. 
 The semiformal sector comprises of community development financial institutions1 
such as credit cooperatives and credit unions .etc; village banks, farmers’ associations; self-
help groups; integrated rural development programs; and nongovernmental organization 
financial programs. This sector is unlicensed and generally unsupervised. However, they may 
operate under particular laws and regulations. Some organizations, such as NGOs, provide 
microcredit but are usually not permitted to mobilize voluntary savings from the public. Some 
credit cooperatives, credit unions, and various forms of credit societies that are considered 
semiformal may provide their members with facilities for both savings and loans.  
 The informal sector serves multiple areas, financing households and small enterprises 
in a wide range of income levels and geographic areas. Informal financial markets are seen 
ubiquitous and are characterized, in most cases, by personal relationships, individual 
operators, ease of access, simple procedures, rapid transactions, and flexible loan terms and 
                                                
1 Ed Mayo and Mullineux (1998) recognise five types of development financial institutions (in the UK), 
including credit unions, community loan funds, microfinance funds, mutual guarantees societies and social 
banks. 
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amounts. The typical forms of informal sector may include (i) rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) in which members both save and borrow; (ii) individual money 
lenders and savings collectors who are pawnbrokers, professional moneylenders, commodity 
wholesalers, shopkeepers, traders, employers, and landlords; and (iii) relatives, friends and 
neighbors from whom those in need can borrow, although primarily for emergencies or 
special purposes rather than for ongoing working capital needs. 
  Interactions among financial sectors indeed occur vertically as well as horizontally at 
national or regional level. Generally, the microfinance system is seen as a network in which 
formal financial sector is incorporated (unofficially or officially) into semi and informal 
sectors (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000). The typical form is that the formal sector provides 
financial services through semi and/or informal sectors and this reduces information costs and 
risks within particular markets (Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz, 1993). Hence, in competitive 
markets, interlinked transactions may reduce risk, expand financial intermediation, and 
contribute to economic development at the local level. But the opposite may also occur in 
markets characterized by monopoly where land, credit, labor, and commodities markets 
converge in the person of the landlord-cultivator-employer-moneylender-trader.  
1.2.3 Concept of sustainable microfinance 
 Although the term “sustainability of microfinance” or “sustainable microfinance” is 
commonly used to mention about the long-term prospective of microfinance, it is understood 
differently amongst researchers. Some (e.g. Schreiner, 1996) define sustainable microfinance 
to mean a system with the ability to adapt while respecting the subsidiary goal of providing in 
a viable way financial products and services to the poor. This definition however emphasizes 
on the capacity to expand outreach to the poor and ignores the role of financial sufficiency. 
Others (e.g. Christen and Drake, 2001) on the other hand emphasize the financial aspect of 
 8 
sustainable microfinance. They see sustainability as the ability to provide financial services to 
the poor and low-income households profitably.  
 We understand that there is a close link between financial self-sufficiency and 
capacity to outreach, but a broad definition of sustainable microfinance should comprise of 
both. We propose that sustainable microfinance should be understood as the ongoing capacity 
to outreach based on the financial self-sufficiency. The capacity to outreach implies the 
number of poor households that gain access to financial sector. Financial self-sufficiency 
implies the ability to cover all administrative costs, loan losses, and financing costs from 
operating income, after adjusting for inflation and subsidies and treating all funding as if it 
had a commercial cost (CGAP, 1997; Micro Banking Bulletin, 2000).  
 However, it should be noted that a maximization of both financial and outreach goals 
is the ideal model and it seems to be difficult to attain because there is a trade-off between 
social and financial goal (Kanathigoda and Steinwand, 2003; Charitonenko and Rahman, 
2002; Gonzalez Vega 1998; Schreiner, 1996). The goal of self-financial sufficiency obviously 
affects the capacity to outreach while widening outreach (for social goal) may reduce the 
ability for a financial institution to be financially self-sufficient. As a result, a balance 
between these two goals should be recognised (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). Thus, 
within this thesis, the concept of sustainable microfinance should be understood as the 
ongoing capacity to expand outreach to a targeted market clientele on the basis of financial 
self-sufficiency (Figure 1.1). Box 1.2 summarises the common properties of a sustainable 
microfinance.  
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Figure 1.1 – Concept of sustainable microfinance 
 
Box 1.2 – Properties of a sustainable microfinance institution 
The sustainable (successful) microfinance institutions: 
 know their market, and therefore attain wide outreach to clients. 
 charge market interest rates to cover both their operational and financial costs, knowing that 
the poor are willing to pay for access and convenience. 
 use special techniques to reduce administrative costs such as simple procedures 
decentralized approvals of application 
 use special techniques to ensure high repayment rates. These include the use of self-selected 
groups in which members guarantee each other’s loans, intensive motivation and 
supervision of borrowers, incentives for borrowers, progressive lending, and compulsory 
savings requirements 
 consider supporting activities such as training and technical assistance .etc  
 
Sources: Rhyne and Otero (1994); Robinson (2001) 
 
 
                         B                      A 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  C 
                                      
Financial Self-
Sufficiency 
Maximization of 
financial self-
sufficiency or profit 
maximization. 
Maximization of outreach 
at a reasonable level of 
financial self-sufficiency 
Outreach 
The ideal model: 
maximization of 
financial self-
sufficiency and 
outreach. 
In this figure, direction A is the ideal model. Direction C aims at profit maximization 
and ignores the outreach (social goal). Direction B implies a balance between 
financial self-sufficiency and outreach (for social goal) and it is the concept of 
sustainable microfinance in this thesis. The task is to make direction B closer to 
direction A. 
 
Sources: Schreiner (1996); Charitonenko and Rahman (2002); Robinson (2001) 
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1.3 Objectives and hypothesis 
1.3.1 Objectives 
 Clearly, ensuring access of the poor and low income households to financial services 
on a sustainable basis is the prime goal in microfinance (Rhyne, 1998; Robinson, 2001; 
Gonzalez Vega, 2003). However, the literature has shown that most of microfinance 
institutions have been not sustainable (Robinson, 2001; Gonzalez Vega; 2003). The aim of our 
study therefore is to provide a deep analysis of how to attain a sustainable microfinance 
system, with an application to the case of rural Vietnam. To realize this aim, our study 
recognises the key objectives as follows: 
 Explain why the poor and low income households are generally excluded from the 
formal banking sector. 
 Explain how the innovative lending technologies such as joint-liability lending can be 
employed to enable poor and low income households gain access to formal banking 
sector.  
 Enhance the understanding that the poor and low-income households do have demand 
for various financial services, especially that they can save. 
 Analyze the advantage and disadvantage of the poverty reduction and financial system 
approach and propose an appropriate approach to microfinance. 
 Implement a comprehensive assessment of microfinance in Vietnam 
 Recognise the key factors that affect the access of poor and low income households to 
financial services in rural Vietnam 
 Analyze the impact of access to credit on household poverty reduction in rural 
Vietnam. 
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1.3.2 Hypotheses 
 The aim and objectives of our research are inspirited by the belief that microfinance 
can be sustainable and sustainability must be the key priority in the provision of financial 
services for the purpose of poverty reduction. The main hypothesis of our research therefore is 
as follows: 
 Given the right policy environment and innovative financial technologies, 
microfinance can be sustainable and sustainable microfinance can contribute better to the 
poverty reduction strategy.  
 To support this hypothesis, we make the following sub-hypotheses:  
 Innovative technologies in microfinance can reduce the asymmetric information 
problem and thus enable the formal financial sector to enhance outreach to poor and 
low income households. 
 A combination of the poverty reduction and financial system approaches to 
microfinance may be appropriate to microfinance. 
 Very poor households are more likely to be excluded from the formal financial sector. 
 Access to financial services has positive impact on household poverty reduction but 
the degree of impact is small. 
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Figure 1.2 - The structure of hypotheses and arguments 
 
Figure 1.3 represents the linkages between the sub and main hypotheses of our research. This 
also represents the structure of key arguments that will be made in the research. Specifically, 
A 1. Innovations in financial technologies (1) reduce the problem of asymmetric 
information, the costs and risks related to provision of financial services. Hence, 
innovations increase the financial self-sufficiency and the capacity to outreach 
which are the essentials of sustainability. Suppose the positive impact of access 
to financial services on poverty reduction (4), sustainability ensures the on-going 
access to financial services by the poor and hence it contributes better to poverty 
reduction. 
A 2. The mixed approach (2) aims at creating a sound financial infrastructure and 
informational intermediation for the microfinance institutions to operate and 
providing social intermediation to the poor. Hence, on one hand, it increases the 
ability of being financial self-sufficiency and the capacity to outreach which 
result in sustainability. Sustainability then contributes to poverty reduction as in 
Sustainability Poverty reduction 
(1) Innovative 
financial 
technologies 
(2) Mixed 
approach 
Financial Self-
Sufficiency 
Ongoing Outreach 
(4) Positive but 
small impact on 
poverty reduction 
(3) Exclusion of the 
very poor 
Failure of 
poverty 
reduction 
approach 
Social/Informational 
intermediation 
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argument A 1. On the other hand, social intermediation contributes directly to 
poverty reduction through development of skills, trainings and job creation .etc. 
A 3. The exclusion of the very poor implies that the poverty reduction approach has 
failed to realize its goal of targeting poor clients and thus the mixed approach 
could be more appropriate. The mixed approach then contributes to sustainability 
and poverty reduction as proposed in argument A 2. 
A 4. The positive but small impact of access to financial services implies that there 
must be a reconsideration of cost effectiveness under the poverty reduction 
approach. This is strengthened by the facts that the very poor are excluded and 
that microfinance institutions cannot attain sustainability. All of these suggest 
that the poverty reduction approach should be removed and the mixed approach 
is more appropriate. Further arguments continue as they are in argument A 3. 
1.4 Methodology 
 The goals and hypotheses of our research are realized by employing both theoretical 
and empirical analyses. The theoretical analysis consists of literature review and modelling. 
The literature reviews are the desk-based research which uses various sources of secondary 
data and information such as books, journals, working papers, reports from the library, 
internet and email discussions. The modelling analysis follows the literature reviews. It 
includes the use of mathematical tools and the comparative analysis. The literature reviews 
are used in almost chapters while the modelling analysis is used mainly in chapter 2 and 3. 
The empirical analyses consist of case studies and econometric analyses. Case studies 
are built using primary information obtained through interviews and field trips. The 
econometric analyses use secondary data that are drawn from two surveys on living standards 
in Vietnam, namely Vietnam Living Standards Surveys - VLSS 1992/1993 and VLSS 
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1997/1998. The discussion of these surveys is in Chapter 5 and 6. The computer software 
programs that we use to analyse these data include Stata, SPSS, Excel and E-views. Case 
study analyses are used mainly in chapter 4 while the econometric analyses are used in 
chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 The thesis is structured into 7 chapters including this chapter. Chapter 2 reviews and 
proposes some extensions to the relevant literature relating to banking with the poor and low 
income households. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the literature of asymmetric 
information (Alkerlof, 1970). We show that the poor are generally excluded from the financial 
sector under the effect of asymmetric information and the lack of collateral (Meyer and 
Nagarajan, 2000; Ed Mayo and Mullineux, 1998; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Binswanger and 
McIntire, 1987). However, innovative lending technologies such as join-liability lending 
(Ghatak, 1999, 2000), prior savings lending and compensating balance lending may serve as 
the solutions to asymmetric information problems and the lack of collateral.  
 Chapter 3 starts with an emphasis that the poor do have demand for financial services 
and that the increased outreach to the poor is necessary (Gibbons and Meehan, 2002; CSD, 
2000; Rutherford, 1998). We then discuss the two current approaches to the provision of 
financial services to the poor (Ronbinson, 2001), in which we concentrate on the strengths 
and weaknesses of each. We find that both approaches may not be appropriate for a 
sustainable microfinance which has been defined within this thesis. With a belief that 
microfinance can be sustainable, we propose that a mixed approach could be a good option. 
 In chapter 4, we focus on the case of rural Vietnam. We conduct a comprehensive 
assessment of microfinance in rural Vietnam, a country that follows the poverty reduction 
approach in microfinance. We find that the main constraints for a sustainable microfinance 
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include the legal and policy frameworks and the lack of innovative financial technologies in 
accordance with the best practices in microfinance. We propose that the poverty reduction 
approach should be removed, and instead, a mixed approach should be initiated. 
 Chapter 5 looks at the ways that the formal sector allocates credit to rural households. 
The main question in our analysis is that who gets credit in rural Vietnam. We find that the 
better-off rather than the poorer households are more likely to get credit. This finding suggests 
that the aim of poverty reduction that targets the very poor has failed and thus the 
reconsideration of the poverty reduction approach is necessary. Other than that, we find that 
the availability of formal credit at commune and village level is important. Hence, the 
extension of the branch network could enhance the access to formal financial services by the 
rural households. 
 Chapter 6 and 7 assess the impact of access to financial services (credit) on the 
household poverty reduction, using cross-sectional data and panel data. Findings from both 
chapters show that access to financial services indeed has positive impact on household 
poverty reduction, both short-term and long-term. Long-term impact (Chapter 7) implies that 
ongoing outreach to rural households is more important. However, the degree of impact is 
small and it raises the concern of the cost-effectiveness in providing financial services to the 
poor under poverty reduction approach. The small impact, together with the fact that most 
formal institutions cannot attain financial self-sufficiency and the necessity of ongoing 
outreach, strengthens the view that the mixed approach should be implemented. 
 The last chapter summarizes the key findings and policy conclusions made in the 
thesis. Figure 1.3 below presents the structure of the thesis. 
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Figure 1.3 – The structure of the thesis 
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CHAPTER 2 
CREDIT RATIONING AND ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR LOW INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS: A REVIEW AND EXTENSION OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The traditional but vital task for any bank is to ensure the repayment by borrowers to 
protect depositors and stakeholders again risks. There is a danger of systemic credit risk in 
which default borrowers worsen the whole banking system. Recent financial crises in 1990s 
have provided a very good illustration of how systemic credit risk may damages the whole 
banking system (Mullineux and Murinde, 2003; Mishkin, 2001; Mullineux, Dickinson, Ford, 
Fry, and Sen, 2000; Mullineux, 1998a). Therefore, banking requires significant expenses in 
gathering, processing and storing vast amounts of information on borrowers.  
Like other economic agents, the banks must learn how to use information effectively 
in order to solve three basic economics problems: what kind of loan contracts to provide, to 
whom, and at what interest rate (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Hence, banking is increasingly a 
business of information. With regard to rural areas, this business becomes more difficult since 
gaining information on rural borrowers is costly. This is due to a number of reasons, such as 
that the transactions costs are high and that rural borrowers do not have any previous 
relationship with banks so that they cannot be screened properly. 
Recent literature on banking has concentrated on asymmetric information that explains 
how credit markets work and why they are less developed in rural areas (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 2004; Yaron, 1998; Ed Mayo and Mullineux, 1998; Meyer and Nagarajan, 
1992, 2000). Asymmetric information creates adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
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which are the sources of credit risk (Mishkin, 2001). The banks attempt to reduce credit risks 
by improving their expertise in collecting and analysing information about borrowers and 
their projects. The use of loan collateral (Bester 1985, 1987) is the most common method for 
reducing credit risks. With respects to rural credit markets, due to insufficient collateral, many 
countries use a group with join liability lending technology (Ghatak, 2000) to induce 
borrowers to use their local information to screen persons selected into the groups and apply 
peer pressure to encourage delinquent members to repay. The banks may also raise interest 
rates to cover risks, but there are several limitations to this approach such as credit rationing 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or social resistance to charging higher interest rates for the poor. 
In this chapter, we review and make some extensions to the relevant theories and 
practices regarding literature of banking with the low-income households (LIHs). First, we 
look at a typical credit market with asymmetric information as a benchmark for analysis of 
credit market for the poor. We explain why, under asymmetric information, credit rationing, 
underinvestment and overinvestment problems may occur in the market. We discuss the 
theory of collateral, which explains how collateral may help to reduce the effects of 
asymmetric information. Next, we focus on the analysis of credit market for the LIHs, where 
we discuss how joint-liability lending, compulsory savings and compensating balances may 
serve well as substitutes for collateral, and therefore help to reduce the effects of asymmetric 
information in the credit market for the LIHs. Overall, we show in this chapter that due to a 
number of reasons such as asymmetric information, transaction costs and the lack of 
collateral, the poor households are traditionally limited to access to formal financial sector. 
The evolution of banking with the low income households therefore requires an intensive 
innovation in lending technology.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a review 
and extensions of literature regarding credit market and asymmetric information, which cover 
credit rationing and the use of collateral. In section 2.3, we discuss the lending technologies 
that are specifically used in lending to low income households. The final section, section 2.4, 
concludes the main findings and discussion raised in the chapter. 
2.2. Credit market with asymmetric information 
Alkerlof (1970) analyses “the market for lemons” with an implication that markets are 
imperfect in terms of information. He shows that for any transaction in the market, one side of 
a transaction has more information than his partner does. Today, this simple notion is well 
known as the theory of asymmetric information. With a specific application to a loan contract 
in credit market, the borrower knows better than the bank about either the probability of 
success of his project or whether he invests in project as committed or not, which, if known, 
affects the lending decision by the bank. Asymmetric information results in the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Mishkin, 2001) which are the main concerns for any 
bank. 
Adverse selection problem occurs since one side holds private information before the 
transaction is launched. Moral hazard occurs as one side’s action is not verifiable by his 
partner, or it receives private information (i.e. the conditions of the transaction are changed) 
after the transaction has launched. Specifically, because the bank does not know the 
probability of success of each project, it may reject safe but grant loans to risky applicants 
(adverse selection effect). Similarly, once given a loan, the borrower may alter his project 
which then alters the probability of repayment and thus alters the expected return to the bank 
(moral hazard effect). As a result, asymmetric information discourages bank to grant loans to 
all applicants or otherwise induces the bank to invest in risky projects.  
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2.2.1. Credit rationing 
The existence of asymmetric information requires extensive effort in screening and 
verifying borrowers to solve for adverse selection (Spence, 1973a, 1973b; Rothchild and 
Stiglitz, 1976) and monitoring borrowers to solve for moral hazard (Jensen and Mackling, 
1976; Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 1985). If verification and screening are costly, one may 
argue that the bank can increase interest rates to cover the estimated risk of default. This, 
however, is not easy. On one hand, it is possible that the pool of borrowers becomes riskier 
since only borrowers with risky projects (which have a high probability of default) can afford 
the increased interest rate and thus faces the bank with greater adverse selection. On the other 
hand, a higher interest rate encourages borrowers to invest in riskier projects in order to cover 
the increased cost of loan, which implies higher probability of moral hazard or an increase in 
monitoring cost. Hence, it is not always a solution for the lender to react with asymmetric 
information by raising interest rate. 
Ex ante asymmetric information, which assumes borrowers have more information 
than the banks about the projects to be financed at the time of contracting, has become a 
central assumption in the studies of credit rationing in credit markets. Extensive literature on 
ex ante credit rationing can be seen from various papers, for examples: Jaffee and Russel 
(1976), Keeton (1979), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Mankiw (1986), Callomiris and Hubbard 
(1990) and Bernanke and Gertler (1987). 
Jaffee and Russell (1976) consider a credit market where they assume two types of 
borrowers: honest borrowers, who accept loans if and only if they expect to repay, and 
dishonest borrowers, who default whenever the costs of default are sufficiently low. 
Dishonest borrowers are assumed to prefer larger loans than honest borrowers do. The bank 
knows the proportion of honest and dishonest borrowers in the market, but it cannot 
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distinguish the type of each individual borrower. Because both types of borrowers are 
indistinguishable, i.e. adverse selection, the bank limits the amount of loan granted to reduce 
the probability of default and to induce the self-selection of borrowers. Self-selection occurs 
because the incentive for dishonest borrowers to engage in a loan contract decreases when the 
amount of loan decreases.  
Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) follow the view that an increase in 
interest rate may cause expected profits to fall, and therefore induce the lender to ration credit, 
for two reasons: adverse selection and moral hazard. First, because of adverse selection, the 
bank cannot distinguish the risk type of each individual borrowers, it offers the same interest 
rate to every applicant. However, at a prevailing interest rate, the least risky borrowers are the 
marginal borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), so if the interest rate increases, marginal (but 
safest) borrowers will be dropped out of the market. In other words, an increase in interest 
rate causes an increase in the proportion of bad borrowers and reduces the average probability 
of repayment. Hence, at some certain time, the bank would be better to ration credit.  
Second, the probability of default could also rise because increased interest rate 
induces borrowers to take more risks, which the lender cannot monitor. This is moral hazard 
explanation for greater probability of default as shown by Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). Assuming that a borrower chooses a privately optimal level of risk that 
provides an appropriate return to him, this return depends on the interest rate. If the interest 
rate rises, the lender takes a greater slice of whatever return is made, but an increase in 
interest has a proportionately greater effect on the borrower’s return if he plays safe. Because 
the borrower’s previous privately optimal level of risk is now too low, he can make himself 
better off by taking default, and hence, the expected loss resulted from borrower’s default 
would impose on the lender. If this effect is sufficiently strong, the expected losses would be 
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high enough to reduce the lender’s expected return overall, despite the fact that higher interest 
rate increases the lender’s return in a non default state. Therefore, the lender would prefer to 
ration credit instead of increasing interest rate to clear the market. 
Another branch of the credit rationing literature focuses on ex post asymmetric 
information (Williamson, 1986, 1987; Diamond, 1984; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Boyd and 
Smith, 1994; Conning, 1996). In this branch, banks and borrowers are assumed to have the 
same information about the projects at the time of contracting a loan. However, once the 
returns from the projects are realized, only the borrowers can observe them. Banks therefore 
have to spend resources (i.e. monitoring) to obtain this information. Thus, information is 
asymmetric in perceiving the returns from projects. One of the important assumptions is that 
all borrowers are potentially dishonest and they will default or misreport their returns from 
projects if their expected return is increased by doing so. This is called ex-post moral hazard 
behaviour. 
The main question is then how this ex post moral hazard behaviour may affect the 
bank’s decisions. Williamson (1986, 1987) argues that monitoring decisions are made ex post 
rather than ex ante. Townsend (1979) shows that a random monitoring action is sufficient 
enough to overcome ex post moral hazard and to induce honesty. Cosci (1993) implies further 
that a perfect monitoring is costly but not necessary. Although monitoring is introduced 
differently, these models (e.g. Williamson, 1986, 1987 and 1988) consider the standard debt 
contract as an optimal arrangement and show that under ex post asymmetric information, 
credit rationing may also exist. 
Williamson (1986, 1987, and 1988) discusses about this possibility by providing some 
theoretical examples. He emphasises on the verification and monitoring costs, and thus in 
some sense refers to economies of scale, as reasons for credit rationing. He argues that the 
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bank could respond to an excess demand for credit by increasing the interest rate on its loans, 
thereby increasing its expected return in non-default cases, but an increase in its interest rate 
would also raise the probability of default and thus increase expected verification costs. The 
net effect of an increase in interest on the bank’s expected return is therefore ambiguous, and 
if the net effect is to reduce the bank’s expected return, the bank will respond to an excess 
demand for credit by rationing credit. 
According to him, since there exists economies of scale in investment projects, it 
makes little sense for a bank to give a borrower a small amount of credit, so the bank must 
either give a borrower a large amount of credit or give him no loan at all (i.e. rationing by 
restricting the number of loans). The bank could therefore find itself a situation where it faced 
identical demands for loans and choose to respond by giving loans to some but not to others. 
However, it is also the case that the pledging of entrepreneurial inside equity and collateral to 
projects encourages the lender to maximise the number of loans it makes, and therefore ration 
by restricting the size of his loans. Whichever the cases those who were denied loans would 
be credit rationed, but this credit rationing would be an equilibrium phenomenon in the sense 
that there would be no way for those who are denied credit could induce the lender to give 
them the (more) credit that was giving to others by offering higher interest rates. 
Some other authors, for example Clemenz (1986), introduce a different set of 
assumptions under which credit rationing is also possible. The objective is to show under 
what reasonable circumstances a backward-bending supply curve can exist. Clemenz (1986) 
finds two additional situations: (i) borrowers differ in skills: if borrowers are risk neutral, they 
will take a loan only if the expected return is greater than the prevailing wage for their skills 
class. As the interest rate increases, the returns from using the loan decrease. As a result, high 
ability borrowers start to leave the market voluntarily, thereby hurting the quality of the 
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lender’s portfolio. Only low ability borrowers or those with low reservation wage will stay in 
the portfolio; (ii) unobservable effort of borrowers: the probability of project success changes 
with effort. Being risk neutral, an increase in the interest rate reduces the expected marginal 
return of effort for the borrower. In order to maintain equality between marginal cost and the 
expected marginal return of effort, the borrower must decrease effort. This reduction in effort 
conspires against the interest of the bank. 
The studies on credit rationing also pay attention to the recognition of it. Baltenspeger 
(1978) and Keeton (1979) propose the distinction between price and quantity credit rationing. 
According to Baltenspeger (1978), price rationing occurs when the borrower cannot pay the 
price of the loan. Quantity rationing occurs when the borrower is rationed through non-price 
devices. This distinction is important because it helps empirical researchers to recognise 
which terms and conditions affect the price and/or the quantity rationing.  
Keeton (1979) and Swank (1996) define a clear distinction between two types of non-
price credit rationing. Rationing in amount of loans (type I) occurs when all borrowers receive 
loans but the amount of loan is lower than the amount demanded at the prevailing interest 
rate. Quantity rationing or exclusion (type II) occurs when indistinguishable borrowers are 
treated differently: some receive loans while the others do not.  
2.2.2. A model of credit rationing 
To illustrate better how credit rationing may happen in a credit market, we develop a 
simple ex ante asymmetric information model as following. We consider a credit market 
where there are two sets of agents: households (hereinafter: borrowers) and banks. Each 
borrower has an opportunity (a project) to generate income but he lacks capital. Assuming 
that each borrower has an initial wealth in kind of labour, which if not employed by his own 
project, it can be rented in the labour market. The borrower therefore has to seek fund from 
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the bank. The bank lends on a market basis (i.e. seeking profit). We assume that information 
asymmetry is persistent in this market.  
We follow the assumption made by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) which assumes that 
projects have the same expected return (µi) but different probability of success (ρi) and 
different return in case of success (µsi). The return to a project in case of failure is µfi. The 
properties of project are not affected by borrower’s behaviour. The bank is able to distinguish 
projects with different expected return, but is unable to distinguish probabilities of success of 
each project. The bank therefore offers the same contract (r,B): interest rate (r) and amount of 
loan (B) to every borrower with the same project expected return. This implies adverse 
selection problem (Mishkin, 2001). 
The return in case of success is assumed to be higher than the repayment to the bank, 
(1+r)B, while the return in case of failure is assumed to be lower. Each project is launched if 
the expected return to borrower is not lower than the opportunity cost, W, which is the initial 
wealth of the borrower. There are two ways of explaining opportunity cost: borrower exerts 
labour effort, dedication and time, which otherwise can be rented in the labour market or a 
borrower uses a tiny amount of money for setting up the project, i.e. tiny equity, which if not 
used can be deposited at a risk free rate. We then can write the functions of expected return to 
a project and to a borrower: 
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Substitute (2.1) into (2.2), after some arrangement, we obtain: 
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Differentiating (2.3) with respect to pi, we have: 
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Since return to a project in case of failure (µfi) is assumed to be lower than the 
repayment to the bank, µfi – (1+r)B < 0, (2.4) implies that the expected return to a household 
is a decreasing function of the probability of success (ρi). Hence, at a certain interest rate, the 
least risky projects (marginal projects) have the lowest break-even point and the most risky 
projects have the highest.  
Consider the marginal borrowers who satisfy zero expected return condition 
0)r,( i =ρpi  and use implicit function theorem to differentiate r with respect to ρi, we obtain: 
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Derivative (2.5) implies that an increase in interest rate charged by the bank leads to a 
decrease in the probability of success. In other words, the marginal borrowers withdraw and 
thus the pool of borrowers becomes riskier if interest rate increases. This effect is well studied 
in Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). What actually matters the bank is the number 
of potential safe applicants who would be dropped. This, however, is not discussed in those 
papers. Neyer (2001) shows that the effect depends on the degree of asymmetric information, 
level of internal finance, and number of marginal borrowers who operate at break-event point. 
Figure 2.1 - Net expected return to a borrower and probability of success 
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Figure 1 presents the effect of a change in interest rate on expected return to borrower 
and the effect of an increase in opportunity cost. The line a-b depicts function 2.3, 
representing the expected return to a borrower when probability of success varies; ρmi is the 
probability of success of marginal borrowers. Since µfi – (1+r)B < 0, an increase in interest 
rate, r, leads to a move of expected return to borrower from a-b to a-b’. The expected return 
to a marginal borrower is then lower than the opportunity cost, and thus marginal borrowers 
drop out of the market. The new marginal borrowers are now with probability of success ρm’i, 
which is lower than ρmi, implying that the pool of borrowers becomes riskier. Similarly, an 
increase in opportunity cost (i.e. similar to Clemenz (1986)) from c-d to c’-d’ will cause the 
same effect.  
  From the bank’s perspective, the bank receives full repayment (1+r)B in case of 
success and receives the return to project (µfi) in case of failure. We can write the function of 
expected return to the bank as follows:  
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Differentiating (2.5) with respect to pi, we obtain: 
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Since (1+r)B – µfi >0, derivative (2.6) implies that the expected return to the bank is 
an increasing function of probability of success. If interest rate increases, there are two effects 
on the expected return to the bank: (i) an increase in the value of component (1+r)B – µfi, 
which is an increase in interest income; and (ii) a decrease in ρi (shown in 2.5) which leads to 
lower expected return to the bank (shown in 2.6) as lower-risk borrowers drop out of the 
market.  
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Figure 2.2 - Return to the bank and credit rationing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hence, there exists a critical equilibrium interest rate (rra) where if the current interest 
rate (r) is lower than that, the bank can increase interest rate without any significant 
withdrawal of lower-risk borrowers and the expected return to the bank increases. However, if 
the interest rate increases beyond rra, lower-risk borrowers drop out of the market and the new 
(but riskier) pool of borrowers decreases the expected return to the bank. In such a case, the 
bank would prefer to ration credit at rra and there exists a problem of underinvestment.  
Figure 2a shows rra as the critical interest rate at which the expected return to the bank 
is highest. Clearly, if at rra, the supply of loans meets the demand for loans, there is no credit 
rationing and the market is at equilibrium without any concerns. If, however, there is an 
excessive demand for credit, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that it is better for the bank to 
ration credit, rather than to increase interest rate to meet the excess demand for credit. Figure 
2b depicts how credit rationing happens. However, as De Meza and Webb (1987) shows, if 
the lenders use equity instead of debt contracts, that would solve the problem of adverse 
selection in the Stiglitz and Weiss model (Ghatak, 2000, pp.605). 
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2.2.3. Overinvestment 
While the literature on credit rationing is extensive, there are some concerns about its 
assumptions. Slightly different assumptions can lead to completely different results. An 
outstanding example is presented by De Meza and Webb (1987, 1992). They show that if the 
ex ante asymmetric information in the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model concerns the mean 
rather than the variance associated with individual project returns, then adverse selection and 
credit rationing would not longer arise, while market equilibrium would exhibit over-
investment rather than under-investment. 
To illustrate this branch in the literature, we consider the assumption made by De 
Meza and Webb (1987) which assumes that projects have the same return in case of success 
(µsi) but different probability of success (ρi), and thus they have different expected return (µi). 
Other assumptions are similar to the case of credit rationing. Looking back at the condition 
(2.2) and differentiating (2.2) with respect to ρi, we obtain: 
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Derivative (2.7) shows that the expected return to a borrower pi(ρi,r) is an increasing 
function of the probability of success of project ρi . Thus, at a certain opportunity cost, the 
most risky projects (the marginal projects) have the lowest probability of success (ρmini ), as 
shown in Figure 3a. If we consider marginal households, their expected return function 
satisfies: 
i
s
iii WBrr =+−= ])1([),( minmin µρρpi       (2.8) 
From the bank’s perspective, it makes loans if its expected return exceeds its cost of 
fund, (1+s)B, i.e.: 
  BsBrr fiiii )1()1()1(),( +≥−++= µρρρκ  
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From (2.6) we know that expected return to the bank κ(ρi,r) is an increasing function 
of the probability of success of project ρi. So, there exists a critical probability of success ρ*i 
which equalises the expected return to the bank to the opportunity cost (i.e. zero profit), as 
shown in Figure 3b. Apparently, if the bank knows the risk of each project, it may choose to 
make loans only to the borrowers with probability of success no less than ρ*i. However, 
because of asymmetric information, the bank cannot distinguish projects by their individual 
risks and hence, from a pool of applicants, the bank takes the average probability of success 
(ρ*i) to make loans at correspondent interest rate r* (Alkerlof, 1970).  
Figure 2.3 - Constraint for the borrower and for the bank 
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Consequently, there exist two groups of borrowers: (i) under-the-average risk 
borrowers, from them the bank makes negative expected return; and (ii) above-the-average 
risk borrowers, from them the bank makes positive expected return. This indicates that, under 
the effect of asymmetric information, some projects are financed but they bring negative 
return to the bank, i.e. adverse selection. In the Figure 2.4, the dark area represents group (i) 
of borrowers; pi(ρi,r) represents the expected return to a borrowers; and κ(ρi,r) represents the 
expected return to the bank. Borrowers whose probability of success is not less than ρmini 
apply for loans. Borrowers whose risk ranges from ρmini to ρ*i bring negative return to the 
bank.  
The existence of under-average-risk projects is well presented in De Meza and Webb 
(1987), which mentions it as the over-investment problem. Over-investment implies the fact 
that some projects are funded but not socially optimal, as a consequence of asymmetric 
information. We can see this clearly by looking at marginal borrowers who bring negative 
expected return to the bank: 
BsBrr fiiii )1()1()1(),( min*min*min +<−++= µρρρκ    (2.10) 
From (2.8) and (2.10), after some arrangement, we obtain: 
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Inequality (2.11) shows that the expected return to marginal projects, which is shared 
between borrower and the bank, does not cover the total opportunity costs (costs to bank and 
to borrower). This implies that, from the view of society as a whole, there is overinvestment 
problem. The reason is that the expected return to marginal borrowers cannot cover the loss to 
the bank for financing marginal projects. The “overinvestment” projects exist in the market 
because they are crossly subsidized by the above-average-risk projects. 
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In their later paper, De Meza and Webb (1992) show that information asymmetries 
should not be considered as the sole source of imperfections in financial markets. They show 
that in competitive markets and under symmetric information, credit rationing (loan size 
rationing) is also possible. Another important contribution of their paper is the notion that 
credit rationing maybe entirely consistent with an efficient market allocation. It is important 
“to recognize that the mere observation of credit rationing is not sufficient to conclude that 
market failure must be present and hence government action is worth considering” (De Meza 
and Webb, 1992). Although it may be difficult to justify symmetric information in financial 
markets, the paper sheds a light about credit rationing in a complete information framework. 
2.2.4. Collateral as a sorting device 
We have shown that asymmetric information may result in both over and under 
investment in the credit market. The main assumption is that banks are unable to distinguish 
risk types of individual loan applicants. Hence, in the states of excessive demand for loans, 
credit rationing is shown as an instrument for the bank to react. In this section, we will discuss 
another instrument that a bank can use to reduce the effects of asymmetric information, which 
is collateral policy (Bester, 1985, 1987, 1994; Bernanke and Gertle, 1989, 1990; Guttentag 
and Herring, 1984; Barro, 1976; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Chan and Thakor, 1987). The 
central assumption in collateral literature is that the ability to pledge collateral is a sign of 
reliability. The assumption that borrowers who expect not to repay the loan will be the least 
likely to risk their assets by pledging them (Barro, 1976) may correct for adverse selection 
problems. Moral hazard problems can also be eliminated when a loan is collateralized 
(Guttentag and Herring, 1984).  
Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987), and Chan and Kanatas (1985) suggest that, 
in credit markets with moral hazard or adverse selection, outside collateral serves as an 
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incentive, or screening device. They argue that outside collateral increases the punishment for 
default. If there is a sufficient amount of collateral available, credit rationing as introduced by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) cannot persist. Bester (1994) suggests that, if a borrower can choose 
from a variety of risky projects, then collateral ensures that low-risk projects will be chosen. 
In the case of adverse selection, banks could offer a menu of contracts that rank loan 
applicants according to the risk of projects. In this scenario, Bester (1994) shows that safer 
borrowers reveal themselves by posting collateral, that is unattractive to high-risk borrowers. 
It’s clear to us that if borrowers could provide any amount of collateral, the bank could 
avoid any default losses by setting collateral requirements at a level high enough to ensure 
that the bank was always repaid in full, along with any incidental expenses (Bester, 1985, 
1987; Bernanke and Gertle, 1989, 1990). If so, the bank would then be guaranteed against loss 
and since it would no longer have any reason to care about default, could offer borrowers 
whatever they wanted at the going interest rate, i.e. no credit rationing. Then, why do banks 
not simply supply fully collateralize loans? 
The answer to this question obviously depends on the bank’s approach. However, it is 
important to recognise that a fully collateralised loan policy would restrict banks to a limited 
segment of the market. Even though risk is totally eliminated, the banks’ expected return 
function may not be maximized. There should be some set of contracts where some degree of 
certainty is sacrificed in order to increase expected profit. Nevertheless, more often than not, 
borrowers cannot provide perfect guarantees because their collateral is limited, and such 
collateralised loans are still risky.  
The limited amount of collateral makes collateral policy more difficult. Collateral can 
be used in one of two ways, each of which gives rise to its own distinct testable hypothesis. 
The first hypothesis is that banks design collateral requirements on the basis of their 
 34
assessment of the risk that a particular loan poses. The more risky they perceive the loan to 
be, the more collateral they will require, which yields the prediction that observably more 
risky loans should be associated with greater collateral requirements. The other hypothesis is 
that borrowers who have private information that they are safer then average, and thereby 
reveal themselves to the bank in a way that less safe borrowers would be reluctant to emulate. 
This hypothesis predicts that greater amounts of collateral should be associated with loans to 
borrowers who had private information that they were relatively safe.  
2.2.5. A model of collateral 
To illustrate how collateral may serve as a sorting device in credit market, we consider 
a simple model as follows. We assume two types of projects in the market: risk ρr and safe ρs 
where ρs > ρr. Each project requires an investment of B. Return in case of success is µss and 
µsr for safe and risk project, respectively. The return in case of failure is µf > 0 for both. The 
expected return to project is the same for every project: 
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Assuming that the bank operates on competitive basis i.e. bank makes zero profit. 
Given the loan size B, a loan contract is tailored by the loan rate r and the collateral C. We 
assume that the cost of collateralisation to a borrower and the cost of liquidation to the bank if 
the borrower defaults are η and ε percent of C.  
Borrower’s perspective 
The expected return to a borrower i (i = r,s) is: 
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If safe borrower has the same expected return as the risk borrower has, the following 
condition should be held: 
),,( Crsρpi = ),,( Crrρpi        (2.14) 
Rearrange (2.14) and note that µs = µr (2.12), we obtain: 
0])1)[(( =−−+− CBr frs µρρ       (2.15) 
Since ρs > ρr, (2.15) implies that the necessary condition for a safe borrower having 
the same expected return as compared to a risk borrower is:  
fBrCC µ−+== )1(*        (2.16) 
We now consider borrowers having the same expected return (for simplicity, we 
assume zero profit) which satisfy: 
),,( Criρpi  = 0        (2.17)  
Rearrange (2.17) to yield the function of interest rate: 
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 Consider a borrower i, the interest rate function (2.18) indicates the indifference 
function, which represents combinations of interest rate and collateral that give the same 
expected return to the borrower:  
If C = 0, note that µs = µr we yield rr – rs = (ρs - ρr)(µ – µf ). Since ρs > ρr and µ > µf, 
so r(ρr,C) > r(ρs,C). 
If C > 0, differentiating (2.18) with respect to C, we obtain:  
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Figure 2.5 – The indifferent return lines 
 
Derivative (2.19) implies that interest rate r is a decreasing function of collateral C. In 
other words, there must be a trade off between collateral and interest rate for a borrower to 
keep the expected return indifferent. Moreover, because ρr < ρs, from (2.19) we can observe 
that the indifference line of a risk borrower is steeper than of a safe borrower. Hence, for a 
certain decrease in interest rate, risk borrower tolerates a smaller increase in collateral than 
safe borrower does. In figure 5a, AC and BC represent the indifference lines of a risk and safe 
borrower, respectively. If interest rate decreases by ∂r, a safe borrower accepts an increase of 
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Bank’s perspective 
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),,( Criρκ = CBr ifii )1)(1()1()1( ερµρρ −−+−++  where i = r, s (2.20) 
The condition for the bank to get the same expected return from lending to a safe and 
risk borrower is: 
0])1()1)[(( =−−−+− CBr frs εµρρ      (2.21) 
Since ρs > ρr, we can arrange for:  
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We now consider the case where bank gets the same expected return (for simplicity, 
we assume zero profit) from lending to safe and risk borrower, i.e. the expected return to the 
bank satisfies: 
),,( Criρκ = 0         (2.23) 
We then arrange to yield the function of interest rate as follows: 
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Note that the interest rate function (2.24) represents the indifference function of the 
bank. 
If C = 0, 
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µµρ −+−= 1),( . Since ρs > ρr so that r(ρr,C) > r (ρs,C). 
If C > 0, differentiating (2.24) with respect to C we obtain: 
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Derivative (2.25) implies that interest rate r is a decreasing function of collateral C. 
Since ρr < ρs, we can prove that the indifference line if bank lends to a risk project is steeper 
than that if to a safe project (Figure 5b). This implies that for a given interest rate, the bank 
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typically requires more collateral from a risk borrower than from a safe household. 
Alternatively, for a given amount of collateral, the bank charges higher interest rate to risk 
household than to safe household.  
The significance of the different preference in the collateral requirement is based on 
the fact that borrowers know their probability of success and decide whether or not they 
should bet their collateral for the benefit of interest rate reduction. Obviously, the difference 
in preference reveals the opportunity that if the bank can design a menu of contracts which 
meet individual preferences of borrowers, banks can classify the risk of borrowers. 
Equilibrium 
From (2.19) and (2.22), we obtain the following inequality: 
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η + (1 - ρi)ε > 0        (2.26) 
Since η and ε > 0, the inequality (2.26) holds. Hence, the indifference line of borrower 
i (i= r,s) is steeper than of the bank if it lends to the borrower i (i=r,s). This implies that for a 
given risk type i, the indifference line of a borrower and of the bank satisfy the “crossing-
property”. Since we have different types of risk (s and r), there is an incentive for the bank to 
tailor its loan contracts to attract different type of borrowers.  
This model is related to those of Bester (1985, 1987). The main finding is that 
collateral tailored contracts may serve as a self-selection mechanism. The key assumption for 
self-selection to work is that risky borrowers do not want to risk their collateral and therefore 
prefer a contract of high interest rate and low collateral, while safe borrowers are willing to 
bet their collateral because they have high probability of success and therefore they choose a 
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contract of low interest rate and high collateral. Moreover, because of the cost of liquidation 
and collateralisation, the banks and borrowers are assumed to prefer less collateral. 
Figure 2.6 - Collateral acts as self-selection mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The use of collateral can be depicted in Figure 2.6. The suitable contracts must be at 
the crossing points, for examples: P1, P2, because they simultaneously meet the borrower’s 
and bank’s maximized utility. If the pair of contracts (P1, P2) is offered, both types of risk 
prefer contract P1 because it has lower interest rate and lower collateral, as compared to 
contract P1. Collateral therefore does not act as a device for risk screening. However, if the 
bank offers the pair of contracts (P2, P3), safe borrowers prefer contract P1 while risk 
borrowers prefer contract P3. The reason is that risk borrowers are indifferent in expected 
return if they choose contract P3 (compared to if they choose P2) but they prefer P3 because 
of lower collateral. Hence, the collateral can work as a device for self-selection. It is noted 
here that there is a wide range of pairs of contracts that the bank may offer. However, if we 
assume that the risky borrowers prefer the lowest collateral contract and that the costs of 
collateralisation and liquidation are high, the pair (P1, P3) is the best choice for the bank to 
offer. 
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 Bester (1985, 1987) shows further that in cases of sufficient collateral, credit rationing 
in kind of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) does not exist at equilibrium. This, however, is a binding 
constraint because not all borrowers can meet the collateral requirement, and if so, some 
credit rationing may still remain in the market (Chan and Thakor, 1987). It is also possible 
that borrowers with more assets to offer may be riskier borrowers. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
and Wette (1983) explain that raising collateral requirements may worsen adverse selection 
effects. If collateral requirements are increased, only wealthy people would be able to get a 
loan. But wealthy borrowers may be those who in the past have succeeded at risky endeavours 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As some of them may have succeeded just by chance, the group 
might be less risk adverse. Even in a world with diverse collateral requirements, credit 
rationing may still be an optimal bank’s response. 
In another paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (1986) develop a model where moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems and the role of collateral were jointly analyzed. They explain that 
equilibrium can take the form of pooling or separating contracts. In a pooling equilibrium, 
credit rationing may persist (even in the presence of collateral) because increasing the interest 
rate may have negative incentive effects and increasing collateral requirements may have 
negative adverse selection effects. In the separating equilibrium case credit, rationing may 
still occur for each one of the different contracts. 
In conclusion, collateral requirements improve the bank’s degrees of freedom. Better 
contracts can now be designed to differentiate among borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1987b). 
However, “as long as the dimensionality of the space of borrower characteristics is larger than 
the dimensionality of the space of contracts, it seems unlikely that perfect information can be 
obtained.” (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990: pp.867) 
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2.3. Lending to low-income households 
For many reasons, credit markets for the low income borrowers are special. Yaron, 
McDonald and Piprek (1997) and Yaron, McDonald and Charitonenko (1998) summarise the 
most common characteristics of a credit market for the LIHs. These characteristics are 
associated with high transaction costs and high credit risks. First, most low income clients 
(both households and small entrepreneurs) experience great difficulty in accessing the formal 
financial sector due to poor physical and financial infrastructure. The client dispersion in rural 
areas and typically small loan amounts lead to relatively high financial transaction costs both 
for banks and borrowers, and increase the perception of high risks, which banks usually 
associate with small clients. Moreover, most of the low-income clients do not have any 
previous relationship (such as savings or payment services) with banks so that they cannot be 
screened properly. As a result, asymmetric information problems are often seen greater for 
small clients and firms (Ed Mayo and Mullineux, 1998, pp. 8-9), and thus induce the banks to 
ration credit.  
Due to these factors, the costs of reaching micro clients and small entrepreneurs are 
high for financial institutions, which charge high interest rates when compared to market rates 
in the formal banking sector. A discussion and summary of the above reasons is well 
presented in Ed Mayo and Mullineux (1998). More than recognizing the difficulties, they 
argue that relatively high fixed transaction costs induce the banks prefer to make larger loans, 
“unless small borrowers are likely to take up other financial products as well” (page 8). This 
in some senses suggests that a combination of financial services to the small borrowers could 
be visible. 
Second, a conventional bank practice that protects the lender against possible 
borrower default is the requirement of loan collateral such as real estate. Banks use loan 
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collateral in order to screen potential clients (as a substitute for lack of customer information) 
and to enforce and foreclose loan contracts in the event of loan default (e.g. Bester, 1985, 
1987; Bernanke and Gertle, 1989, 1990). The preferred form of conventional bank collateral 
is mortgage on real property, which, however, requires clear land titles and mortgage 
registration. However, most of low income households do not own assets that qualify as 
collateral (such as land titles). Hence, without secure loan collateral, it is expected that there 
will be a contraction in the supply of bank credit and this will result in reduced access of 
small and rural clients to finance (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987).  
Another characteristic is the heterogeneous demand for credit. Most microfinance 
clients are from the rural areas with farm businesses. It is clear that different farmers have 
different investment needs, and may apply for seasonal and/or investment loans to meet 
specific financing requirements. Furthermore, the time of demand may be different among 
different types of businesses and therefore the clients may require a specific repayment 
schedule in accordance with their income flows. Closely associated with the difference in 
demand is the expected risk-return basis, which however is not of financial term. Factors such 
as weather and diseases, which cannot be forecasted exactly may affect the expected revenue 
flows and therefore affect the repayment. It should be noted that the same factors might have 
different effect on different types of businesses. 
For these reasons, the search and verification costs in micro lending are relatively 
high. As a result, credit markets for the LIHs are characterised as under-developed 
complementary markets, being seen by not many institutions operating and services available 
in the markets. Also, providing credit and other financial services to LIHs is expensive, 
especially in relation to the size of the transactions involved. That is why many governments 
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have been trying to facilitate the process of providing micro financial services to micro 
borrowers, even in developed financial markets like US with Federal Farm Credit System.  
Given the asymmetric information associated with credit markets, several forms of 
government intervention have been suggested (Robinson, 2001; Gonzalez Vega, 2003), 
including the operation of public development banks, to correct for such instances of market 
failure. Intervention is not, however, an appropriate solution, even in the presence of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, because the government faces very much the same information, 
agency and incentive problems as private lenders do. As a result, banking with the low 
income households relies on innovative lending technologies to gain information on and 
enhance access to potential borrowers. These technologies may include the tailored loan 
contracts (such as joint-liability, compulsory savings) or lending through partnership with 
social and informational intermediaries (such as credit rating agencies).  
2.3.1. Joint-liability lending 
Surveys of literature on micro-lending technologies (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; 
Morduch, 1999) indicate that many of studies have focused on how these lending 
technologies may be used to reduce the effect of informational problems. One of the 
innovative lending technologies that attracted attention from economists is “group lending” or 
“joint liability” lending. It is believed that joint liability lending can improve efficiency 
compared to standard debt contracts in the presence of asymmetric information. A well-
known example of this type is the Grameen Bank’s group lending program.  
The study of group lending actually began with papers by Stiglitz (1990) and Varian 
(1990) that detailed how peer monitoring solves the moral hazard problem for groups without 
collateral. These papers follow the credit rationing paper by Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), 
describing how the lenders could induce the borrowers to take on the safe projects, structuring 
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incentives to guard the lenders against default. Several recent studies have taken off from this 
starting point, trying to explain how peer screening, peer-monitoring and peer-pressure among 
group members may help to reduce the problems of asymmetric information (Besley and 
Coate, 1995; Ghatak, 1999, 2000; Eric Van Tassel, 1999; Aghion and Gollier, 2000). Some 
other tried to identify the best form of joint liability and the optimal number of group 
members to maximize the repayment incentives (Impavido, 1998). 
Stiglitz (1990), Besley and Coate (1995), Mosley (1996), Morduch (1999) show that 
the access to further and higher loans crucially dependent on the repayment of all borrowers 
in the group creates incentive for peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure among 
borrowers. The main idea here is that because the group members want to keep the probability 
of default of the whole group as low as possible, they therefore not only keep their own 
probability of default low but also the probability of their peers by monitoring the other group 
members to ensure that the projects are carried out in the most profitable way as agreed on 
before the loan disbursement. Also, it is expected that group members will support each other 
with financial means, with information and with other means in the case one or more group 
members face the problem of repayment. As a result, the moral hazard problem is reduced as 
much as possible for the lender in the sense that it is transferred from the lender to the 
borrowing group. 
Two recent papers on group lending with joint-liability are by Ghatak (2000) and 
Aghion and Gollier (2000). Ghatak (2000) demonstrates that group lending may lead to peer-
selection, which alleviates problems of adverse selection. The key to this result is that joint 
liability contracts induce group members to self-select each other, which gives banks the 
possibility to use the joint liability instrument as a screening device. It can then be shown that 
in the presence of asymmetric information, a joint liability contract may help the safe 
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borrowers - who otherwise might be excluded by individual contracts - gain access to loans. 
Aghion and Gollier (2000) show that joint liability lending reduces the interest rate and 
eliminates the credit rationing in the credit market through the “collateral effect” of joint 
liability. They also propose that peer group system can be viewed as an effective risk pooling 
mechanism.  
Others, such as Bond and Raj (2002), study the use of collateral substitutes in 
microfinance markets and find that social sanctions and credit denial, which are generally 
seen as incentive effect in group lending, can serve the role of collateral. This, together with 
previous findings (Ghatak, 2000; Aghion and Gollier, 2000), ensures us to think that group 
lending may produce a “collateral effect” in either the form of joint liability or the social 
sanctions and credit denial. Besides, it is worth to recognise that lending to a group is a good 
way to minimize transaction costs, compared to individual lending. 
Even though, there are some concerns around group lending with joint liability. The 
main concern of the group with joint liability lending arises from the fact that the whole group 
will be excluded from further access to credit or credit denial if they are not able to repay the 
previous loans of their members. At the worst, the domino effect may occur when one 
member defaults and other group members are not able or not willing to repay for him. Besley 
and Coate (1995) argue that, in such a case, it is the deliberate strategy for all group members 
to deny repaying the loans because the whole group will be excluded regardless their 
individual ability of repaying the loans. This outcome is definitely a disadvantage of group 
lending as compared with the individual lending, because all other group members in fact can 
repay the loans. Some other studies concern the size of group and the possibility of free riding 
within a group (e.g. MkNelly and Kevane, 2002) and matching problem when the demand for 
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credit and the repayment schedule do not suit all group members (e.g. Paxton, Graham and 
Thraen, 2000). 
2.3.2. A model of joint-liability lending 
To better understand how the group lending may work, we develop a simple model. 
We however do not consider group lending as a static model but in a context of competition 
where both individual and group lending are available to borrowers. We analyse the 
conditions for the bank and the borrower to decide to get involved in group lending. This is 
essential because the borrowers have the right to choose a source to borrow, such as from a 
money lender with individual lending or from a bank with group lending. 
We consider a joint liability contract (rG, C). C is the joint liability, which implies the 
amount of money that one borrower has to pay the bank if his partner fails. We again employ 
the assumption made in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that the probability of success of each 
project is ρi and different amongst borrowers, but the expected return to project is the same 
for every project. The expected return to a borrower i if he forms a group with a borrower j is 
as follows: 
 piG(ρi,rG,C)  = ρiρj[µsi – (1 + rG)B] + ρi(1 - ρj)[ µsi – (1 + rG)B - Ci]      
    = ρi[µsi – (1 + rG)B] - ρi(1 - ρj)Ci    (2.27) 
Ci   = min [(1+rG)B, µsi – (1 + rG)B]    (2.28) 
 Equation (2.27) indicates that the expected return to borrower i comprises of two 
components: his own return in case of success and his joint liability if his partner fails. 
Condition (2.28) implies that the amount of joint-liability C cannot exceed the full amount of 
his partner liability (1+rG)B. This condition is not specified in Ghatak (2000) which, 
according to Gangopadhyay, Ghatak and Lensink (2005), may raise a problem that if the joint 
liability exceeds the personal liability and if there is one failed and one succeeded, the latter 
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may prefer to announce both succeeded and repay for both than to paying for himself and the 
joint liability for his partner.  
Since borrower i knows his probability of success ρi, the probability of success of his 
partner ρj affects his return: the higher the probability of success of his partner, the higher the 
expected return to him. This implies that any borrower prefers to form a group with safer 
partners. Moreover, because it is more likely for a safe borrower to form a group with a risky 
borrower, he may prefer an individual loan to a joint-liability loan and hence there must be an 
incentive for him to choose a joint-liability contract. The fact that safe borrowers are more 
likely to form a group with risky borrowers is simple. If we rank borrowers by their risks i.e. 
the probabilities of success (ρi), the probability for the lowest risk (or safest) borrower to form 
a group with higher risk borrowers is equal to 1 because all other borrowers are riskier.  
The borrowers’ choice 
Assuming that all borrowers are risk neutral, borrower’s preference of contract type 
depends on his comparison of expected return. For a borrower i, the difference in expected 
return between joint-liability and individual borrowing is as follows: 
 Dpi  = piG(ρi,rG,C)- piI(ρi,rI)  
  = ρiB(rI - rG) - ρi(1 - ρj)Ci       (2.29) 
If iI = iG then Dpi = - ρi(1 - ρj)Ci < 0.  This implies that if borrower i joins a group and 
if there is no difference in the lending rates between two types of contract, his expected return 
decreases by an amount of joint liability - ρi(1 - ρj)C. Hence, if the bank offers a menu of joint 
liability and individual loan, there must be some benefit for borrowers to choose the joint 
liability loan such as a reduction in interest rate to compensate for the joint liability. The 
necessary condition for a borrower to be indifferent in choosing a joint-liability or individual 
lending is:  
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ρiB(rI - rG) = ρi(1 - ρj)Ci,        (2.30) 
Since the right hand side is greater than zero, the left hand side must be greater than 
zero as well, which implies that the joint-liability lending rate must be lower than the 
individual lending rate. Therefore, we believe that group based lending may not be more 
attractive from the point of view of borrower than applying for a loan on an individual basis 
unless it leads to interest rate reduction. 
The bank’s choice 
Consider the expected return to the bank if it makes a joint-liability loan to a group of 
two borrowers i and j: 
κG(ρi,rG) = ρiρj2(1 + rG)B + ρi(1 - ρj)[(1+rG)B +Ci] + ρj(1 - ρi)[(1+rG)B + Cj] 
= (ρi+ρj)(1 + rG)B + ρi(1 - ρj)Ci + ρj(1 - ρi)Cj  (2.31) 
 If the bank makes two individual loans to these two borrowers, the expected return to 
the bank is: 
κI(ρi,rI)  = 2ρiρj(1+rI)B + ρi(1-ρj)(1+rI)B+ρj(1-ρi)(1+rI)B 
= (ρi+ρj)(1+rI)B      (2.32) 
Thus, the difference in expected return to the bank between two types of lending is: 
Dκ   = κG(ρi,rG) – κI(ρi,rI)  
= (ρi+ρj)B(rG –rI) + [ρi(1 - ρj)Ci+ ρj(1 - ρi)Cj]  (2.33) 
We can see that if rI = rG then Dκ = [ρi(1 - ρj)Ci+ ρj(1 - ρi)Cj]>0, implying that the 
expected return to the bank is higher if it offers a joint-liability loan to two borrowers. The 
underlying idea behind this is that, by offering a joint liability contract, the bank has induced 
borrowers to provide an amount of his return as collateral for his partner. However, the case 
where rI = rG is not realistic. 
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Because the bank has the right to design a menu of contracts, it may offer either joint-
liability contracts only or individual contracts only or both liability and individual contracts. If 
the bank offers only one type of contracts, there is an opportunity for a new entrant such as a 
money lender to enter the market and offer the other type of contracts. As a result, the 
competition between lenders is a necessary condition for the existence of two types of 
contracts in the market. The sufficient condition must be the choice of borrower. The 
competition between lenders leads to the following condition: 
κG(ρi,rG,C)  - κI(ρi,rI)   = 0, which is then arranged for: 
(ρi+ρj)B(rI –rG)   = ρi(1 - ρj)Ci+ ρj(1 - ρi)Cj   (2.34) 
The right hand side is greater than 0 so that rI > rG.  
Equilibrium 
Assuming that we can find a pair of interest rate (rI*, rG*) subject to rI* > rG* which 
satisfies the conditions (2.30) and (2.34), two types of contracts will co-exist in the market. 
This result implies that if there are no constraints on the entry to the market and/or on the type 
of contracts offered, the group lending with joint liability induces lower interest rate, 
compared to individual loan contract. This indicates that joint liability lending can serve as a 
device to reduce interest rates in the microcredit market. This result is similar to findings in 
De Aghion and Gollier (2000), Krahnen and Schmidt (1994) and Madajewicz (1999).  
However, the benefit gained from a reduction in interest rate is offset by an increase in 
the cost of joint-liability and therefore the effective cost to a borrower is unchanged. 
Obviously, whether or not a reduction in interest rate benefits borrowers depends on the 
quality of group: if all group members succeed, they all benefit. The result also suggests that 
if the individual loan lending method is too costly for both borrowers and lenders, joint 
liability lending is the better option. This explains why in microfinance, where is 
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characterised by high costs and insufficient collateral, group lending with joint-liability is 
popular.  
How do borrowers select partners? 
Another branch in literature on group lending focuses on how groups are formed 
(Ghatak, 2000; Aghiona and Gollier, 2000; Sadoulet, 1999; Morduch, 1999, and Eric Van 
Tassel; 1999). The assumption of homogeneous matching has become the key point in 
explaining the advantages of group lending in recent papers (e.g. Ghatak, 2000). However, 
others (for example, De Aghion and Gollier, 2000) argue that homogenous matching is not 
necessary in order for peer group lending to be welfare improving. They show that under an 
economy where borrowers are imperfectly informed about each others’ types and ex post 
auditing by banks is costly, a random matching can be incentive compatible for all types of 
borrowers, even though group lending implies that safe borrowers will cross subsidise their 
risky peers with positive probability.  
We now continue by reviewing a simple model by Ghatak (2000) which shows that if 
there is no intervention in the group formation process i.e. self-selection, groups are formed 
homogeneously. His idea follows the comparison between the gain and loss for a borrower to 
form a group with safe or risk partner. From (2.32), we specify four possibilities of matching, 
as follows: 
Safe borrower to have a risk partner: 
pisr(ρs,r,C)  = ρs[µss – (1 + r)B] - ρs(1 - ρr)C      (2.35) 
Risk borrower to have a safe partner 
pirs(ρr,r,C)  = ρr[µsr – (1 + r)B] - ρr(1 - ρs)C      (2.36) 
Safe borrower to have a safe partner 
piss(ρs,r,C)  = ρs[µss – (1 + r)B] - ρs(1 - ρs)C      (2.37) 
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Risk borrower to have a risk partner 
pirr(ρr,r,C)  = ρr[µsr – (1 + r)B] - ρr(1 - ρr)C      (2.38) 
If a risky borrower forms a group with a safe partner (2.36), his expected return is 
higher than the expected return if he forms a group with a risky partner (2.38). Hence, the 
gain for a risky borrower to have a safer partner is:  
pirs(ρr,r,C) - pirr(ρr,r,C) = ρr(ρs - ρr)C      (2.39) 
Similarly, if a safe borrower forms a group with a risk partner (2.35) his expected 
return is lower than the expected return if he forms a group with safe partner (2.37). The 
expected loss for a safe borrower to have a risky partner is: 
piss(ρs,r,C) - pisr(ρs,r,C) = ρs(ρs - ρr)C      (2.40)  
From (2.39) and (2.40) we see that: because ρr < ρs, so that ρs(ρs - ρr)C < ρr(ρs - ρr)C. 
This means the expected loss for a safe borrower having a risky partner is greater than the 
expected gain for a risky borrower having a safe partner. Thus, there cannot be a case where 
the risky borrower compensates safe borrower to form a group. The group matching is 
therefore homogeneous (Ghatak, 2000).  
Ghatak (2000) also points out that homogeneous matching may increase the aggregate 
return to the borrowers as a whole. Because pirs(ρr,r,C) - pirr(ρr,r,C) < piss(ρs,r,C) - pisr(ρs,r,C), 
so we obtain: 
pirs(ρr,r,C) + pisr(ρs,r,C) < piss(ρs,r,C) + pirr(ρr,r,C)    (2.41) 
The left hand side indicates the aggregate return in case of heterogeneous matching 
and the right hand side in case homogeneous matching.  
Ghatak (1999, 2000), Morduch (1999), and Eric Van Tassel (1999) are some of 
valuable papers in this literature. They show that the incentives derived from joint liability, 
accompanied by various additional incentives of the lending mechanism such as access to 
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further loans or dynamic incentives, induce that similar risk types are grouped 
homogeneously, if and when the borrowers have sufficient information about each other. 
According to Ghatak (2000), the main reason why homogeneous matching occurs is that the 
benefit of having a safe partner is positive to all group members but the expected loss of a 
safe borrower because of having a risky partner is higher than the expected gain of the risky 
borrower. This implies that risky borrowers cannot compensate for the safe borrowers to be 
accepted in the group, and hence the group are formed homogeneously.  
Some empirical works (e.g. Vigenina and Kritikos, 2002; Wenner, 1995; Paxton, 
1996) have provided some supports to this literature. For example, Vigenina and Kritikos 
(2002) test the hypothesis of homogeneous matching and the relationship between joint 
liability properties and the high rate of repayment with data from Georgia. They find that after 
an intensive self-selection process, the better risk borrowers indeed form groups with better 
risk borrowers and vice versa by making use of local information. The information on 
individual creditworthiness used in the traditional, document-based, credit evaluation 
processes cannot help the lender identify risk types. They also find that because of borrowers’ 
self selection and effective screening efforts of the loan officers, applicants with the worst risk 
characteristics did not apply for this loan type. Virtually, all borrower groups succeeded in 
repaying their loans, also supporting the hypothesis of an efficient self-selection given by the 
incentives of the lending methodology. 
However, it is noted that homogeneous matching property in Ghatak (2000) is true 
only in cases where there is only one contract is offered and in a one-period lending model. 
We believe that if the bank offers a menu of joint-liability contracts and if the risk borrower 
may enjoy lower interest rates gained from forming a group with safe borrowers, there should 
be the case for the risk borrower to compensate the safe borrower to form a group with him. 
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Also, if we consider repeated periods of borrowing and that the safe borrowers want to access 
further loans while the risky borrowers can enjoy the lower interest rates, there is also a case 
for the risky borrowers to compensate the safe borrowers. This is because if the risk 
borrowers can form a group with safe borrowers, their expected return increases. Hence, they 
are willing to pay for the safe borrowers to keep the groups (Sadoutlet, 1999; Sadoulet and 
Carpenter, 2001). 
Sadoulet (1999) presents a model of repeated lending which results in a heterogeneous 
group matching. The key assumption in Sadoulet’s model is that borrowers seek insurance 
arrangement for further access to loans. As a result, where insurance markets are absent, 
borrowers have to seek for those arrangements with their groups. This assumption is 
reasonable because even in cases of homogeneous matching, some failures may still exist and 
thus the whole groups will be excluded. Hence, it can be a wiser way if insurance 
arrangement is made to ensure the group repayment, whatever the outcome is.  
Specifically, Sadoulet proposes that there should be a payment transfer between group 
members in a way that risky borrower compensates his safe partner in cases of success to 
cover for his failures when needed. Sadoulet argues that this insurance arrangement is an 
important part of the group formation process. Consequently, he finds that safe borrowers 
may form groups with riskier partners while riskier borrowers may form groups with either 
safe borrowers or with similar risk types. It, however, should be noted that Sadoulet comes up 
with this result since in his model the incentive for borrowers to seek partners is the access to 
further loans, rather than reduced interest rates as in Ghatak (2000). 
While the support for homogeneous matching seems not to be strong, some empirical 
research has shown that groups are formed heterogeneously. For examples, Sadoulet and 
Carpenter (2001) investigate credit groups in Guatemala show that credit groups are formed 
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heterogeneously. Lensink and Mehrteab (2002) follow the methodology suggested by 
Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) and test the matching hypothesis by employing the data from 
two micro credit programs in Eritrea. They found that the groups are formed heterogeneously.  
Joint-liability contract as a sorting device 
Although the nature of group matching is ambiguous, we may still see the advantage 
of group lending as a sorting device. We assume that we observe a pool of homogenous 
groups of loan applicants. If risk borrowers have compensated for safe borrowers to form 
groups with them, the groups are then deemed to be homogeneous as well. Now if we 
consider each group as a single loan applicant, we may see that the bank again faces the 
asymmetric information problems since it cannot distinguish safe and risk groups of 
borrowers.  
However, if the bank offers a menu of joint-liability contracts (r,C), in which each 
contract specifies a fixed amount of joint-liability C and an interest rate r, it may distinguish 
the risk types of groups: safe groups prefer a high joint-liability and low interest rates while 
risk groups prefer the opposite. This effect of joint-liability on borrower’s preference is very 
similar to the basic case of collateral that we have discussed in section 2.3. Moreover, Ghatak 
(2000) shows that as the expected borrowing cost for risk types is higher than safe types 
because their partners are more likely to fail, it is expected that there are only safe types 
applying for loans with joint liability if the joint liability is sufficiently high so that the 
expected return is negative for risky borrowers. Therefore the adverse selection can be solved 
not only at the borrower level but also the group level. 
The assumption that one borrower should pay a limited amount of joint liability as 
above is more reasonable in reality. However, this fixed joint liability should not exceed the 
individual liability (condition 2.28). If the joint liability is unlimited, the successful borrower 
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is expected to pay all the repayment for himself and for his failed partner in order to get 
access to further loans. However, if the successful borrower has a return just enough to pay 
for himself but not for his partner, it may be deliberate for him to report failed as well. If this 
happens, group lending may cause a domino effect and cannot serve as a screening device.  
2.3.3. Compulsory savings 
Although not well-known as the group lending with joint liability, it is well shown that 
compulsory savings prior to loan disbursement is an essential tool to enforce micro lending. 
This lending technology is quite popular in many countries such as Vietnam (for examples, 
People Credit Fund and Pilot Credit Programs run by NGOs). On one side, compulsory 
savings help poor borrowers manage and smooth their cash flows better. On the other hand, it 
implicitly assumes a transfer of wealth from the borrowers to the bank which creates a 
collateral substitute effect and thus reduces the problem of asymmetric information. 
  To illustrate how this mechanism may work, we consider a market where a bank 
offers two types of contract: individual loan contracts (rI,B) without prior savings and 
compulsory savings loan contracts (rS,B). We assume there is a thread of competition from 
other lenders, such as a Rotating Credit and Savings Association (ROSCA), so that the 
expected returns to the bank gained from offering two different types of contract should be 
equal. Borrowers have the choice of choosing a compulsory saving loan or an individual loan, 
depending on their expected returns. For compulsory saving contracts, each borrower is 
required to save an amount of S before receiving a loan from the bank. The borrower earns an 
interest τS on his savings if he repays the loan and looses his saving plus interest if he fails.  
Borrower’s choice 
The expected return to a borrower i if he chooses a compulsory saving loan contract is: 
pi(ρi,rs,S)  = ρi[µsi – (1 + rs)B + τS] - (1 - ρi)(1+τ)S    (2.42) 
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If he chooses individual loan contract, his expected return comprises of his expected 
return from project and his expected return from his savings S. Hence, the difference in 
expected return Dpi gained from two different types of contract is: 
Dpi   = pi(ρi,rs,S) -  pi(ρi,rI)   
 = ρi[µsi – (1 + rs)B + τS] - (1 - ρi)(1+τ)S – [ρi[µsi – (1 + rI)B+τS] 
= ρi (rI - rs)B – (1-ρi)(1+2τ)S      (2.43) 
The necessary condition for a borrower to be indifferent between two types of 
contracts is: 
ρi (rI - rs)B = (1-ρi)(1+2τ)S       (2.44) 
The right hand side is greater than zero, which implies that rI > rS for the condition to 
be held. In other words, compulsory saving lending technology must charge a lower interest 
rate, compared to standard individual lending, for a borrower to be indifferent between them.   
Bank’s choice 
The bank may offer a menu of contracts (compulsory saving loan and standard loan), 
which maximises its profit. The expected return to the bank if it makes a compulsory loan 
contract is: 
κ(ρi,rS,S) = ρi(1 + rS)B + (1 - ρi)(1+τ)S     (2.45) 
 The difference in expected return Dκ between the two types of contracts therefore is: 
Dκ   = κ(ρi,rS,S) - κ(ρi,rI)   
= ρiB(rS – rI) + (1 - ρi)(1+τ)S      (2.46) 
In a competitive market, if the bank offers only one type of contract of its interest, 
there is an opportunity for the new entrants to offer the other type of contract which offers 
some incentives (such as a reduction in interest rate) to capture borrowers. As the result, the 
difference in expected return between the two types of contracts should be zero: 
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  ρiB(rS – rI) + (1 - ρi)(1+τ)S = 0      (2.47) 
Equation (2.47) implies that rS < rI. Specifically, in a competitive market, the 
compulsory saving lending technology charges lower interest rate, compared to the individual 
loan contract.  
Equilibrium 
Conditions (2.44) and (2.27) are necessary for two types of contracts to 
simultaneously exist in the market. We assume further that there exists a pair of interest rates 
(rI*, rS*) which satisfies these conditions for the equilibrium in the market to be attained. Then, 
we can see that rI*> rS*. In other words, individual lending with compulsory saving charges 
lower interest rate, compared to a standard individual lending.  
Compulsory saving as a sorting device 
Another advantage of compulsory saving lending is that it may act as a sorting device 
in the presence of asymmetric information. We will show that the bank may tailor a menu of 
compulsory saving loan contracts to distinguish borrowers who choose this type of contract. 
From (2.42), differentiating r with respect to S, we obtain the indifference return function of 
borrower: 
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Assuming that τ < 1, derivative (2.48) < 0. This implies that interest rate is a 
decreasing function of compulsory saving. We also observe that since ρs>ρr, then ∂r(ρs)/∂S > 
∂r(ρr)/∂S, which implies that the risk borrowers have steeper indifference line.  
From (2.45), differentiating r with respect to S, we get the indifference return function 
of bank: 
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Derivative (2.49) indicates that interest rate is a decreasing function of compulsory 
savings. Moreover, if ρs > ρr, then ∂r(ρs)/∂S > ∂r(ρr)/∂S implying that indifference return line 
is steeper if the bank makes loans to riskier borrowers. 
From (2.48) and (2.49), we see that for a specific type of risk, the indifference line of 
bank is steeper than that of borrower. This satisfies the crossing property and thus we come 
back to the basic case in section 2.2.5, which indicates that compulsory savings may serve as 
collateral effect. The bank therefore can design a menu of contracts to attract different types 
of borrowers. Safe borrowers prefer a contract with higher compulsory saving and low 
interest rate while risk borrowers prefer low compulsory saving and high interest rate.  
In many countries, such as Vietnam, compulsory savings are normally combined with 
group lending technology. Each group member is required to contribute to group savings in 
order for the whole group to borrow from banks. This practice enhances the advantages of 
group lending as it forces the members to tie their personal savings to group and therefore 
they become more responsible for the group. Hence, we believe a group lending with joint 
liability and compulsory savings technology could speed up the business of banking with the 
poor.  
2.3.4. Compensating balances 
Compensating balances are not a popular lending technology but it may be worth to 
consider as it, in some sense, encourages the banks to enter the market in the absence of 
collateral. Kroll and Cohen (2000) propose this lending technology as a solution to the 
problem of credit rationing. Compensating balance does not require the borrowers to have a 
prior saving, but borrowers have to deposit part of their loan at the bank. Specifically, the 
bank provides a loan of B plus an amount of compensating balance CB. Compensating 
balance is deposited at the bank and earns a risk free-interest rate τ. However, the borrower 
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has to repay the full amount of B+CB plus interests. The compensating balance lending 
method is used because it increases the expected return to the bank. The reason is that the 
borrower transfers part of their net return to the bank by agreeing to take the “compensating 
balance”. We will show how this method works in a simple model as follows. 
Borrower’s choice 
The expected return to a borrower i if he chooses the compensating balance borrowing 
is: 
pi(ρi,r,CB)  = ρi[µsi – (1 + rC)(B+CB) +τCB]    (2.50) 
Hence, the difference in the expected return between compensating balance loan and 
individual loan is: 
Dpi  = pi(ρi,rC,CB) -  pi(ρi,rI)    
= ρiB(rI-rC) - ρiCB(1 + rC – τ)     (2.51) 
 The necessary condition for a borrower to be indifferent between the two types of loan 
contract is: 
ρiB(rI-rC) = ρiCB(1 + rC – τ)       (2.52) 
The right hand side is greater than zero, so this implies that the necessary condition for 
a borrower to be indifferent between two types of lending is rI > rC: the interest rate charged 
by compensating balance method must be lower than the individual loan method. 
Bank’s choice 
The expect return to the bank if it makes a compensating balance loan is: 
κ(ρi,rc,CB) = ρi[(1 + rc)(B +CB) - τCB]     (2.53) 
Therefore, the difference in expected return to the bank between the two types of 
contracts is: 
Dκ  = κ(ρi,rc,CB) - κ(ρi,rI)  
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 = ρiB(rc - rI) + ρiCB(1 + rc - τ)     (2.54) 
 In a competitive market, the difference in expected return to the bank equals zero: 
  ρiB(rc - rI) =  - ρiCB(1 + rc - τ)     (2.55) 
 The right hand side is lower than zero, so this implies rc < rI.  
 Equilibrium  
 Assuming that we can find a pair of interest rates (rI*, rC*) which satisfies conditions 
(2.52) and (2.55), then rI* > rC*. In other words, at equilibrium, compensating balance lending 
reduces the interest rate charged, compared to the standard individual lending. However, it 
should be noted that a reduction in interest rate does not mean that borrowers are better off but 
that there is a payment transfer from borrowers to the bank and therefore encourages the bank 
to enter the market. 
 Compensating balance as a sorting device 
Our next concern is whether the compensating balance can serve as a sorting device. 
From (2.5) and (2.53), we get the same derivatives: 
CBB
r1
CB
r
+
−+
−=
∂
∂ τ
        (2.56) 
The derivative (2.56) indicates that interest rate is a decreasing function of 
compensating balance. More specifically, if the bank requires high compensating balance, the 
interest rate must be low. We can see that individual loan is just a special case of 
compensating balance where compensating balance equals zero. However, compensating 
balance can not serve as a sorting device because the indifference line of borrower and of 
bank does not depend on the risk type of borrowers 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reviewed the relevant theories and practices regarding credit 
markets in general and credit markets for the low-income households in particular. We have 
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focused on the asymmetric information problems to explain how the credit markets work. It is 
important to note that asymmetric information causes the problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard, which result in credit rationing in credit markets. The requirement of collateral 
can be used as a screening device and to insure the banks against credit risks. However, not all 
borrowers can provide sufficient collateral.  
The credit markets for the low-income households are characterised by high costs, high 
risks and insufficient collateral. All these factors explain why banks are generally reluctant to 
make loans to low-income borrowers. That is why an intervention from the government into 
the market is sometimes called. However, governmental intervention is not the optimal 
solution since the government faces very much the same problems of asymmetric information. 
Hence, the better solution is to find efficient lending technologies in order to encourage banks 
to enter into the market. These lending technologies may include the tailored contracts (such 
as joint-liability) or lending through partnership (such as informational credit rating agencies). 
Much of the literature on micro-lending (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Morduch, 1999) 
has focused on the group lending (e.g. the Grameen Bank model) with joint liability. It is 
believed that group lending may reduce the problem of adverse selection through peer-
screening and joint liability while it may reduce moral hazard through peer-monitoring and 
peer-pressure. It is also argued that group lending reduces interest rates in the market and 
minimizes the cost of lending to the borrower. However, group lending also has some 
disadvantages. The most important is the domino effect where one group member fails may 
lead the failure of the whole group and possibly the whole group lending system. The central 
point to this possibility is a strategic default where a successful borrower may refuse to pay 
for his failed partner and report group default if his expected return from not paying at all is 
higher. 
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The models of lending with prior savings and compensating balances are alternative 
solutions for the banks in order to enter the credit market for the low-income households. 
These two lending technologies are based on a simple idea that a borrower transfers a part of 
his expected return to the bank in order to obtain loans. By requiring prior savings and 
compensating balances, banks are able to attain information and screen potential borrowers 
more properly. 
In short, what we have presented in this chapter are actually the general means for banks 
to reach the poor. Other innovations in lending technologies may include lending through 
partnership with social or informational intermediaries such as NGOs or credit rating 
agencies. For examples, NGOs may introduce a non-state subsidy, especially in the form of 
cheap subsidized basic bank services such as micro savings (even if the actual micro-credits 
are not subsidized), to gain information on micro borrowers. Lending through a partnership 
between banks and these intermediaries may then develop. Lending through partnership may 
be preferable since it combines the professional skills of banks and the knowledge on low 
income households (by the social or informational intermediaries).  
The role of social and informational intermediaries and lending through partnership will 
be discussed further in the next chapter when we look at the approach to microfinance. We 
will show that different countries and institutions may follow different approaches to 
microfinance. For example, some believe that microfinance should be provided on a 
subsidized basis for the purpose of poverty reduction, while others argue that it should be 
provided on a market basis for a sustainable outreach. This basically shows a part of policy 
issues in microfinance. We will suggest that a mixed approach that emphasizes the leading 
role of financial intermediation and the supporting role of social and informational 
intermediaries in providing financial services to the poor is more appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEMAND FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES AND APPROACH TO FINANCE FOR THE 
POOR AND LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
3.1 Introduction 
The basic economic theory tells us that the market performance of goods or services 
depends on supply, demand and market conditions. In previous chapter, we have discussed 
the supply side of financial services (i.e. credit) for the poor. We have shown that the formal 
banking sector is reluctant to extend loans to low-income households for a number of reasons 
such as asymmetric information, transaction costs, risks and collateral. Market failure in 
extending credit to low-income households induces people to think that a direct intervention 
by the government in credit markets for the poor could be of help. However, governments 
face very much the same problems as the banks do and it is shown that subsidized credit 
programs by the governments have failed in expanding outreach to the poor on a sustainable 
basis.  
Given this context, what can we do? How can we improve the outreach of financial 
services to low-income households? The answer to these questions is crucially important if we 
know that there is an excessive demand for financial services from the low-income 
households (Gibbons and Meehan, 2002). There are both theoretical and empirical evidences 
to strengthen the view that the poor indeed need financial services, especially credit and 
savings, to enhance their lives (Hulme and Mosley, 1996a; Rutherford, 1998; ADB, 2000a; 
Morduch and Haley, 2003). Considering social aspect, if financial services are available to the 
poor and if the poor can make of use of them, it is significant to the goal of poverty reduction 
(Morduch and Haley, 2003). Even if we ignore the social and are interested in business 
aspect, financial services for the poor could be a good business if we can find the appropriate 
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mechanism and technologies in reaching the poor profitably (Robinson, 2001; Gonzalez 
Vega, 2003). 
In this chapter, we aim at finding an appropriate approach to financial services for the 
poor. We discuss why the poverty reduction approach (Rhyne, 1998; Gulli, 1998; Robinson, 
1999, 2001), which bases on subsidized credit programs, has failed in expanding outreach to 
the poor on a sustainable basis and for the goal of poverty reduction. We believe that a direct 
intervention from the government, such as controls of interest rates and credit quota 
allocation, does not encourage financial institutions to expand their activities because the 
costs of services can not be covered and thus financial services for the poor are inefficient 
(Gonzalez Vega, 2003; Robinson, 2001). Moreover, the poverty reduction approach basically 
targets the extremely poor while it is evident that for these people financial services may not 
be the basic needs and they could be harmful for them (Gonzalez Vega, 2003; Robinson, 
2001; Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). If we insist on this approach, we have ignored a 
large proportion of better-off poor, who are believed to be able to make use of financial 
services (Robinson. 2001; Hulme and Mosley, 1996b).  
The financial system approach (Rhyne, 1998; Gulli, 1998; Robinson, 2001), which 
proposes an application of market principles and builds a financial intermediation system to 
the poor, is then analyzed. We show that the financial systems approach could be more 
appropriate because it aims at building a system of financial intermediation for the poor on a 
sustainable basis (Robinson, 1999; 2001; Christen and Drake, 2001; Charitonenko and 
Rahman, 2002). However, this approach targets only the economically active poor i.e. better-
off poor and we expect some exclusion of the extremely poor. The targeted clientele could be 
reasonable if we ignore the social aspect, but even in this sense the question is still that what 
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could happened if the financial institutions find it unprofitable to provide financial services to 
the poor?   
The answer is clear that in order to do their business, financial institutions must find 
innovative financial technologies in reaching the poor effectively and efficiently (Gonzalez 
Vega, 2003; Charitonenko, 2002). However, this goal depends on many factors such as the 
physical and financial infrastructure that without supports from the governments can not be 
improved. Hence, we believe that, a mixed approach in which financial institutions play their 
role as financial intermediaries and the governments and donors provide necessary supports 
could be a good option. On one hand, the governments and donors should create a sound 
financial infrastructure and establish supporting informational intermediaries such as the 
credit rating, credit bureaus or credit scoring agencies to facilitate the operation of financial 
institutions. On the other hand, the government and donors may provide supporting services 
such education, healthcares, transportations, job creation and business skills i.e. provide social 
intermediation for the poor (Ledgerwood, 1999), especially the extremely poor in order for 
them to have access to financial services at low costs and be able to make use of them. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: first, we discuss briefly the 
relevant theories and present empirical evidence showing that the poor do have demand for 
financial services and that there is an excessive demand for financials services from the poor. 
Second, we analyze the poverty reduction approach in which we emphasize on why poverty 
reduction approach has failed in reaching the poor. Next, we focus on the discussion of 
financial systems approach and we highlight with supports why this approach could be more 
appropriate. We then raise a question of whether or not we need a new approach. We also 
propose our idea in this section that a mixed approach could be a good option at this stage. In 
the next section, we focus on the role of the government in building up a sound financial 
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infrastructure for microfinance. Conclusion section summarizes the main findings and 
recommendation made in the chapter.  . 
3.2 Do the poor have demand for financial services? 
Like other markets, financial markets for the low income households are affected by 
three factors: supply, demand and market imperfection (Ed Mayo and Mullineux, 1998). We 
have shown in Chapter 2 that due to market imperfection, the supply of financial services to 
the poor is limited. The situation is worsen in financial markets for the poor where the 
transactions costs are typically high and the poor basically do not have sufficient physical 
assets to serve as collateral. As a result, it is believed that there is an excessive demand for 
financial service from the poor (Gibbons and Meehan, 2002), and if so, it could be a 
significant gap that any country, especially developing countries, has to overcome in order to 
make a better life for their residents. 
However, it could be argued that whether the poor have demand for financial services? 
If the poor do not have any demand for financial services, the discussion of supply of 
financial services to the poor becomes senseless. Our answer is yes, the poor do have demand 
for financial services, like everyone else. While the demand for credit is understandable, the 
demand for other services such as savings makes many people confused as they believe that 
the poor are too poor to save. Hence, the understanding of the poor’ demand for financial 
services should be important because it helps to understand why there is an excessive demand 
for financial service by the poor. 
3.2.1 Theoretical background 
In economics, the most influential theories, which explain individual behavior in 
response to a decision towards consumption and savings/borrowing, include “Life Cycle 
Hypothesis” (Ando and Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani and Ando, 1957; Modigliani and 
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Brumberg, 1954) and the “Permanent Income Hypothesis” (Friedman, 1957). These 
hypotheses are based on the assumptions that individuals and households are rational beings 
who respond in predictable ways to changes in incentives, and that borrowing or savings are 
the ways to “smooth consumption” in facing income fluctuations. The definition of 
consumption varies but we do imply that for the poor and low-income households, a small 
investment in their small enterprises is one kind of consumption. 
It’s however worth noting that although these models assume perfect capital markets, 
they do imply a possibility that households in general consider their consumption based on 
their income pattern. Therefore, the analysis of these models helps understand household’s 
behaviors in response to its income expectation. Furthermore, the analysis is a reference for 
the interpretation of the Rutherford’s (1998) model which analyzes the poor and their money 
with some modification. 
Model of two-period consumption 
The model of two-period consumption is based on the perception that an individual 
maximizes his or her level of satisfaction received from present consumption Cp and from 
future consumption Cf. The constraint to this satisfaction function is that the consumption 
choice is dependent on the current income (Y0), the expected level of income (E[Yf]) and the 
initial wealth (W0) which can be used to produce assets. The general model takes the 
following form: 
 Maximization:  U = f(Co, Cf) = U(Co) + U(Cf)(1+)-1     (3.1) 
 Constraint:       [Yp – Cp](1+r) + Wo = Cf - Yf     (3.2) 
where the future satisfaction value is discounted at the “rate of time preference” ρ and r is the 
interest rate representing a payment or reward for current consumption. The rate of time 
preference implies the importance of future consumption considered at present value for a 
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given individual. An individual with high rate of time preference means that he or she 
considers current consumption relatively higher than future consumption. For this type of 
individuals, they tend to consume as much as their current income. The rate of time 
preference is assumed to be stable in short run. 
With the above assumption, the left hand side of the equation (3.2) implies the 
“current resources” or current income for future consumption in exceed of the future income, 
which is represented on the right hand side. The current savings [Yp – Cp] is multiplied by an 
interest rate factor (1+r) for future value of savings. Rearranging the equation (3.2) in order to 
see the future consumption as a function of current consumption, we have the linear function 
as follows: 
 Cf = [Yp(1+r) + E(Yf) + W0] - (1+r)C0       (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) implies that the current consumption must be at the expense of the 
future consumption. In the Figure 3.1, the indifference curves Ui (i = s,b) represent levels of 
satisfaction received from combination of present and future consumption activity. The 
position of an indifference curve depends on the individual's own rate of time preference . 
Higher ρ results in the position of Ui closer to current consumption (Ub) and vice versa (Us). 
The constraint line (the function of future consumption) represents the possible levels of 
consumption in the two periods given the individual's level of present income, future expected 
income and the prevailing interest rate r. This constraint line has a slope equal to -(1+r). There 
exists a point in the constraint line, namely the “balanced point” G, where the net savings 
equals zero and therefore future consumption and income must also be equal. 
In figure (3.1a), the indifference curve Us represents the behaviour of a net saver who 
has the low rate of time preference or has strong preference for future consumption. The 
maximization of satisfaction is achieved at the point (C0,Cf) where C0<Y0 and Cf>E(Yf). In 
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figure (3.1b), the indifference curve Ub represents the behaviour of a net borrower who has 
high rate of time preference or has a strong preference for current consumption. For this 
individual, he has to borrow funds to finance his current consumption. 
Figure 3.1 – Borrowing and saving in two-period consumption model 
 There are two important implications interpreted from the above analysis. First, for a 
given income pattern (stable interest rate and expected – current and future - income), an 
individual becomes a borrower if he or she has a higher rate of time preference or becomes a 
saver if he or she has a lower rate of time preference. Thus, the explanation of why 
individuals and households demand for credit and saving services become the question of how 
the rate of time preference move over time.  
Second, from the equation (3.3), it is clear to us that an increase in the expected future 
income E(Yf) or the current income (Y0) would lead the constraint line to move to the right. 
As the rate of time preference is assumed to be stable in the short run, the indifference curve 
would also move in parallel to the right. This results in an increase in the net savings for an 
observed period. In other words, for a given rate of time preference and within the observed 
period, an individual with higher current and/or (expected) future income would be more 
likely to be a net saver.  
E(Yf) 
C0 Y0 
Cf 
Current consumption 
Future consumption 
Constrain line, 
slope = -(1+r) 
Us 
A net saver 
G 
E(Yf) 
C0 Y0 
Cf 
Current consumption 
Future consumption 
Constrain line, 
slope = -(1+r) 
Ub 
A net borrower 
G 
 70
The initial results suggest that high-income households are more likely to demand for 
savings services while low-income households are more likely to require credit services. If we 
apply this notion into microfinance, it is expected that the better off poor could demand 
savings services and the poorest of the poor could demand credit. This implies that the poor in 
general do have demand for financial services. 
Model of Life Cycle Hypothesis 
The Life Cycle Hypothesis is an extension of the two-period consumption model with 
a lifetime view. It considers the life-length basis of an individual rather than the two-period 
basis. The idea is similar that individual will act in a way which maximises the satisfaction 
from consumption over time and is based on the constraint that life-length consumption must 
equal income. The model takes the following form: 
Maximisation:  Ut   = L[U(Ct)(1+ρ)-t]      (3.4) 
Constraint:   LCt(1+r)-t  = NYt(1+r)-t + Wo      (3.5) 
where U(Ct) is the satisfaction received from consumption in time period t, Ct is the level of 
consumption in time period t, Yt is income in time period t, ρ is the rate of time preference - a 
measure of individual preference between present and future activity and is assumed to be 
constant in short run and Wo is an initial level of income producing assets.  
Equation (4) can be rearranged as follows: 
Ut = U(C0) + L[U(Ct)(1+ρ)-t]  (t = 1..L)      (3.6) 
If it is safe to assume that the poor and low-income households are those who have to 
live for today, or in other words they consider current consumption more important than 
future consumption, equation (3.6) indicates that rates of time preference for low-income 
households are higher than for the high-income households. This is easily seen because within 
a given satisfaction level Ut, higher current satisfaction U(C0) means relatively lower total 
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satisfaction L[U(Ct)(1+ρ)-t]. Therefore, the rate of time preference must be high. This again 
shows that the better-off poor households are most likely to become the net savers and the 
extremely poor households are more likely to become the net borrowers. 
Model of Permanent Income Hypothesis 
The Permanent Income Hypothesis considers a series of period income in the lifetime. 
It does not view the degree of satisfaction as the key direction for consumption behaviour but 
the expected income/consumption pattern does matter. For a given period, it decomposes the 
aggregate income (Y) into two separate components: YP as the projected level of income or 
the permanent income and YT as the temporal change or difference between the observed 
levels of income and the projected income or most simply we can understand as the error 
parameter from the permanent income. Thus, the first assumption takes the form: 
  Y = YP + YT.          (3.7) 
Because the level of difference (YT) is only temporal and may be either positive or 
negative, the expected value of the differences equals zero (E[YTt] = 0). In other words, in 
long run, the observed levels of income (Y) are equal to the permanent income (Yp). 
The second important assumption made by the permanent income hypothesis is that 
consumption expenditure is proportional to permanent income: 
 C = kYP          (3.8) 
The parameter k, a constant, represents both the average propensity to consume and 
the marginal propensity to consume. The implication of the permanent income hypothesis 
therefore is that, in short run, there is a different between temporal and the permanent levels 
of income. When the temporal change is positive, households tend to save. However, when 
the temporal change is negative, it does not necessarily mean the potential for borrowing. In 
such a case, the households may use their previous savings to smooth their consumption 
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pattern and the borrowing occurs only if the previous savings is not sufficient (see the figure 
below). 
Figure 3.2 – Borrowing and saving in permanent income model 
 
It seems clear to us that the implication of the Permanent Income Hypothesis is 
important to understand why the low-income households may well become both the 
borrowers and savers. The low-income households do not have the regular income 
mainstream and therefore their time income may be different from their permanent income. 
This is especially true for the farm households whose income basis is dependent on the 
seasonality. However, as Gulli (1998) argues, even low-income households have capacity and 
desire to save but the impediments in policies and instruments of savings are more important 
than the households’ preference. This implies the improvement or innovation in mechanism of 
provision of financial services may be of help. 
Model of Lump Sum Money 
The most recent convincing essay explaining why and how the poor and low-income 
households do need the basic financial services is by Rutherford (1998). Although his 
explanation of why the poor need basic financial services is based on the main assumption 
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that they need the “lump sum” or “large sum” money at a certain point in time, it does reflect 
the hypothesis of permanent income. Rutherford sees three processes namely saving up, 
saving down and saving through: 
 Saving up implies a series of savings from now in exchange for a large sum needed in 
the future. The time amount of saving is not necessarily the same. 
 Saving down implies a series of savings in the future in exchange for a large sum used 
today, normally regarded as a loan. The time amount of saving may be the same in the 
form of instalment. 
 Saving through implies the combination of the two above processes. Specifically, if 
the saving up process generates insufficient amount when needed, a further loan may 
be taken and then repaid by the next savings. 
Figure 3.3 – Borrowing and saving in Lump Sum Money model 
Source: Adapted from Rutherford (1998) 
Hence, Rutherford (1998) shows that the poor and low-income households do use both 
savings and loans to acquire the lump sums that they often need for such purposes as 
emergencies, social and religious obligation, and investment in their businesses. Therefore, in 
theory, it is proved that the poor and low-income households as anyone else do have the 
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demand for basic financial services. The fact that they are financially excluded thus must be 
reasoned from somewhere else rather than the demand side.  
3.2.2 Empirical evidence 
 Millions of the poor and low-income households need financial services for various 
reasons: their demand for livelihood activities such as foods, health care and education; and 
for small business opportunities, which generate jobs and income. However, it can be 
observed that the lack of works and the quality of works are amongst the major concerns. If 
the poor and low income households have opportunities to access to credit, it is believed that 
they may increase their living standard from returns on their investments. Hence, it is well 
recognized that the primary concern is the excessive demand for credit and that “credit is 
essential for economic activity” (Ed Mayo and Mullineux, 1998, p 6), from both poor 
households and micro-enterprises (ADB, 2000a).  
Box 3.1 - Demand for microfinance services 
 
 
 
 
 
Basically, most of people in developing countries live in the rural and remote areas, 
where there are a few chances for them to be employed and salaried. Their earnings if any 
normally come from the occasional sources such as hired labor or low paid employment from 
the local small and medium enterprises. Some of them may run their own small business from 
home such as farming and small trading. Our argument is clear that if we can help to establish 
a network of small businesses, the low income households can benefit from it in two ways (i) 
by running the business, the business owners can realize their business opportunities which 
Poor and low income households have effective demand for a range of microfinance services 
including: 
 Safe and convenient deposit services — so they can save for emergencies, investment, 
consumption, social obligations, and the education of their children 
 Credit services — for consumption smoothing, and to finance livelihood activities and 
large expenses for education, housing improvements, migration, etc. 
 Other financial services — such as insurance and funds transfer services. 
 
Source: ADB (2000a) 
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create jobs and income for themselves; and (ii) if the business is expanded, a number of other 
low income households may be employed by these businesses. 
However, for those who have their own business opportunity, to set up such a small 
business, they need money. Because not many of them can afford for such amount of initial 
capital, the only way for them is to borrow money from any sources that they can access. 
Generally, the commercial banks are reluctant to lend to them for several reasons, such as 
high costs and market imperfections (see Chapter 2). As a result, the low-income households 
with business opportunity have to decide (i) to borrow from informal sources of credit such as 
moneylenders, who charge very high interest rate; or (ii) to give up their business startup 
because of lacking money. To us, both decisions are economic inefficiency. 
Besides credit, there is demand for savings and other services such as insurance. The 
low-income households need safe and convenient savings services. Contrary to some 
preconceptions, there is much evidence that the poor have the capacity and willingness to save 
(CGAP, 2004; Rutherford, 1998; CSD, 2000). They need to save for emergencies, future 
investment, consumption, social obligations, the education of their children, and many other 
purposes. Poor and low-income households also have a demand for other financial services, 
such as insurance. Migration, whether international or internal, also tends to create a demand 
for funds transfer services (ADB, 2000a). 
The excessive demand for financial services by the poor and low income households 
can be seen from the gap between number of low income households and number of 
households having access to financial services (Donald, 1976; Zeller and Sharma, 1998; 
Gibbons and Meehan, 2002; Navajas and Gonzales Vega, 2002; Wenner, Alvarado and 
Galarza, 2002; Zeller, 2003). Gibbons and Meehan (2002) show that of about 234.9 millions 
poor households around the world, there are only around 19.6 millions households having 
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access to financial services, making only 8.3% coverage ration. Most of the poor households 
(67.2%) are from Asia, where the coverage ratio is 9.3%. The low coverage ratios tell us 
much that there are many works to be done in order to help poor households having access to 
financial services. 
One of the reasons for low coverage ratios is that most of MFIs are NGOs (CGAP, 
2004) and too small in providing financial services: 63% (70%) of MFIs have less than 2,500 
clients (poorest households) and only 2% have more than 100,000 clients and poorest 
households (Graph 1a,b). This implies that the providers of financial services to the poor are 
still reluctant and microfinance has not been seen as a business which is the interest of larger 
financial institutions, and thus the evolution of microfinance requires a participation of large 
financial institutions such as commercial banks. Hence, in our idea, the important task to 
enhance the development of microfinance sector is to build up a financial system which 
attracts the participation from formal financial institutions. This, however, requires a 
revolution in the perception of financial services for the poor.  
 77
 Figure 3.4 – Access to financial services by the poor 
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 Figure 3.5 - Outreach by size of MFI 
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3.3 Approaches to microfinance 
The perception of microfinance is important because it decides the ways that financial 
institutions provide financial services to the poor. According to a study by Churchill (1998, 
1999) microfinance was initiated from three different development initiatives. First, several 
countries promoted the establishment of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with supports 
from donor projects. Second, microfinance services were originated in projects to alleviate 
poverty. These projects are normally based on subsidy basis. Third, many microfinance 
institutions emerged to provide financial services on the market basis for low-income 
households and small firms who are not served by the formal financial sector. The objective 
of these MFIs is neither supporting the SMEs nor the poverty alleviation, but for profit. 
The origin of microfinance suggests us that there have been two separate goals in 
providing financial services to the poor: (i) for development goal such as SMEs development 
or poverty reduction and (ii) for profit. We can see that the first goal implies microfinance as 
a policy tool while the second one considers it as a business. Separate goals then result in two 
different approaches in microfinance, which in literature are mentioned as the poverty 
reduction approach and the financial systems approach (Robinson, 2001, Rhyne, 1998).  
We believe that microfinance industry is at the stage of transition, where people are 
considering between the two approaches. As Christen and Deborah (2001) show, there is a 
process of commercialization in microfinance where MFIs are transforming from poverty 
reduction approach into financial systems approach. However, our main concern is not the 
process and characteristics of transition but where would this transition lead the microfinance 
sector to and how could we make a better financial sector for the poor? Finding answers to 
these questions takes us to the discussion of strengths and weaknesses of current approaches 
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to microfinance. We will show that a mix of the two approaches could be a good option at this 
stage. 
3.3.1 Poverty reduction approach 
Robinson (2001) and Rhyne (1998) review the two approaches in microfinance. 
According to these studies, the poverty reduction approach considers microfinance as a tool 
for poverty reduction. This approach claims that the overall goal of microfinance should be 
poverty reduction and empowerment, and thus there is no need to discuss financial 
sustainability if services provided do not have any impact on clients’ poverty levels. The 
poverty reduction approach concentrates on reducing poverty through subsidized credit 
(Robinson, 2001).  
Hence, under this approach, credit is provided to poor borrowers typically at below 
market interest rates and often through the network of government agencies such as state 
owned development banks and donors. The target of this approach is to reach the large 
population of the poor, especially the extremely poor, with cheap credit to help them get out 
of poverty. Other services, such as mobilization of local savings, are normally not a 
significant part of the poverty reduction approach, except some compulsory savings required 
as a condition of receiving a loan (Gulli, 1998; Robinson, 2001).  
However, there is a concern on the impact of credit on households. Although there are 
some evidences that show positive effect of access to credit on household poverty reduction, 
the degree of effect is very small (see Chapter 6, 7). Moreover, it is questionable that whether 
all the poor and low-income households can make use of financial services such as credit and 
repay them. Robinson (2001) argues that credit is a powerful tool that is used effectively 
when it is available to the economically active poor who have the ability and willingness to 
repay them. But for the extremely poor households, because of lacking profitable self-
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employment and high risks involving in using loans (Hulme and Mosley, 1996a), they may 
not be able to use the loans effectively (Robinson, 2001), and thus credit may be even harmful 
for them (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002).  
In a detailed analysis of how credit could improve the poor households, some authors 
(Gonzalez Vega, 2003; Gonazlaez Vega, 1998a; Zeller et al., 1997) propose that the 
relationship between the access to financial services and poverty reduction is ambiguous. If 
there exist some productive opportunities, financial services can (i) help poor households get 
out of poverty (Gonzalez Vega, 2003); (ii) assist in stabilizing incomes and eliminating 
vulnerability to risk (Zeller and Meyer, 2002; Zeller, 2003); and (iii) assist in processes of 
acquiring physical and human capital to allow households to overcome poverty traps 
(Maldonado, Gonzalez Vega and Romero, 2002). However, if productive opportunities do not 
exist, repayment capacity will usually be missing and the enforcement of debt contracts will 
impoverish borrowers. Thus, depending on the circumstances, financial services can increase 
or decrease poverty (Gonzalez and Vega, 2003).  
 Another concern is that whether credit or another development tool (such as education, 
infrastructure) are more effective to enhance poverty reduction? It is believed that for the 
extremely poor households, they require basic needs such as food, shelter, skills training and 
employment before demanding credit (Robinson, 2001; Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). 
Some studies (Gulli, 1998; Gonzalez Vega, 2003) also show that credit is not always the main 
constraint for low income households and that low income households demand a wide range 
of financial services (rather than just credit) for different business and households purposes. 
For example, Gonzalez Vega (2003) shows that loans cannot create productive opportunities, 
which are essential to income generation, particularly when other constraints are binding. He 
argues that credit cannot build the roads that are missing but needed to bring the crop to 
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market; credit cannot discover the farming technology that does not exist; credit cannot 
generate key inputs that are not available; credit cannot create or destroy comparative 
advantages or change consumer preferences (Gonzalez Vega, 1994 and 1998a). 
While the goal of poverty reduction approach is suspicious, some studies (Robinson 
2001, Gonzalez Vega, 2003) believe that even if we assume a positive relationship between 
access to credit and poverty reduction, it is clear that sustainable microfinance built on cost-
effectiveness basis is more likely to deal with it (Robinson, 2001). This is because of two 
reasons: (i) financial self-sufficient MFIs can leverage substantial funds for their portfolios by 
mobilizing public savings, accessing commercial debt, or attracting for-profit investment; and 
(ii) if financial services are important to the poor households, a long-term access should be 
more important. 
However, it is evident that financial services for the poor following poverty reduction 
approach can not be sustainable. Most MFIs that provide subsidized credit, have failed to 
meet the excessive demand for financial services from the poor households, in terms of both 
outreach and financial self-sufficiency (Robinson, 2001). In an analysis of rural finance, 
Gonzalez Vega (2003) shows that although there were many attempts to expand the supply of 
agriculture subsidized credit and despite the massive use of public funds for this purpose, the 
majority of the rural population of the developing countries has actually never had access to 
formal financial services. Only 10% to 15% of all rural households in developing countries 
had ever had access to formal credit by the mid 1970s and this proportion has not changed 
much over time (Donald, 1976; Zeller and Sharma, 1998; Navajas and Gonzales Vega, 2002; 
Wenner, Alvarado and Galarza, 2002; Zeller, 2003). Furthermore, empirical evidences also 
suggest that the better-off poor rather than the poorest of the poor are most likely to get access 
to formal financial services (see Chapter 4, 5 and 6). 
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The weak outreach to the poor households is believed to be a consequence of not self-
financial sufficiency. Under poverty reduction approach, the successful mobilization of 
voluntary savings and the operation of subsidized micro credit programs can both be found, 
but not both together (Robinson, 2001). Financial institutions which follow this approach, 
whether savings-led or credit-led, cannot provide micro credit and savings services—on a 
large scale. Even the best of the institutions (e.g. Grameen Bank) that operate with subsidized 
loan portfolios are effective only either in capturing savings or in providing micro loans with 
wide outreach but not both (Robinson, 2001). They cannot afford to be effective in both 
because their lending interest rates are too low to cover the costs and risks involved in the 
practice of large-scale sustainable microfinance. Thus, microfinance could attain wide 
outreach only outside the subsidized credit model, in financial self-sufficient institutions 
(Robinson, 2001). 
It also a concern that the poverty reduction approach often links financial services with 
training programs in a belief that such a linkage has positive impacts on clients. The 
underlying assumption is that to use their financial services properly, the poor need training in 
skill development, business, literacy, finance, agriculture, and so on. But two problems can 
arise when training is linked directly to credit programs. First, institutional sustainability is 
hindered because training costs are rarely covered by revenue. Second, the training provided 
is often not considered valuable by the trainees. The real problem is not the value of training 
in general but the linkage of credit and training (Adams and Von Pischke, 1992). Thus, we 
understand that the essential is not the integration of training into financial services but the 
right training at right time to right people who can make right use of financial services 
In conclusion, somewhere else governments and donors have been following poverty 
reduction approach because they believe that access to credit may enhance poverty reduction. 
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Indeed, access to credit and other services may contribute to the poverty reduction in some 
circumstances but this is not always the case (Gonzalez Vega, 2003). Thus, if the 
interventions are based on incorrect perceptions about the nature of relationships or reflect 
wrong expectations about the role of finance in the process of poverty alleviation, they can be 
useless. Therefore, it is important to understand when financial actually matters the poverty. 
Evidences show that poverty reduction approach with subsidized credit, interest 
controls and administrative credit allocations is no longer favored. Direct production of 
financial services by the state has been seriously suspected. Formal financial institutions are 
unable to charge interest rates that cover their operating costs and associated risks (Gonzalez 
Vega, 2003). All these facts suggest that microfinance can not be sustainable under the 
poverty reduction approach and thus a new approach to financial services for the poor should 
be considered. 
3.3.2 Financial systems approach 
The failure of poverty reduction approach in reaching the poor has led to the new 
perception of microfinance towards financial systems approach, which emphasizes on the role 
of microfinance as financial intermediation among the poor and low income households. The 
introduction of group lending model (Ghatak, 1999, 2000) and the success of village banking 
model initiated by the BRI in Indonesia create effective benchmark tools for MFIs to reach 
the low-income households and constitute the belief that microfinance can be profitable on 
market basis. Also, the increasing recognition of the importance of a wider range of financial 
services such as savings, payments instruments and remittance services (Gonzalez Vega, 
2003; Patten and Rosengard, 1991; Adams, 1995; Robinson, 1998) and concerns with the 
absence of insurance markets and other tools to manage risks (Townsend, 1995; Zeller et all., 
 84
1997; Thompson, Miranda, and Gonzalez Vega, 1998; Skees, 2003) have strengthened the 
view that a development of financial intermediation is important. 
The foundation of financial systems approach is set by the Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
when it proves its model of sustainable micro-banking system operating profitably at large 
scale without subsidy (Robinson, 2001). The most important feature of the financial systems 
approach is that it focuses on applying the principles of commercial finance (with necessary 
adaptations) into the growing knowledge of the microfinance market that then constitutes the 
term commercial microfinance. The philosophy of this approach is to build up an 
intermediation of financial services for the poor and low income households. It is believed 
that by employing new financial and informational technologies, the profitable provision of 
small loans is made possible by the tailored lending methodologies, pricing, products, and 
services that are designed specifically for microfinance clients (Robinson, 2001).  
The argument supporting for the financial systems approach against the poverty 
reduction approach is simple that if loans are demanded and repaid in time, the market has 
demonstrated that the services provided are valuable for both financial institutions and clients, 
so there is no need for further impact studies. Moreover, the services should not be targeted 
only to the poorest as in the poverty reduction approach, but to the underserved market niches 
in general. Debts and financial services are not the effective tool for helping the poorest 
enhance their economic conditions (Ronbinson, 2001; Adams and Von Pischke, 1992). 
According to this approach, the potential for outreach in future is represented by financial and 
institutional sustainability, rather than the availability of funds. Thus, there is no rationale for 
subsidies and NGOs are seen as having only a minor role in the microfinance market (Gulli, 
1998).  
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The central concept in enhancing financial systems approach is the commercialization 
of microfinance institutions or commercial microfinance institutions. In terms of conditions, 
commercial microfinance institutions refers to institutions that finance their loan portfolios 
from locally mobilized savings, those that access to commercial debt and for profit 
investment, and those that use retained earnings to finance their lending (Robinson, 2001). In 
terms of methodology, commercialization means the application of market-based principles to 
microfinance (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002).  
Specifically, commercialization of microfinance implies a development towards for-
profit operation with diversified and demand-driven financial services on the basis of full 
costs recovering pricing strategy. The essential and expected goal of commercialization of 
microfinance is to attain a sustainable microfinance which comprises of both institutional 
sustainability (wider outreach) and financial self-sufficiency. Commercialization also implies 
a transition towards for-profit formal financial institutions which are subject to prudential 
regulation and supervision and are able to operate as commercial financial intermediaries 
(Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). Figure (3.6) demonstrates the progress of 
commercialization. 
It is noted that commercial financial intermediaries are the highest level of 
commercialization of microfinance. In stages of transitions, the term of commercial 
microfinance institutions refers to any institutions that apply market principles into operation. 
Hence, the term may include institutions that provide microfinance to the public such as banks 
and those that serve only their members such as credit unions. The term may also include 
institutions that provide only microfinance as well as those that offer microfinance as part of a 
wider set of financial services. Overall, commercial microfinance institutions are 
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differentiated from informal commercial lenders who lend money for profit, from subsidized 
formal credit and from unregulated NGOs. 
 Figure 3.6 - Progress toward commercialization 
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services, as percentage (Christen, 1997). Hence, charging the costs that are equal to the costs of conventional 
commercial financial services may be understood as “subsidy”. 
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systems and to finance the development of financially self-sufficient microfinance institutions 
(Robinson, 2001).  
Some studies have shown that formal sector commercial microfinance has proven 
itself able to make financial services, both credit and savings, available to low income 
households on a large scale, and to do so profitably (Robinson, 2001). Institutions such as 
BRI and BancoSol have demonstrated that wide outreach to economically active poor 
households can be achieved without ongoing subsidies. By the late 1990s commercial 
microfinance was no longer limited to a small group of scattered institutions. It was an 
industry. In this context, the development of BRI’s micro banking system and of somewhere 
else like BancoSol are of particular interest, both because of the scale on which they conduct 
continuously profitable operations and because of their leadership roles in the development of 
the commercial microfinance industry. These banks were the first of the self-sufficient 
microfinance institutions to develop the management, organizational structures, information 
systems, staff training systems, and internal supervision and control that, along with their 
commitment to full cost recovery and institutional self-sufficiency, enabled them to provide 
microfinance profitably on a large scale.  
To make the financial systems approach viable, it requires commitments by 
governments to financial market liberalization, reduced targeting of loans, and better pricing 
of financial products. Sustainable microfinance on a national scale depends on institutional 
governance, management, and organization as well as on products, pricing, and knowledge of 
the market. The financial frontier is being pushed outward to include several innovative 
financial institutions, programs, and products designed to service those previously excluded 
from formal finance (Von Pichske, 1991). The approach emphasizes voluntary savings 
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mobilization rather than funding from government or donors, which is consistent with the 
objective of creating independent institutions. 
The financial systems approach also requires employing the new concepts and 
methodologies that have been developed to enable MFIs to provide financial services 
profitably on a market basis, without ongoing subsidy. These concepts and methodologies 
may include innovative lending technologies that reduce costs and risks; suitable products that 
meet the demand of the poor and low-income borrowers and savers; interest rate spreads that 
permit institutional profits; innovative operating methods and information systems; widely 
dispersed small service outlets; specialized staff training and incentives; the financing of loan 
portfolios from locally mobilized savings and from commercial debt and investment; and 
others.  
The development of new concepts and methodologies are clearly essential in 
microfinance as it increases the capability of outreach to the poor. However, the goal of 
providing financial services on a sustainable basis implicitly implies that MFIs provide 
financial services to the poor whenever they find it profitable to do so. The concern for any 
policy maker is then what would if the MFIs found non-profitable? It is clear that the costs 
and risks of providing microfinance services are high and MFIs find it less attempting (see 
Chapter 2). Thus, if we employ the financial systems approach, there might be the case that 
the financial markets for the poor do not develop at all while the demand from the poor is 
excessive.  
Moreover, if we agree that financial systems approach is necessary for a sustainable 
microfinance, the conflicts and overlapping of policies within microfinance market may 
prevent this approach to work well in practice. The reasons are that different types of MFIs 
(e.g. NGOs, banks) may be differently regulated and supervised. For examples, in many 
 89
countries, such as Vietnam, NGOs are not regulated by the banking law and are not permitted 
to mobilize savings while the banks (such as VBARD, VBP) are. This results in the fact that 
these all MFIs are not competing fairly in the market. Unfair competition could make the 
market for the poor become even worse as the market occupiers may act on their own 
interests.  
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Figure 3.7 – Poverty reduction approach and financial systems approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Drawn and adapted from Robinson (2001) 
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3.3.3 The key difference 
A summary of difference between the two approaches is presented in Box 3.2. Key 
differences result from the different goals that each approach follows. The poverty reduction 
approach emphasizes on microfinance as a tool for poverty reduction while the financial 
market approach considers microfinance as a business of serving the poor, i.e. financial 
intermediation. For example, Gonzalez Vega (2003) argues that poverty reduction approach 
considers financial services for the poor as a policy tool while the financial systems approach 
considers them as intermediate inputs in the process of production and consumption at 
household level. In other words, financial systems approach considers microfinance sector as 
a productive sector for the poor with its own firms, production functions, outputs, prices and 
markets (Shaw, 1973). 
The differences in perception then lead to the differences in the ways of providing 
services and the target market. Poverty reduction approach focuses on providing credit to the 
poor at subsidized level and to the poor households, while the financial market approach 
commits to providing a broader range of services at market level and to the economically 
active low income households. According to Gonzalez Vega (2003), the poverty reduction 
approach concerns how to control or redirect the supply of financial services, in order to 
pursue specific non financial objectives, while the financial systems approach concerns how 
to promote an outward shift of the supply, in order to improve the delivery of financial 
services as intermediate inputs. That is an issue of how to further expand the frontier of 
financial services. 
Another difference between the two approaches is the targeting clients. The poverty 
reduction approach aims at providing financial services to the poor households, especially the 
poorest of the poor, in order to help them get out of poverty, while the financial systems 
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approach aims at the economically active households or better-off poor households. The 
poverty reduction approach argues that the poorest of the poor are those who need helps 
because they are normally unemployed, low education .etc and are unable to get access to 
financial services. The financial systems approach however argues that providing financial 
services to the poorest of the poor could harm both the poorest and the lenders because the 
poorest need basic needs rather than debts and thus it affects their ability to repay the loans. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that these two approaches have similar goal 
of expanding their activities i.e. attain a broader scale of outreach. Poverty reduction approach 
sees outreach as an immediate means to achieve poverty reduction and thus outreach is 
always considered as a goal of poverty reduction. Financial market approach, on the other 
hand, considers outreach as a result of the business. MFIs following this approach may see 
that if they are successful in providing financial services to the poor on the market basis, they 
may expand their market share and enjoy economies of scale.  
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Box 3.2 - Primary features of the old and new paradigms 
 
Figure 3.8 - Targeting clients: Poverty Reduction versus Financial Systems Approach 
 
Source: Adapted from Robinson (2001) 
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3.4 Do we need a new approach? 
3.4.1 Major concerns 
Although the financial systems approach is mentioned as the newly generated 
approach, many developing countries continue to follow the traditional poverty reduction 
approach through their directed programs, especially in agriculture and rural development. 
This indicates that there still has not been a common view towards the development of 
sustainable microfinance. However, it is recognized that there has been a significant shift 
from the poverty reduction to financial systems approach (Christen and Drake, 2001; 
Robinson, 1997; Vogel and Adams, 1997). The success of the Unit Desa System of BRI in 
Indonesia, and of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which has changed its view towards 
financial systems approach (Yunus, 2001), have made important contributions to the progress 
of new approach.  
We, like Robinson (2001), support the financial systems approach as we believe 
microfinance can be profitable and that it is the right approach which enables the development 
of sustainable microfinance. People may see commercial microfinance is feasibly profitable 
when they observe how moneylenders make their money. However, it should be emphasized 
that moneylenders may exploit local information gained from living close to their clients and 
thus reduce the risks and costs associated with their transactions. Hence, the priory factor that 
decides the profitability of a commercial microfinance is the ability to charge cost-covering 
interest rates that the clients can afford and willing to pay.  
There are two issues in this assumption. First, whether microfinance borrowers are 
willing to pay high cost-covering interest rates? Studies (Robinson, 2001) have shown that 
even the costs of accessing informal funds from money lenders are low, compared to formal 
financial institutions, the micro clients have to pay extremely high interest rates that ends up 
 95
with extremely high total cost of borrowing to borrowers. The existence and popularity of 
moneylenders in many developing countries therefore imply that in fact the poor can afford 
for such high interest rates when they have a demand. Therefore, it is feasible that commercial 
microfinance institutions can charge cost covering interest rates (Charitonenko and Rahman, 
2002).  
Second, whether MFIs can charge the interest rates that the micro borrowers can 
afford? It is clear that if the commercial microfinance institutions could provide financial 
services at the costs that the money lenders are providing, they would be profitable. 
Moreover, the commercial microfinance institutions may have some advantages gaining from 
the poor’ preference: the poor usually prefer not to be indebted to individuals, especially in 
rural areas. It is also another advantage that that formal financial sector may provide large 
scale of financial services and be understood as being able to provide financial services on a 
long-term basis, which is essential to poor borrowers. 
We have now come up with a major concern that given the excessive demand for 
various types of credit, savings and other financial services (Gonzalez Vega, 2003), if the 
poor can afford for high interest rates and microfinance is profitable (Robinson, 2001), why 
has the demand not been met? Why there is still a huge number of poor and low-income 
households having no or insufficient access to financial services (see section 3.2)?  
Robinson (2001) recognises that the most likely reasons for the above concerns, 
assuming financial systems approach, include: (i) the lack of appropriate and efficient 
financial technologies; (ii) insufficient accurate information about the dynamics and 
interactions of local markets that are available to bankers, economists, and policymakers; and 
(iii) the limited interest in microfinance among policy makers and managers of financial 
institutions. While the first two reasons can be solved time by time when microfinance 
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industry develops, the limited interest in microfinance is seen to be a problem of cost-
effectiveness (Gonzalez Vega, 2003), which shows extremely high costs to provide 
commercial microfinance in areas of very low population density (Robinson, 2001). 
It is important to recognise that the cost-effectiveness problem can be solved if we can 
(i) develop innovative financial technologies that enable financial institutions to reduce the 
costs associated with financial transactions; and (ii) creating a sound financial environment 
that makes information available to participants in the microfinance market (Gonzalez Vega, 
2003). The purpose of these solutions is to create an efficient mechanism that allows financial 
intermediation for the poor and low-income households. This is similar to the implication by 
Rutherford (1998) which suggests that provision of financial services for the poor people is 
simply to create an efficient mechanism which enables them to convert a series of savings into 
useful large lump sums and that financial services for poor people are to help them get hold of 
usefully large sums of cash when they need cash or have an opportunity to invest it. Hence, a 
more favourable policy environment and particularly appropriate innovations in financial 
technologies and improvements in the institutional design of financial organizations can allow 
a cost effective expansion of the formal financial sector services to broader sectors of the 
population in the developing countries (Gonzalez Vega, 2003; Chaves and Gonzalez, 1996). 
Given the cost-effectiveness problem, the next concern relates to social issue in 
providing financial services to the poor. Since commercial microfinance institutions target the 
better-off poor who have investment opportunities, the poorest of the poor are left aside. 
Moreover, even if the target at the better-off poor is acceptable, what would happen if the 
commercial microfinance institutions are able to offer financial services only at the costs that 
are much higher than those that better-off households can afford? Apparently, this problem 
indicates that in such a circumstance there should be a balance between the commercial and 
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social goal (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002) in order to enable the development of 
microfinance industry. Hence, we believe that some kind of subsidy should be needed, but the 
question is then how much subsidy should be acceptable and in which forms? 
We suggest that it is necessary to help the poorest of the poor become bankable and 
gain access to financial intermediation under financial system approach. Labour intensive 
development programs, job creation, skills development, heath care services .etc could be 
necessary for the poorest of the poor before they are able to make use of financial services. It 
is also noted that the provision of these services is normally accompanied within the poverty 
reduction approach (Robinson, 2001). However, it is combined simultaneously with credit 
and thus does not help the poorest make use of it. What we do imply here is a subsidy from 
the government (or relevant agency) to provide these services separately from the financial 
intermediation which keeps its commercial principles. In other words, we need social 
intermediation for the poorest before financial intermediation and these two processes should 
be coordinated. 
3.4.2 The mixed approach?  
Given the considerations of cost-effectiveness and the balance between commercial 
and social goals, we propose that the pure financial systems approach is not a good option at 
this stage. A new approach which encourages the development of commercial microfinance, 
and thus enables the development of sustainable microfinance and simultaneously keeps keep 
the balance of commercial and social goals would be more ambitious and necessary at this 
stage of transition. The performance of alternative financial institutions3 which do not 
maximize their profitability and are successful at getting double bottom-lines (i.e. financial 
self-sufficiency and social goals) has promised the potential future of new approach in 
                                                
3 See CGAP (2004) 
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microfinance (CGAP, 2004). This indicates our concept of sustainable microfinance presented 
in Chapter 1. 
In thinking of the new approach, we suppose that two main forces affecting the 
development of sustainable microfinance industry include the process of commercialization of 
microfinance and the supports from governments and donors. We expect that if these two 
forces are realized, tailored and implemented carefully, they would shift the microfinance 
productivity frontier from a low outreach and unprofitable to a higher outreach and profitable 
productivity frontier (see Figure 3.9). 
Figure 3.9 – Two forces and new productivity frontier 
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services at the costs that the clients can afford, rather than the goals of financial sustainability 
or poverty reduction. Our idea is simple that if the “Black Box” of microfinance is unlocked, 
it enables the goal of wide and sustainable outreach and thus contributes to both the goal of 
poverty reduction and financial sustainability.  
Under this mixed approach, supports from the government and donors can be in two 
forms. First, the government should create a sound financial environment and informational 
intermediaries that facilitate the development of financial intermediation for the poor. 
Government and donors should intervene in financial markets for the poor households with 
actions towards institutional mechanism development rather than direct financial (Gonzalez 
Vega, 2003). Government and donor actions are needed in order to (i) encourage the 
development and adoption of new financial technologies that would make it possible at 
reasonable costs to reduce the risks of financial transactions for all market participants; (ii) 
build additional institutional infrastructure that would support the implementation of the new 
financial technologies; and (iii) build new institutional designs that would guarantee the 
adoption of these technologies by organizations with the vocation and capacity to become 
sustainable (Gonzalez Vega, 2003).  
Specifically, government and donor actions may include the supports towards the 
creation of informational intermediation such as credit scoring, credit rating agencies and 
payment systems. They may also comprise of any support that contributes to an efficient 
mechanism of financial intermediation such as new allocation network, risk management 
techniques, credit scoring solutions and partnerships. All microfinance institutions should be 
granted access to this information and techniques. Donors may encourage the establishment of 
informational intermediaries such as credit rating agencies that collect information about 
clients of non-regulated institutions (such as Mass Organizations in Vietnam), which are 
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potential partners in microfinance partnership. The prudential regulation and supervision are 
also necessary. 
Second, the government and donors should provide non-financial supporting services 
such as physical infrastructure improvements (e.g. transportation, telecommunications), 
trainings on business skills, job creation, health care and education i.e. social intermediation 
(Robinson, 2001) to the poor, especially the poorest of the poor. It should be noted that 
favourable economic and sector policies are a necessary condition but not sufficient for 
expanding the frontier of financial services, especially in rural areas (Gonzalez Vega, 2003). 
The establishment of a physical and institutional infrastructure that facilitates the smooth 
operation of financial markets is indispensable for rural financial deepening. Many 
components of this physical and institutional infrastructure contain elements of public goods 
and, without state intervention, they would be underprovided. All of these supporting actions 
can be understood as some kind of subsidies of the government and donors in order to help 
commercial microfinance institutions develop, but they should not be in the forms of direct 
subsidy to costs of financial services. 
In brief, in an attempt to develop a sustainable microfinance industry, it is necessary to 
recognise that there is always a conflict between profitability and social goal. The pure 
poverty reduction approach fails because it focuses on social goal but forgets the profitability 
aspect which is important for operation on sustainable basis. The pure financial system 
approach aims at profitability goal but it ignores the social goal, if it finds microfinance 
unprofitable.  Hence, a mixed approach which keeps the balance between profitability and 
social goal could be more appropriate at this stage of transition. However, the mixed approach 
that we have suggested does not mean a partly subsidy but a combination of financial 
intermediation (which follows principles of financial systems approach) and social and 
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informational intermediation (which is separated and supported by government and donors). 
Microfinance institutions which operate on commercial basis may benefit from building 
partnerships with these intermediaries. 
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Figure 3.10 – The mixed approach to microfinance 
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 3.6. Financial policies and microfinance development 
3.6.1. The role of government 
We believe that a sound business environment plays a critical role in enabling the 
emergence of microfinance as an industry. As analyzed in the above sections, the new views 
on microfinance require a more favorable “playing field” which encourages the participation 
of financial institutions in microfinance market. For most cases, the task of creating a 
favorable playing field in financial sector is assumed to be of the central banks. The 
discussion of the role of central banks basically starts with their overall objective and 
functions related to the financial system and the economy. As Chandavarkar (1996) analyzes, 
there is a distinction between developmental and promotional functions of a central bank.  
Developmental activities include credit guarantees and insurance, participation in the 
capital and management of development institutions, priority sector lending, differential 
interest rates, preferential rediscount rates and facilities, and setting target credit/deposit ratios 
for rural branches of banking institutions. The promotional functions emphasize the role of 
central banks as “creating traffic” agent in terms of filling the gaps in the financial structure in 
respect of instruments, institutions, markets and personnel. Chandavarkar (1996) also argues 
that promotional activities should be the measures to reduce transaction and information costs. 
Promotional activities may include support for pilot projects using innovative approaches to 
microfinance, the conduct of research, the collection and publication of data, and advocacy 
and training.  
With respect to microfinance, Gonzalez Vega (2003) shows that for a proper 
development of commercial microfinance, the role of the state (central bank) should be to 
promote the smooth and efficient operation of markets, rather than to substitute administrative 
allocations for market forces. The central bank should not intervene in the determination of 
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interest rates and other prices of financial services and impose portfolio quotas and other 
quantitative instruments to redirect the supply and to administratively influence the allocation 
of credit. Borune and Graham (1984) also suggest that any direct production of rural financial 
services by the state (central bank) should not be encouraged.  
Overall, we believe that the central bank should not subsidize or get involved directly 
but promote microfinance. However, as Ed Mayo and Mullineux (2000) argue, it should be 
aware that in case of market failure, a “careful subsidy” can, in principle, promote the 
development of microfinance through competition. The creation of such supporting agencies 
like Development Bank or Small Business Agency (for examples the Farm Credit 
Administration and the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation in the US), which perform 
the function of supporting the development of microfinance by providing loan guarantees and 
ensuring the soundness and safety of MFIs (rather than subsidizing loans directly) and 
business training supports could be more valuable than any of the directed actions (see section 
3.5).  
3.6.2. Does financial liberalization help? 
The government may also affect the emergence of commercial microfinance through 
its perception towards a financial reform. Generally, the foundation for financial reform 
depends on the belief of whether financial repression or financial liberalization is important to 
economic development. Although it has been increasingly seen that financial liberalization is 
more preferable (Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson, 1996), but somewhere else, it is believed better 
to keep the financial system repressed (Stiglitz, 1994, 1996).  
However, it is not our purpose to argue about the choice of financial repression or 
financial liberalization, but how these two options may affect the development of 
microfinance. Even though, we recognize that in fact, the rules that govern the activities of 
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MFIs are not appropriate with MFIs for a simple reason that in most cases those rules were 
not designed with the MFIs in mind, and so the simple point is to remove any regulatory 
barriers and create a fairer basis for competition (Ed Mayo and Mullineux, 2000). 
Financial repression 
Shaw (1973) sees financial repression as “distortions of financial prices including 
interest rates and foreign exchange rates”. The works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
discuss about the weaknesses of the financial repression with a message that financial 
repression is no longer appropriate for economic development. However, on the other hand, 
others (see for example: Stiglitz, 1994, 1996) believe that financial repression is necessary in 
some certain circumstance. There are a number of reasons for the persistence of financial 
repression. The most seen reason shows the approach that the governments may attempt, 
through their central banks, to encourage what they regard as priority activities. As to 
economic development in general and microfinance in particular, this is crucially important if 
the government believes in the poverty reduction approach. 
One example of financial repression from practice could be the case of Vietnam and 
similarly, China. In these countries, there existed the so-called “mono banking” system. There 
were no separate commercial banks, and the central bank acts as both the regulatory authority 
and the commercial banks. The central bank was directly involved in developmental activities 
on behalf of the government, extending loans at administered interest rates to particular 
industry sectors and state-owned enterprises in accordance with the centrally determined 
credit plan. The major changes in attempt to remove the restrictions on financial system i.e. in 
some sense towards financial liberalization were made in 1986 and 1978 (but not yet in effect 
of financial sector until 1998 and 1995) in Vietnam and China respectively when these two 
countries introduced their economic reforms. However, the central bank still has 
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responsibility for some developmental activities. For instance, the list of legislated central 
bank functions includes the power to administer financial institutions and to control financial 
markets. Indeed, the central bank still carries out government policy directives of a 
developmental nature. 
  Under financial repression, in our idea, it seems less evident to see such policies of 
controlling interest rates and directing credit for developmental purposes have been effective. 
First, controlling the interest rate (normally below the market rate) discourage saving and thus 
induces saving and investment below their socially optimal level. Second, directed credit and 
(manual) credit rationing distort the allocation of bank lending between projects, reducing the 
average quality of investments. Third, high level of the state ownership in financial sector – 
normally as a consequence of financial repression – might be associated with slower financial 
development and lower growth in per capita income (as shown in the study of La Porta et al, 
2000).  
These reasons suggest that the government through central bank should not support 
microfinance through measures such as directed credit programs, interest rate controls, and 
high ownership of financial institutions. Interest ceilings – frequently combined with high 
rates of inflation or the overvaluation of the domestic currency, restriction on entry into 
financial intermediation and constraints on competition, portfolio quotas and other 
quantitative and qualitative controls on credit portfolios as well as controls on the terms and 
conditions of loan contracts and on banking procedures – had discouraged experimentation 
and innovation in financial technologies (Gonzalez Vega (2003).  
 Financial liberalization  
 The policies of financial liberalization have been gradually introduced since the mid 
1980s (Gonzalez Vega, 2003). Building on a more favorable macroeconomic environment, 
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given the success of stabilization measures, these policies have attempted to improve 
efficiency in the operation of financial markets and to take advantage of the gains from 
transactions that take place through markets and on market terms. Indeed, in past two decades, 
financial liberalization and other financial policy reforms in many developing countries and 
economies in transition have opened spaces for innovation in financial technologies that had 
previously been frustrated by financial repression (Westley, 1999).  
Recent research (e.g. Levine, 1997) has shown the empirical evidence that rapid 
financial development, which results largely from legal and policy changes to liberalize the 
financial system, has been associated with rapid economic growth in many developing 
countries. However, we should remind about the “rapid” financial liberalization in light of the 
Asian financial crisis. In one hand, rapid financial liberalization can contribute to economic 
growth, but on the other hand it can also create the conditions for financial collapse (ADB, 
2000b). It is believed that the financial liberalization can be effective if it is accompanied by 
complementary legal, regulatory, human resource, and informational reforms (see for 
examples: Demirguc Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Cole and Slade, 1999).  
As regarding microfinance, among other things, many researchers believe that central 
banks can and should contribute to the development of microfinance through careful and 
appropriately sequenced financial liberalization. Liberalization enables the financial system to 
reach some households that would otherwise not have access to formal financial services. 
However, the task has been to find the ways in which liberalization can contribute to the 
development of a sustainable microfinance sector, such as through deregulating interest rates 
and removing barriers to entry of new institutions into the formal financial system.  
It is clear that financial liberalization by itself is not a sufficient condition for ensuring 
that large numbers of poor households have access to financial services on a continuing basis 
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(Gonzalez Vega, 1993; Westley, 1994). The formal financial system reaches only a small 
proportion of households in developing countries. As interpreted from Fry et al. (1996), it is 
not to remove restrictions on financial markets but also to impose a positive encouragement of 
financial markets in order to get the goal of reaching poor households on sustainable basis. 
This suggests a possible role for central banks in promoting financial systems. 
Moreover, as Gonzalez Vega (2003) shows, financial reforms have arrived into the 
rural areas, where demands for micro-financial services come from, more slowly than to other 
sectors of the economy. In many quarters, there is still a deep-felt view that farm households 
are too poor to save and to demand deposit facilities or to acquire financial assets, and they 
cannot pay market interest rates on loans or determine by themselves the best possible uses 
for loan funds.  
Another aspect of financial liberalization is reform in framework for prudential 
regulation and supervision. According to Gonzalez Vega (2003), the commercialization of 
microfinance requires a regulatory framework that (i) promotes competition and lower 
barriers to entry into microfinance markets; (ii) eliminates unnecessary fragmentation in rural 
financial markets, resulting from specialized charters that prevent competition and the 
emergence of economies of scale, economies of scope and portfolio diversification; (iii) 
eliminates credit programs housed in non-financial institutions; and (iv) establishes a road 
map for the closing, sale or privatization of state-owned development banks.  
3.7 Conclusion 
 We have shown in this chapter that the poor do have demand for the financial services 
(Rutherford, 1998), like everyone else. They need financial services for a number of reasons 
such as to invest in business opportunities and to smooth consumption (Morduch and Haley, 
2002; ADB, 2000a). The convincing theory by Rutherford (1998) indicates that for the poor, 
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financial services such as credit and savings help them to accumulate “large sum” money 
when they need. Even though, the ratio of coverage by microfinance institutions is too low 
and thus, there is an excessive demand for financial services from the poor and low income 
households (Gibbons and Meehan, 2002). One of the reasons for the low coverage is that most 
microfinance institutions are NGOs and are too small and unable to reach the poor on large 
scale (CGAP, 2004; Gibbons and Meehan, 2002). This implies that an enhancement of formal 
financial sector for the poor on sustainable basis is necessary. 
 In attempts to meet the excessive demand for financial services from the poor, 
microfinance institutions and governments have followed two different approaches, namely 
poverty reduction approach and financial systems approach (Rhyne, 1998; Robinson, 1999, 
2001). On one hand, the poverty reduction approach bases on the belief that financial services 
have positive impact on household poverty reduction and thus commits to providing cheap 
financial services (mainly credit) to the poor, especially the poorest of the poor, on subsidy 
basis. On the other hand, the financial system approach aims at building a financial 
intermediation system among the poor, especially the economically active poor, on a 
sustainable basis with an application of market principles into microfinance.  
 We find that both approaches have their own disadvantages. The poverty reduction 
approach expects a positive impact of credit on household poverty reduction but literature 
shows that the degree of impact is too small, which raises an issue of cost-effectiveness 
debate (Morduch and Meehan, 2002; Gonzalez Vega, 2003). Some studies also have indicated 
that the positive impact is not always been found and that it depends on certain circumstances 
(Gonzalez Vega, 2003). Moreover, it is suspected that the target at the poorest of the poor 
may not be a right policy as for the extremely poor they need basic needs and are not able to 
make use of financial services and thus the provision of financial services is even harmful for 
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them (Robinson, 2001; Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). Empirical studies also indicate that 
under this approach better-off households are most likely to be granted credit (see Chapter 4, 
5 and 6). As a result, it has been shown that this approach has failed in achieving its goal of 
outreach and it is no longer favored (Gonzalez Vega, 2003; Robinson, 2001).  
 The financial systems approach has developed with a belief that microfinance can be 
profitable on sustainable basis and indeed it is shown by the case of Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 
The key element of this approach is the application of market principle into microfinance, of 
which charging full costs on financial services provided is essential (Charitonenko and 
Rahman, 2002; Christen and Drake, 2001).  While this notion is feasible if we know that the 
poor potentially can afford services from money lenders at extremely high costs, there are 
some concerns with the cost-effectiveness problem. It is possible that the financial institutions 
may find their cost of supply much higher than the maximum cost that the households can 
afford, and thus they decide not to operate in the market. It also possible that because this 
approach targets the economically active households, the extremely poor are often excluded. 
Both these possibilities indicate that there should be a balance between social and financial 
goal in developing a sustainable microfinance industry (Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002). 
 In recognition of the balance between social and financial goal in microfinance, we 
propose a mix of the two approaches. We suggest that financial institutions should follow 
their objective of being a commercial microfinance institution i.e. follow financial system 
approach and the governments and donors should provide supports to this approach in two 
ways: (i) create an enabling financial infrastructure and informational intermediation to assist 
(but not subsidize) microfinance institutions to reduce costs; and (ii) to provide social 
intermediation, such as physical infrastructure, education , health, job creation and  business 
skills to the poor, extremely poor in order for them to be able to make use of financial services 
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and gain access to financial system. We also have made some recommendation on the role of 
the government in the implementation of financial policies to support the proposed approach. 
 To some extent, we have supported the view that financial repression may not be of 
help and financial liberalization may release some freedom for the formal financial sector to 
increase its outreach to the poor and low income households. However, it should be noted that 
some economists (e.g. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, 1997) argue that some controls and 
restrictions on competition create franchise value in financial markets that reduce moral 
hazard behaviors among financial intermediaries. Lending rate controls may also increase the 
efficiency of intermediation by reducing agency costs in loan markets. This set of financial 
policies is called the financial restraint which distinguishes from the financial repression in 
that the financial restraint extracts rents from private sector while the financial repression 
calls for the government to create rent opportunities in this sector. However, again, our 
purpose in this chapter is not to discuss the choice of policy pattern but to emphasize that the 
right policies are clearly important for stimulating the development of microfinance sector. 
 In conclusion, we have discussed briefly the choice of approach to microfinance with 
a view that the perception of microfinance may play an important role in its development. We 
believe that there will be a revolution of microfinance in the near future towards a 
commercialization of finance for the poor and this revolution will enhance its performance. 
The detailed analysis of commercialization of microfinance and how it would affect the 
performance of microfinance is necessary and important, but it however is not the purpose of 
our study and we expect it for further research.  
 In the next chapter, we start investigating the study: microfinance in rural Vietnam. 
We will present a picture of microfinance in Vietnam, a country that follows the poverty 
reduction approach. We will discuss the structure of microfinance in rural Vietnam, with a 
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detailed analysis of each type of microfinance institutions, including performance and 
strength and weakness. We will also analyze the governmental policies and approach to 
microfinance and explain why microfinance in Vietnam has not been sustainable. Finally, we 
will make comments on building a microfinance sector following a mixed approach, which 
has been proposed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MICROFINACE IN RURAL VIETNAM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In Chapter 2, we have explained why formal financial sector is generally reluctant to 
provide financial services to the poor and low income households. We also have discussed in 
Chapter 3 that government interventions in the financial markets for the poor could be also 
not a solution. The poverty reduction approach, which aims at cheap credit for the poor, has 
shown its failures and weaknesses in reaching the poor (Gonzalez Vega, 2003; Robinson, 
2001). The financial systems approach, which aims at developing a commercially financial 
intermediation for the poor could be also not a solution at this stage because of financial self-
sufficiency issues and the exclusion of the extremely poor. Hence, a mixed approach could be 
more appropriate.  
 In Vietnam, finance for the poor has been the interest of the government for about ten 
years. The economic reform taken in 1986 has transformed the country towards a market-
oriented economy and achieved some significant results in terms of economic growth (Dao, 
2001a, 2002). However, the rural Vietnam seems to be lagged behind while most of the 
population are from the rural areas, resulting in a large gap in income and living standards 
between the rural and urban areas. In this context, the national development strategy has 
emphasized on the importance of agriculture and rural development. One of the important 
components of this strategy is to ensure the rural poor having access to financial services 
(SRV, 2002). 
 As a result, the government of Vietnam follows the poverty reduction approach in 
providing financial services to the poor. Cheap credit from governments and donors is 
provided to the poor through the network of state-owned banks with a perception that credit 
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improves the poverty reduction in rural areas (SRV, 2002). While the impact of credit on 
household poverty reduction, which will be discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, is found positive but 
small, the formal financial sector has shown itself unsustainable in reaching the poor.  The 
main reason is that the poverty reduction approach does not allow financial institutions to be 
financially self-sufficient. Other reasons may include (i) the lack of supports from the 
government and donors to enhance the financial infrastructure and information intermediation 
which does not enable financial institutions to reach the poor at lower costs; and (ii) the lack 
of innovations in financial technology which does not help financial institutions to reach the 
poor more efficiently and effectively.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the current situation of microfinance in rural 
Vietnam in order to make possible recommendations towards a strategy for sustainable 
microfinance. To do so, we look at the performance of the microfinance markets with specific 
interests on the role of government shown by policy frameworks and the strengths and 
weaknesses of financial institutions. Generally, we suppose that formal financial institutions 
are not financially self-sufficient in providing financial services to the poor in rural Vietnam. 
We therefore suggest that the poverty reduction approach with subsidized credit should be 
removed, and instead, a mixed approach should be launched. The government and donors 
should invest more in social and informational intermediation while the financial institutions 
should learn from the successful experiences such as from the BRI or NGOs in reaching the 
poor and in pricing their services. 
 The remainder of the chapter is as follows. The next section discusses about the 
economic reforms and the rural poor and their incomes. In section 4.3, we present a picture of 
microfinance in rural Vietnam. In this section, we focus on the market structure i.e. who are 
providing microfinance services in Vietnam and the outreach to the poor. Section 4.4 analyzes 
 115 
the lending technologies that are generally used in rural Vietnam. We then conduct a brief 
assessment of microfinance in rural Vietnam which covers all of the above issues in the next 
section. Section 4.6 reveals our major recommendations towards a sustainable microfinance in 
Vietnam. The last section summarizes the main findings of this chapter. 
4.2 Reforms and the rural poor 
 
Box 4.1 – Profile of Rural Vietnam 
 
 
4.2.1 Economic reform and strategy for poverty reduction  
 Vietnam has been transforming itself from a centrally planned to a market oriented 
economy since Doi Moi, or economic reform, was initiated in the late 1980s. Significant 
improvements in terms of economic growth rate have been achieved. On average, the GDP 
growth rate has increased from 4.6% on average in 1980s to 7.6% in 1990s. However, there is 
a significant inequality in the development of rural and urban areas. Recent average national 
per capita income is estimated at US$300, but for rural areas, accounting for 80% of 
population, the figure is at US$100 (Dao, 2001a, 2002). Therefore, the rural development has 
Vietnam – Rural Microfinance Profile 
 61 provinces, 527 districts, 9 801 communes and 45 000 villages. 
 Total Population: 78 million people. 
 Total number of households: 15 million. 
 Inflation rate was 8.9% as of February 1999 and -0.6% in 2000. 
 Average per capita income is 200 USD in 1998 and 300USD in 2001. 
 80% of population living in rural area giving a total of 12 million rural households. 
 Average per capita income is approx. 80USD in 1998 and 100USD in 2001. 
 Five groups of rural population 
1. Hungry Poor  : 10% of population ( 1.2 million households ) 
2. Poor   : 15% of population ( 1.8 million households ) 
3. Average                 : 40% of population ( 4.8 million households ) 
4. Better-off   : 25% of population ( 3.0 million households ) 
5. Rich   : 10% of population ( 1.2 million households ) 
 Total Rural Households (HHs): 12 million HHs 
 Low Income Households (LIHs): included groups 2 and 3. 
 LIH was estimated at 55-56% of the population, or 6.7 million LIHs. 
 
Source: Vietnam – Canada Rural Finance Project, 2001 
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been set as one of the prime goals of the Vietnamese Government’s strategic development 
plan (SRV, 2002).  
 The first government’s rural development initiative was launched in 1997 when a 
national poverty alleviation strategy was introduced to give poor and low-income households 
opportunities to have a better life. One of the major components of the government poverty 
alleviation strategy is to ensure that the rural poor have access to credit and financial services. 
The government concluded that improving access to microfinance in rural areas was one of 
the most tangible ways of assisting low-income households (SRV, 2002).  
 However, the outreach of formal banking sector to rural areas is limited. A recent 
study (McCarty, 2001) indicates that the formal banking sector meets only 30 % of rural 
credit needs. The majority of rural borrowing is from informal sources and often at interest 
rates that are many times higher than those charged by formal institutions. Although the 
informal sector (mainly money lenders and rotating savings and credit associations) satisfies 
some of the rural credit needs, the high interest rates charged are regarded as usurious for low-
income households and it provides no assistance in the field of savings mobilization (Dao, 
2002). Improving the supply of banking services in rural areas therefore appears to be 
important to enhance low-income households' capacity to improve their living conditions and 
to increase financial intermediation in general. 
 Even though, the government has not issued any specific policies on microfinance. 
The main policy that relates the importance of microfinance and poverty alleviation is the 
national strategy for Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR). The strategy aims at 
reducing poverty headcount percentage to 10% of the population by the year 2005. In this 
strategy, subsidized credit is considered to be one of the most important elements (SRV, 
2002). To enable this strategy, government has established the Vietnam Bank for the Poor 
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(VBP) in 1995 with a primary duty of providing soft loans to poor households and promoting 
poverty alleviation programs. The government also reinforces the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural development (VBARD) to emphasize its role as a government agent in 
the development process.  
4.2.2 Banking sector reform 
As part of the economic reform program, the banking sector has been transformed 
from a Soviet-style mono banking system toward a two tier system in which the big four state-
owned banks are commercialised and play the major role in banking market and there is a 
central bank. The banking sector reform also creates the opportunities for the participation of 
non state-owned banks and credit institutions in the credit market. In rural areas, there are 
several banks and credit institutions operating, including the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (VBARD), the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP)4, Rural 
Shareholding Banks (RSHBs), Peoples Credit Funds (PCFs), Credit Cooperatives and some 
other types of microfinance institutions (MFIs). VBARD has the largest branch network and 
has become the largest player in this market (McCarty 2001). VBP was formed in 1995 and 
operates through the network of VBARD as a result of an initiative by the government to 
provide subsidised credit to poor households (Dao, 2001a, 2002). 
 One of the most important areas of banking sector reform affecting rural credit is 
interest rate policy. The Law on Banks and Credit Institutions determines and regulates 
interest rates at banking institutions. Since 1996, the government has gradually liberalised 
interest rates (World Bank, 2002). The ceiling interests were replaced by the base rate plus 
margins. However, banks and credit institutions operating in the rural market regard the rates 
to be too low to permit them to be financially sustainable. The banks have little or no 
                                                
4 This bank has been transformed into the Policy Bank since 2003. 
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flexibility when trying to cover expenses and make a return or profit. The regulation that the 
spread between lending rates and rates on savings cannot exceed 0.3% and 0.5% per month 
for short-term loans and medium- and long-term loans, respectively, has further discouraged 
rural financial institutions from extending small loans to the rural poor and low-income 
households, given the high transaction costs for small loans (Dao, 2002)5.   
4.2.3 The rural poor and their incomes 
A recent study by Dao (2002) suggests that if we consider 12 million rural households, 
65% can be categorised as poor or low-income households. However, it is noted that this 
classification is drawn from the government’s criteria (see Appendix 4.1). If we use the 
criteria set by the World Bank, it could be that most of the rural households are poor and low 
income households (see Appendix 4.2). Statistical data has also shown that living standards of 
rural borrowing households are slightly lower than those of non-borrowing households (Table 
4.1). This indicates that the poorer households in rural Vietnam indeed demand credit. 
Table 4.1 - Selected indicators of household welfare (in thousand VND) 
 1997/1998 1992/1993 
Selected household living 
standard 
Rural 
households 
Rural 
borrowing 
households 
Urban 
households 
Rural 
households 
Rural 
borrowing 
households 
Urban 
households 
Per capita expenditure 2361.29 2248.61 5230.33 1161.85 1119.1 2286.14 
Per capita food expenditure 1306.81 1251.24 2117.3 702.76 679.36 967.67 
Per capita non-food expenditure 1054.48 997.38 3113.04 459.09 439.74 1318.47 
Average of poverty status [1..5] 2.85 2.75 4.34 2.84 2.75 4.13 
Average amount of borrowing 4626.07 4626.07 13098.42 1328 1328 6215.85 
Source: VLSS92/93 and VLSS 97/98 
The most evident characteristic of rural borrowers in Vietnam is the lack of sufficient 
collateral, partly due to the former state-landownership system. Only a small number of 
households have the collateral required by formal financial institutions. These institutions 
only accept legally registered assets as collateral – the primary asset being the official Land 
                                                
5 It should be noted that the interest rate ceiling has been removed since 2003 in the commercial financial sector, 
but for rural development and poverty reduction lending programs, the government still commits priory or cheap 
credit. However, the spread on interest rates is relevant for the period before 2003. 
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Use Certificate (LUC). However, as by June 2001, no province in Vietnam had yet finalized 
the issuance of LUCs to households (Dao, 2002). Moreover, each household can have only 
one LUC, which provides eligibility for only one loan at a time. Assets used as collateral are 
usually of low value, and are usually under-valued in comparison to the land price stipulated 
by the government.  
 The low level of education of rural borrowers causes difficulty in understanding and 
completing the necessary forms and documents (e.g. business plans and statements on loan 
utilization). Most rural borrowers reside far from financial service points, resulting in time-
consuming travel to the bank branches.  Furthermore, the publicity about financial services is 
both inefficient and late. Rural borrowers are also inexperienced in preparing loan 
applications and many rely on credit officers to help them. For most applications, credit 
officers are consulted on the preparation of business plans and loan utilization, or simply in 
order to get loan application forms.  
 However, credit officers are limited in number and, in the case of VBARD, one officer 
regularly has to deal with three communes with hundreds of borrowers without a fixed 
working schedule. Consequently, applicants spend a lot of time and money on preliminary 
activities, which in some cases do not even result in the submission of an application form. 
Furthermore, households want to use funds for various purposes, but formal financial 
institutions only finance a certain number of specified uses (McCarty, 2001). The expenses 
(certification fees, photograph, application form, travel and work lost etc.) incurred to borrow 
from the banks are unaffordable for many low-income households who thus effectively face 
financed exclusion.  
 The task of getting outreach to the rural poor households is therefore important. As we 
will see further in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, the poor households are in general difficult to get access 
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to the formal financial sector for a number of reasons, but they indeed benefit from having 
access to financial services. For example, studies by Dao (2001b, 2000) suggest that the 
number of working hours for rural households, which almost are relying on agriculture such 
as rice farming and animal husbandry , increases if they gain access to financial services (see 
Table 4.2) and hence the household income increases (Figure 4.1). 
Table 4.2 - Number of full working months a year of households 
Before borrowing (% households) After borrowing (% households) 
Region 1-3 
months 
3-5 
months 
5-7 
months 
7-12 
months 
1-3  
months 
3-5  
months 
5-7  
months 
7-12 
months 
North 0.95 5.87 22.16 71.02 0.19 1.52 13.83 84.47 
Central region 0.15 4.32 15.77 79.76 0.00 0.89 9.67 89.43 
Central 
Highland 1.75 3.06 15.72 79.48 0.87 1.31 3.93 93.89 
South 2.98 4.47 15.88 76.67 0.74 2.48 9.43 87.34 
Country 1.20 4.64 17.65 76.50 0.33 1.48 10.11 88.25 
Source: Dao (2001b) 
Figure 4.1 - Household Monthly Income (per capita) Pre- and Post-Borrowing 
Before borrowing
9.37%
15.63%
35.68%
38.96%
0-50,000 51-80,000 81-200,000 More than 200,000
efore borro ing
9.37
15.63
35.68
38.96
0-50,000 51-80,000 81-200,000 ore than 200,000
Before borrowing, the percentages of households who 
have a monthly per capita income of between VND81-
200,000 and more than VND200,000 are 35,68% and 
38.95%, respectively … 
 
Source: Dao (2001b) 
After borrowing
3.39% 8.63%
26.89%
61.09%
0-50,000 51-80,000 81-200,000 More than 200,000
fter borro ing
3.39 8.63
26.89
61.09
0-50,000 51-80,000 81-200,000 ore than 200,000
…But after borrowing, these figures are 26.89% and 
61.09% implying that households indeed benefit from 
borrowing. 
4.3 Microfinance structure and outreach 
4.3.1 An overview 
The rural financial market in Vietnam is segmented into three core sectors: formal, 
semi-formal and informal. In the formal sector, the key providers of microfinance services are 
VBARD, VBP, PCFs and RSHBs. The semiformal sector is dominated by National Programs, 
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Microfinance Programs of Social Organisations (SOs), and Savings & Credit Schemes 
supported by NGOs and donors. Typically, formal and semi-formal financial sectors in 
Vietnam provide credit to rural households for the specific purposes of rural development 
and/or poverty reduction at cheaper interest rates. Thus, these sectors basically employ their 
own criteria in selecting and screening borrowers who are eligible to receive loans from them. 
The formal and semi-formal schemes however, were either unable to meet the huge demand 
for financial services or they could not reach the poor. In such cases, the poor have to rely on 
the informal credit sources, which consist mainly of credit extended by rotating credit 
associations, moneylenders, families, friends and traders. Figure 4.2 at the end of this section 
presents an outline of the structure of rural credit market. 
Prior to 1990, formal credit institutions (state-owned banks and credit cooperatives) 
provided credit only to state enterprises and production cooperatives. International NGOs 
were not allowed to operate in the country; and social organizations did not offer financial 
services. Individual farmers and households therefore could not access credit from formal 
institutions. The Doi Moi policy, begun in 1990, and followed by reform of banking sector 
and land use, has changed the face of rural credit service development. The percentage of 
rural households having access to credit has increased significantly.  
  There has been an increasing role of formal credit in the rural credit market. As the 
Table 4.3 shows, in 1998, there were only 49% of the total rural households and 40% of the 
total rural LIHs having access to formal and/or semi-formal credit, but in 2001, the figures 
were 70.2% and 61.5%. Most of rural households and LIHs had access to formal financial 
sector, of which the major sources are from the VBARD and the VBP. Semi formal source of 
financial services cover a very small market clientele, 1% of rural households and 1.8% of 
LIHs in 2001. However, there are still a large proportion of households with no access to 
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either formal or semi-formal credit: 51% of rural households and 60% of LIHs remained 
unable to access financial services in 1998, and 29.8% and 38.5% in 2001. These households 
are assumed to have to seek financial services from informal at extremely high costs, or have 
no demand for financial services.  
The reasons for borrowing from the informal sector are various, of which smoothing 
consumption (Rutherford, 1998; Morduch and Haley, 2002) is important. A survey in 2001 
conducted by Microfinance Resource Center, National Economics University reveals another 
reason that almost 99% of interviewed households took loans from the informal sector at 
higher interest rates as a result of restricted access to the formal sector (Dao, 2001)6. Because 
rural households in Vietnam traditionally dislike being indebted to individuals, informal 
borrowing can be viewed either as distress borrowing, or the second choice. Households may 
however borrow from relatives or friends at very low interest rates, but there are normally not 
in the forms of contracts and are therefore temporary. 
Table 4.3 - Comparative Indicators of Rural Financial Institutions 
 
Population: 78 million people in Vietnam; Total rural households: 12 million 
Estimated low-income households: 6.7 million 
Institution Outreach to Rural Households Outreach to Rural LIHs 
 1998 June 30, 2001 1998 June 30, 2001 
Formal 5,910,000 49% 8,303,000 69.2% 2,700,000 40% 4,000,000 59.7% 
VBA 4,000,000 33 % 5,000,000 41.7% 1,800,000 27 % 2,350,000 35.1% 
VBP 1,300,000 11 % 2,571,000 21.4%    600,000   9 % 1,250,000 18.6% 
PCF    600,000   5 % 720,000 6.0%    300,000   4 % 400,000 6.0% 
RSHB      10,000 0.08% 12,000 0.1% -  - - 
Semi-
formal NA NA 120,000 1% NA NA 120,000 1.8% 
Total 
served 
5,910,000 49% 8,423,000 70.2% 2,700,000 40% 4,120,000 61.5% 
Informal or 
No access 
6,090,000 51% 3,577,000 29.8% 5,000,000 60% 2,580,000 38.5% 
Source: Dao (2002), McCarty (2001) 
 
                                                
6 The author participated in this survey as a team leader in conducting household interviews and processing 
data in 15 selected provinces across the country from May to July 2001.  
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4.3.2 Providers of formal financial services 
 There are four formal institutions which provide formal financial services to the rural 
households and LIHs, including VBARD, VBP, PCF and RSHBs. Most of loans made by 
these institutions are for specific purpose such as rural development or poverty reduction on 
subsidy basis. In other words, these institutions are the vehicles of the government in carrying 
its poverty reduction approach (see Chapter 3).   
 Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) 
 VBARD is the state owned bank and the biggest financial institution that provides 
financial services in rural areas in Vietnam through a nation-wide network. It has the largest 
market share among the formal financial sector. The market clientele of the VBARD includes 
a mix of rural households and the LIHs. In 1998, it accounts for 68% of the rural households 
and 67% of the LIHs who had access to formal financial services. In 2001, these figures were 
60% and 59%, respectively (see Table 4.4 and 4.5). These figures indicate that VBARD is the 
key player in the outreach process and the leader in the government’s strategy in rural 
development and poverty reduction. 
 Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) 
 In reality, the VBP is institutionally “merged” with VBARD. VBP branches have been 
established within VBARD’s district branch network in all provinces. Until 2002, VBP had 
no plan to set up its own network. It has been transformed into a “policy bank”7and basically 
based on the foundation set by the VBP. One of the bank’s functions is to extend credit to 
poor households with government’s subsidy. This bank is also encouraged to cooperate with 
Credit & Savings Schemes run by NGOs and SOs. With major support from the government, 
VBP has increased its market share from 22% in 1998 to 31% in 2001 to the rural households 
                                                
7 The “Policy Bank” has been set up in 2003 to replace the VBP but with the same function of providing cheap 
credit to the low-income households. In our idea, this is typically a rename. 
 124 
who had access to formal sector (Table 4.4 and 4.5). It should be noted that most of VBP’s 
clients are the rural poor households, i.e. the LIHs. This signals a prospective that VBP or 
Policy bank would be the key player in outreach strategy to the poor households in the future. 
 People’s Credit Funds (PCF) 
 A People’s Credit Fund is a small community based cooperative and social financial 
institution owned, operated, and governed by shareholder members who are from the 
commune in which it is located. PCFs perform an active financial intermediation function; 
they improve the access of rural borrowers and savers to financial services, emphasising 
savings and credit discipline. A PCF provides a safe and easy place for commune members to 
keep their savings, provides a source of loans to families who no longer qualify for the VBP, 
makes loans that create local businesses and jobs in the commune, helps to displace 
community money lenders who charge very high rates for their loans, and can lend funds fast 
for household income earning purposes. The PCF network, however, plays a minor role in 
rural financial markets, accounting for only 5% and 6% of the rural households who had 
access to formal sector in 1998 and 2001 (Table 4.4 and 4.5). 
 Rural Shareholding Bank (RSHB) 
 RSHBs are the result of the reorganization or merger of rural credit cooperatives (they 
are thus sometimes referred to as Credit Cooperatives) in which the government has a 10% 
stake. The main advantage of such banks is that their lending procedures are simple with 
credit officers relying on their knowledge of and close relationships with borrowers who are 
often family or friends. The credit officers also help the applicants complete the required 
documents. The reliability and low cost of this process are brought about by the dual roles of 
most staff, as technical personnel and shareholders. However, the market share of RSHB is 
very limited. 
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Table 4.4 - Formal Sector Outreach 
 
Institution Outreach to Rural Households Outreach to Rural LIHs 
 1998 June 30, 2001 1998 June 30, 2001 
VBA 4,000,000 33 % 5,000,000 41.7% 1,800,000 27 % 2,350,000 35.1% 
VBP 1,300,000 11 % 2,571,000 21.4%    600,000   9 % 1,250,000 18.6% 
PCF    600,000   5 % 720,000 6.0%    300,000   4 % 400,000 6.0 % 
RSHB      10,000 0.08% 12,000 0.1% -  - - 
TOTAL 5,910,000 49% 8,303,000 69.2% 2,700,000 40% 4,000,000 59.7% 
 Assumptions:  i) A loan to a borrower actually serves a household.  
   ii) LIHs include those who borrowed 3 million VND or less. 
 Source: Dao (2002), McCarty (2001) 
 
Table 4.5 - Market Share of Rural Borrowing Households 
 
Institution Borrowing - Rural Households Borrowing - LIHs 
 1998 June 30, 2001 1998 June 30, 2001 
 VBA 4,000,000 68% 5,000,000 60% 1,800,000 67% 2,350,000 59% 
VBP 1,300,000 22% 2,571,000 31%    600,000   22% 1,250,000 31% 
PCF    600,000 10% 720,000 9%    300,000   11%  400,000 10% 
RSHB      10,000 - 12,000 - -  - - 
TOTAL 5,910,000 100% 8,303,000 100% 2,700,000 100% 4,000,000 100% 
On June 30, 2001, while VBARD’s HH borrowers account for 60% of total borrowers, its’ total outstanding 
loans represent 75% of all outstanding loans in VND from any source. 
Source: Dao (2002), McCarty (2001) 
4.3.3 Providers of semi-formal financial services 
 Semi-formal credit plays a minor role in rural financial markets. The total market 
share of this sector accounts for only 1% and 1.8% of the rural households and the LIHs who 
had access to formal sector in 2001 (Table 4.3). Semi-formal microfinance is mainly provided 
by three groups, including (i) national programs; (ii) financial services from Social 
Organizations (SO’s); and (iii) Credit and Savings Schemes of the International NGOs. 
 National Programs 
 National programs are basically funded by the State Budget and have different 
objectives.  Several national programs also include in their activity a credit component that is 
used to support the pre-set objectives. Examples of main programs can be listed such as Job 
Creation, Greening Bare Hill and the National Program for Eradication and Poverty 
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Reduction etc. Financial services such as credit are usually provided in supporting these 
programs rather than driven by demand from rural poor households. 
 Micro-finance Services of Social Organizations (SOs)  
 The prime interest of a social organization is the economic improvement of its 
members.  Credit not only serves this interest but also acts as a catalyst in support of other 
activities. The two basic approaches of social organizations in credit activities are as (i) they 
own and manage members’ savings and grants from donors such as international NGOs; and 
(ii) they serve as facilitators or financial vehicles for the VBARD, VBP. The credit service 
offered by social organizations, such as Vietnam Women Union (VWU), Vietnam Farmer 
Union (VFM) .etc is highly appreciated because it can be channelled directly to targeted 
beneficiaries at the grassroots level. Moreover, because it is community-based so it has more 
direct and closer contact with customers than a formal credit institution has. This is why many 
International NGOs and the formal financial institutions such as the VBP-Policy Bank have 
chosen to cooperate with SOs in their development programs (see Box 4.2 and 4.3 for case 
studies). 
 International NGOs - Rural Microfinance Schemes 
 Many International NGOs in Vietnam have run their microfinance schemes integrated 
with other activities with specified purposes. Microfinance schemes integrated with other 
activities can exploit economies of scope, which can piggy-back microfinance on top of other 
organizational frames (e.g. collectives that emerge around irrigation services), or exploit 
complements in household production and welfare improvement. Many NGOs therefore view 
microfinance as a means to an end rather than the end in itself. However, Credit and Savings 
schemes by NGOs are typically small in scope and they cover a very small number of rural 
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households. Some NGOs have tried to cooperate with the VBP and SOs in order to increase 
its capacity to outreach (see Box 4.2 for a case study). 
4.3.4 Providers of informal financial services 
 In Vietnam, the sources of informal microfinance are families, friends, relatives, 
traders, unregistered private moneylenders, and traditional rural credit associations. 
 Private Moneylenders   
 Moneylenders provide credit on a range of terms (seasonal, daily) whatever the client 
may wish. They are usually the better off in rural areas and have a deep pocket of money or 
goods. It is estimated that in each village there are 2 or 3 permanent and 5 to 10 seasonal 
private moneylenders. The hidden nature of this activity means there is no data on the number 
of people using moneylenders. The main features of moneylenders are that they observe a 
market approach in providing credit and negotiate for a high rate with payments made on a 
monthly basis around 3-10% per month (Dao, 2002). The service is flexible but bearing a high 
opportunity cost.   
 Traditional Rural Credit Associations:  Ho, Phuong and Hui   
 Ho    
 The name means Relatives or Friendship and originates in the North of Vietnam. It is 
a traditional small credit group organized by local people.  Each group comprises from 5 to 20 
members. The members often have the same career e.g. groups of farmers, groups of traders, 
groups of war veterans etc. Each group operates as an individual organization having no 
relation to other groups or to formal institutions. A group leader is elected by members to 
collect deposits and keep records. Members deposit savings to form funds, which will be lent 
to each group member in rotation.  Savings can be in cash, paddy or gold.  The amount of 
monthly cash savings depends on the agreement reached within the group. This system can be 
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understood as a ROSCA but the major difference is that in Vietnam the Ho is not an 
association but isolated local credit groups. 
 Phuong.   
 Phuong does not charge interest on loans.  Each member deposits required periodic 
savings and is entitled to receive an interest-free loan once in a credit cycle.  Minority groups 
in mountainous areas, where interest-bearing loans are not considered a friendly way to help 
each other, favour this approach. The groups are smaller than in the Ho, varying from 5 to 8 
members. One may understand this mechanism as a rotating savings and lending group. 
 Hui.   
 The name of Hui originates from the South of Vietnam. The Hui has operated 
somewhat like a Ho in the north.  Unfortunately many members borrowed as much as 
possible by offering incredibly high interest (5 to 20 per cent per month).  The loans were 
used to invest in land, trading or assets for speculative purposes. Such investments earned a 
high return during the boom 1985-98. However it ended because some members even 
borrowed from one person to repay the other, anticipating that the future returns would cover 
all debts. Many Hui collapsed (VO HUI) as borrowers lost the ability to make repayment. As 
a result, Hui is now considered as "cheating credit" in Vietnam. 
 Borrowing from Friends or Relatives  
 This kind of credit is normally free of interest with flexible terms. Credit terms depend 
on the relationship with the borrowers and on the availability of extra income sources. The 
poor are not likely to borrow from relatives or friends because of the social implications.  The 
culture dictates that one should help poor friends or poor relatives by handing over the money 
rather than lending it to maintain good relations.   
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4.4 Lending technologies 
4.4.1 A brief 
As in many other countries, the common methods of lending in rural Vietnam are 
individual and group lending. It is observed that around 90% of loans are made on the basis of 
group lending (Table 4.6), but this method of lending in fact works mainly as a mechanism to 
reduce transaction cost, rather than as a joint-liability mechanism. Most loans are provided by 
formal institutions on the basis of collateral/guarantee, whether for individual or group 
lending. The assets listed and used as collateral include land use certificates (LUCs), houses 
and fixed assets; of which LUCs are the most widely used by rural borrowers. Movable assets 
such as televisions, bicycles, and animals do not qualify as collateral. Moreover, the 
administrative procedure requires that the local peoples’ committee must certify the list of 
assets and their total value.  
The monthly interest rate charged in the formal sector is on average relatively low, at 
1.26%, compared to the 3.95% charged in the informal sector (McCarty, 2001). The average 
loan size is typically small at around 3.2m VND (around USD180) for formal and semiformal 
lenders and 1.75m VND (USD110) for informal lenders (Table 4.7). It is worth noting that the 
VBARD usually grants approximately 50% of the actual loan amount requested by a LIH and 
the most decisive criteria for lending is the list of assets of the potential borrower. The most 
commonly accepted form of asset/collateral is the LUC. If a household has not been provided 
with the LUC, certification by local authorities that the land is free from disputes can be used 
as a loan guarantee (Dao, 2002). 
As a government policy, formal financial institutions offer loans only for the purpose 
of production (Dao, 2002). In 1998, loans for production capital accounted for about 63.7% of 
all the loans taken from all sources (McCarty, 2001). Borrowers must present a business 
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proposal when applying for a loan. Furthermore, although the government requires no 
collateral for loans of up-to VND 10 million (equivalent to USD 600), households in general 
are required to provide their LUCs as collateral in order to a secure a loan (Dao, 2002). 
Business plans and LUCs are therefore important criteria for the screening of applicants 
(Mishkin, 2001: Ch. 8, pp 187-198) by formal lenders.  
There are several factors that affect the lending technologies by the formal MFIs. First, 
although the interest rate has been liberalised gradually, the low basic interest rates and the 
government commitment to providing cheap credit to poor households have discouraged 
formal institutions from extending to more rural households due to high transaction costs 
creating financial repression (McKinnon, 1973 and Shaw, 1973). Second, the issuance of 
LUCs has been slow and has not yet been completed in many provinces. This reduces the 
probability of access of rural households to formal credit. Furthermore, an effective use of 
LUCs as collateral requires a market for transferring LUCs, which does not exist.  
Table 4.6 - Comparison of group and direct lending to farm households of VBARD 
 
Lending method 1995 1998 30/06/2001 
Direct lending 1.9% 7.9% 12.4% 
Group lending 98.1% 92.1% 87.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: McCarty (2001) 
 
Table 4.7 - Rural household loans and average loan sizes by sources 
 
Lenders Average loan size (1,000 VND) 
Informal financial  sector 1,752 
1.Money lenders 2,141 
2.Relatives 1,861 
3.ROSCA and other individuals 1,366 
Formal & semi-formal financial sector 3,209 
4.Private banks and cooperatives 2,230 
5.Government banks 3,512 
6.Government programs and  others  1,547 
Source: McCarty (2001) 
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4.4.2 Individual loan with guarantee and collateral 
 Following this method, loan approval, and particularly loan size, depends on the 
collateral provided. The non-collateral loan limit has been increased from 5 million VND to 
10 million VND (approximately US$300 and US$600) but however the applicants are usually 
required to provide the list of assets as collateral and the total value of listed assets must be 
certified by the Local People Committee. Land use certificates (LUCs) seem to be the most 
common loan security. In some circumstances such as in cases of applying for loans from the 
VBP, poor rural households are required to submit a certification from the Local People 
Committee which guarantees that they are the poor households and eligible to apply for loans.  
 The administrative procedure for loan disbursement is a time consuming process (see 
Figure 4.3). The main reason is the lack of branch network at the grassroots levels. For 
example, in the case of VBARD which has a nationwide branch network, the branch network 
is extended only at the district levels8 and thus credit officers, in most cases especially in 
remote and far communes/villages, have to travel around to deal with loan applications. To 
make a lending decision, credit officer must consult the loan proposal which is in a form of 
the so-called “a business plan” and get advice from the Local Committee.  Maximum loan 
amount is also determined by credit officer and is normally equal to 70-80% of the total value 
of the listed assets (Dao, 2002). However, the final decision is made by the branch director.  
   
                                                
8 The hierarchy is as follows: province, district, commune, village and so on. 
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Figure 4.3 - Individual Lending Procedure to farmer households by VBARD 
 
 
Explanation: 
 
1 - Loan requested by borrower who purchases loan application 
2 - Loan Application certified by LPC 
3 - Credit Officer reviews loan documents and makes appraisal 
4 - CO recommends loan amount, duration and interest rate  
5 - Chief of Credit division recommends loan 
6 - Approval by Branch Director who sends loan documents to accountant 
7 - Accountant completes loan contract and sends to Treasurer 
8 - Disbursement made to borrower 
 
Source: Dao (2002) 
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4.4.3 Group lending  
 Literature has shown that group lending with joint liability is the most well known 
lending technology used by microfinance institutions around the world (see Chapter 2). It has 
proved that this lending technology may help to reduce the problems of asymmetric 
information, the lack of collateral and associated risks through peer selection, monitoring and 
pressure (Ghatak, 1999, 2000; Aghion and Gollier, 2000). Following this technology, 
potential borrowers are asked to form borrowing groups. The primary and important feature 
of borrowing group is the joint-liability which means that all group members are required to 
repay for their defaulted partners in order to receive further loans. 
 In Vietnam, it is estimated that about 90% of loans to rural poor households are made 
through borrowing groups (Dao, 2002). However, most of financial institutions (except from 
the Credit and Savings Schemes run by international NGOs) are making group loans without 
clearly-specified joint-liability. Borrowing groups are formed mainly by the SOs. Each 
borrowing group then must be certified (that they are poor households) by the Local People 
Committee in order to apply for loans. Borrowing process then continues as it does in 
individual lending model (see Figure 4.4). Credit officers disperse loans and collect 
repayments directly from each group member. 
 The joint-liability property is in fact ignored. The group leader is responsible for the 
whole group but without any liability specified. His tasks simply are (i) to provide 
information relating to group’s members to credit officers; (ii) to collect loan applications 
from group members; and (iii) to convince the members to repay their loans. Moreover, due to 
both the lack of effective procedures and the limited knowledge of management skills, group 
leaders in many cases cannot manage their groups properly. In cases of default, other group 
members do not have to pay anything but they may put some pressure on the defaulted 
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partners in terms of social consequence (e.g. fames). The responsibility of dealing with 
defaulted borrowers is of the credit officers and the group leader may help persuade them to 
repay.   
 As a result, although group lending is popular, it is simply a mechanism to reduce 
transaction costs rather than a mechanism to reduce default risks. Hence, others may consider 
this lending technology as individual lending through groups. However, this technology is 
very much different from the normal individual lending because it lends to certified groups.  
By requiring that groups are formed by the SOs and certified by the Local People Committee, 
the financial institution can exploit information on a group of borrowers and make individual 
loans to them. The cooperation or partnership with the SOs and the Local People Committee 
therefore reduces the problems of asymmetric information which is persistent in typical 
individual lending.  
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Figure 4.4 - Group Lending Model at the VBARD 
 
 
Explanation:  
 
(1)  - Group establishment: collecting members (5 – 25 members) 
(2)  - Appoint group’s leader and agree on group’s regulations 
(3)  - Submit to Local People’s Committee (LPC) for approval of group establishment. 
(4) - Send LPC’s approval to VBARD 
(5) – Credit officer appraises and reviews loan’s documents from group members or borrowers 
(6) - Loan’s applications of group members are certified by LPC 
(7) – Credit officer submits loan applications for approval 
(8) – Branch director approve loan applications 
(9) – Accountant treasurer issues contracts to borrowers and makes disbursement. 
 
Source: Dao (2002) 
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4.5 An assessment of microfinance in rural Vietnam 
4.5.2 Policy environment 
 Although the government of Vietnam has followed the poverty reduction approach in 
microfinance, the major concern is that the government has not yet formulated a specific 
policy and strategy in favour of microfinance sector. The banking laws and legal framework 
do not attract various kinds of MFIs to participate in the microfinance market. Most formal 
MFIs now operate under a legal framework that is common to all banking and credit 
institutions while it is well recognised that microfinance sector should be treated specially 
(see Chapter 3). Semi-formal MFIs, especially international NGOs and SOs which are seen as 
being able to apply the best practices in microfinance, seem to be excluded from providing 
financial services in real terms.  
 The absence of a specific policy and strategy in favour of microfinance could lead to a 
less development in terms of both outreach and interests. Experiences from countries in the 
region, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines, where financial markets have been 
liberalized and microfinance has been defined, and to some extend favoured, could be good 
lessons to consult. For example, in the mid-1980s, the Philippine government took its first 
steps toward financial liberalization, which opened the banking industry to greater 
competition (McGuire, Conroy and Thapa, 1998). The Bangko Sentralng Philipinas (BSP), 
the central bank, abandoned its restrictive bank entry and branching policies and encouraged 
the entry of new players in the industry. The BSP removed all restrictions on the opening of 
branches in rural areas in 1989 and lifted the moratorium on the entry of new banks in 1990 
(Benjamin and Seibel, 2000). More significantly, the Philippines adopted a national policy on 
microfinance in 1997 and, in 2000, included a specific microfinance policy and activities in 
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the amended general banking law (Gallardo, 2001). As a result, this policy environment 
enabled the development of network of microfinance with participation of all kinds of MFIs. 
 Given the current policy framework, the second concern is the policy toward interest 
rates. The government commitment to providing priory and cheap credit to rural poor 
households has not recognised the necessity of self-sufficiency for MFIs, especially for the 
formal sector which is the leader in microfinance, to increase their outreach. Most of formal 
MFIs cannot cover the high costs of lending to the poor and thus they are unable to achieve 
financial sustainability (McCarty, 2001; Dao, 2002). For example, in the VBARD system, the 
average spread between input and output rates as of 30 June 2001 is 0.36% per month while, 
as calculated by microfinance experts, the sustainable spread requires at about 0.6 to 0.7% per 
month (Dao, 2002). As a result, most formal MFIs are reluctant to provide microfinance 
services unless under sponsored projects funded by international development institutions 
such as the WB, ADB and UNDP. 
 The difference in interest rate policy and the resulting effect on performance can be 
seen from the case of Indonesia where there are no restrictions on interest rates, for example 
the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). The deregulation of interest rates since 1983-1984 has 
allowed BRI to set their own interest rates on loans and savings. BRI uses 2.7% per month on 
flat rate basis (based on initial amount of loan) on its loans. This is an effective rate of 44 % 
yearly while the average cost of funds is 28% for a gross margin of 16% or the equivalent of 
0.98% monthly, much higher than that of 0.36% for the case of VBARD (Table 4.8; Dao, 
2001a, 2002). 
Table 4.8 - Comparison of interest rates between Vietnam and Indonesia 
 
MFIs Interest policy Output rate Input rate Spread 
VBARD (Vietnam) Regulated: basic rate of 0.6% per month ~1.05% ~0.69% 0.36% 
BRI (Indonesia) Deregulated since 1983 ~ 2.7% ~1.72% 0.98% 
Source: Microfinance Resource Center of Vietnam 
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4.5.3 Lending methods 
 As seen in previous section, the most common lending technology in Vietnam is the 
group lending. However, this technology is different from the popular model i.e. Grameen 
Bank’s model. The main advantages of the group lending in Vietnam include: (i) because 
groups are established normally through SOs, such as the VWU and VFU, and are certified by 
the Local People Committee (LPC), it ensures group sustainability and makes it more legal; 
(ii) because loan applications are certified by the LPC, it helps reduce the persistent risk 
resulting from the problem of asymmetric information, since the LPC has better information 
about borrowers than the MFIs; and (iii) because group members are required to provide 
collateral, such as a Land Use Certificate, in order to obtain the loans, it insures MFIs against 
default risks that may occur.   
Table 4.9 - Comparison of group lending methods 
 
Criteria for comparison The recent group lending model of 
VBARD 
The group lending models in the 
other countries 
Establishers Women Union, Farmers’ Association, 
Voluntarily 
Voluntarily 
Administrative 
requirements 
Allowed by the local People’s 
Committee 
No requirement 
Requirements relating to 
loan application 
Certified by Local People’s Committee No requirement 
Collateral requirements Required Not required 
Disbursement Direct to each members Through the group’s leader 
Savings Not required Required 
Collection Direct from each members Through the group’s leader 
Combined activities Not available Available 
Source: Dao (2002)  
 A comparison between group lending in VBARD and the popular Grameen’s model is 
presented in Table 4.9. The disadvantages of the group lending as compared with the famous 
Grameen Bank’s model are significant. Because of the requirements of group establishment 
through social organizations and allowed by the LPC, many borrowers are excluded from 
microfinance services. This also increases the problem of administrative procedures, which 
basically take time and result in high non-financial costs for borrowers. Moreover, the 
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requirement of collateral seems not to be relevant for microfinance borrowers while the role 
of joint liability, which can serve as collateral and is the key factor explaining success of 
group lending, is generally ignored. The credit officers in fact work directly with group 
members.  
4.5.4 Microfinance institutions 
Formal sector 
 Most formal MFIs in Vietnam such as VBARD and VBP are state owned 
organizations. The main strengths of this group as compared with other MFIs are that they 
have a wide national network with good relations to the Local People Committee, which is an 
important player in microfinance in Vietnam and a vehicle of local information, and are 
professional in banking. This explains why formal microfinance accounts for the largest 
portion of microfinance in Vietnam and also has a better performance. However, the network 
of formal MFIs in the case of VBARD or VBA just outreaches to the district level but not the 
village and commune level, which is seen better to serve the LIHs (see Chapter 5, 6, 7). 
 The importance of expanding branch network can be learnt from the case of the BRI in 
Indonesia which specifies micro banking division (known as the BRI Banking Unit System) 
and offers savings and credit products at the grassroots level. The extended network of BRI's 
Unit banking system is one of its greatest strengths with 3,703 units at the grassroots level. 
Each BRI Unit operates as a separate profit centre having its own balance sheet and profit and 
loss statements. This concept is at the heart of the BRI Unit system and it enables BRI to 
implement performance-based incentive programs and facilitates the implementation of 
monitoring tools. As a result, the Micro Banking division was the most profitable and even 
supports the other operations of the Bank (McGuire, Conroy and Thapa, 1998).  
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 While the success of extended network from BRI is a critical lesson to learn, another 
weakness of formal MFIs in Vietnam is that they depend much on relations with other 
organizations, such as Social Organizations (SOs) and the Local People Committee (LPC), 
which increases the administrative costs to borrowers. Although this feature is also the 
strength because it reduces the cost of screening borrowers, it does reflect the consequence of 
the central planning economy. The complicated hierarchy in lending procedure obviously 
increases the non-financial costs and likely leads to negative behaviours by the responsible 
persons. A summary of strengths and weaknesses of individual formal MFIs is presented in 
Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10 - Strengths and Weaknesses of Formal Financial Institutions 
 
Organization Strengths Weaknesses 
VBARD • Largest network to provide credit 
service in rural area. 
• Willingness to improve outreach by 
following collateral free group lending 
up to a ceiling of VND5 million, inter-
commune transactions offices and 
mobile banking operations.   
• Unofficial fees raise the cost of 
borrowing for clients. 
• Willingness to improve outreach 
comes from Government rather than 
from VBARD’s strategy. 
• Not targeting rural LIHs. 
• Many rural areas still not covered. 
• Mixed commercial credit with 
government subsidized programs. 
VBP • Focus lending to the rural poor. 
• Impressive outreach achieved in a 
short time. 
• Good relationship with local 
government. 
• Subsidized credit. 
• No financial sustainability. 
• Deeply depend on VBARD (staff, 
offices). 
 
PCFs • Market approach credit service 
• Owned by its members 
• Focus on local savings mobilization. 
• Commune-based credit service. 
• Most loans are short-term. 
• Initial growth is focused on richer 
areas and richer clients. 
 
Source: Dao (2002) 
Semi-formal and informal sector 
 Although they do not have the nation-wide network and they do not have professional 
skills on microfinance as compared with the formal group, semi and informal microfinance 
have the advantage of focusing on the poor as targeted customers. Furthermore, semi-formal 
such as International NGOs normally bring experiences from abroad and thus ensure the best 
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common practices from the world of microfinance. Most studies have shown that NGOs 
follow the best practices in microfinance, especially in group lending and social 
intermediation (Dao, 2002; McCarty, 2001). The very famous case of success in Vietnam is 
the CIDSE9, which launched its microfinance schemes in cooperation with the VWU and 
provided financial services relevant to the group lending model known as TYM (TYM - Tao 
Yeu May- I Love You) and combined with regular trainings and meetings. 
 The main weakness of these groups, however, is that they are excluded from the legal 
framework to provide financial services. This is obvious, of course, for informal sector. For 
semi formal microfinance, financial services cannot be provided as the main activity but only 
combined with other activities. This is different from other countries, such as the Philippines 
or Indonesia, where competition is encouraged and entry barriers to financial markets are 
removed. In other words, semi formal microfinance institutions in Vietnam cannot perform as 
financial institutions in real terms.  
 The other weakness is the high associated costs. For the semi-formal microfinance, 
this is because they don’t have their own networks. As a result, most semi-formal 
microfinance institutions are based on subsidised sources of funding. For informal 
microfinance lenders, they normally charge very high costs to borrowers as a solution to 
problems of asymmetric information (McCarty, 2001). The key strengths and weaknesses of 
semi formal and informal microfinance institutions are summarised in Table 4.11. 
                                                
International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE) is currently operating as an International 
NGO providing microfinance schemes in cooperation with the VWU. The author visited and worked with this 
credit program in 2001.
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Table 4.11 - Strengths and Weaknesses of Semi- and Informal MFIs 
 
Organization Strengths Weaknesses 
National 
Programs  
• National network. 
• Strong government backing and 
support from local government 
• Combine credit provision with 
technical assistance. 
• Subsidized credit. 
• No financial sustainability. 
• No savings mobilization. 
• Inadequate skills, staffing for credit 
service. 
• Not focus on LIHs. 
• Political and social target over 
economic efficiency. 
Social 
Organizations 
• Large national networks reaching to 
the commune and village levels. 
• Have tried different micro finance 
schemes. 
• Willingness and eager to mass 
mobilization through credit service. 
• Loan repayment is higher than other 
formal credit schemes.     
• Focus on poor members.  
• No function of credit provision. 
• No institutional sustainability in term 
of financial service. 
• Lack of skills and staff for large-scale 
intervention in savings and credit. 
• Insufficient understanding of financial 
sustainability of credit schemes; 
Depending on outside support. 
International 
NGOs 
• Effective in reaching the poor. 
• Target customers are clearly 
identified. 
• Market approach. 
• Have good experience and knowledge 
of micro finance schemes. 
• Appropriate technical assistance. 
• Focus on sustainability and self-
management of grassroots poor. 
• High operating cost. 
• Isolated and small coverage. 
• Low financial fund.  Dependent on 
subsidised funds. 
• Due to small scope, cannot reach 
sustainability.    
 
Informal 
Financial 
services 
 
 
 
• Convenient, simple and local. 
• Market interest approach. 
• Lender and borrowers know each 
other well. 
• Good local savings mobilization. 
• Independent operating. 
• High cost to the poor. 
• Very poor are excluded. 
• Loan in kind at high interest rate. 
• Most loans are small and short-term. 
• Isolated operation. 
• Are not encouraged to become formal 
credit organization. 
Source: Dao (2002) 
 
4.5.1 Capacity to outreach  
 The capacity to outreach depends on self-financial sufficiency while self-financial 
sufficiency depends on the ability to charge the sustainable interest rates that cover all 
necessary costs (see Chapter 3). In rural Vietnam, formal financial institutions that are 
providing financial services to the LIHs are regulated by one or more of the following laws: 
The Law on Cooperatives, The Law on the State Bank of Vietnam, and The Law on Credit 
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Institutions. Within the current context of legal framework and policy, the clearly seen 
constraint for formal MFIs to charge sustainable interest rate is the interest rate policy.  
 Although the government, through SBV, has changed its interest rate policy with the 
shift from lending rate ceiling (e.g. 1.2 per month in 1999) to a base interest rate policy, it still 
commits and requires the formal MFIs (such as the VBP-Policy Bank) to provide prior or 
cheap credit to the rural poor households and under governmental directions. As a result, this 
seriously limits the formal MFIs to attain profitability and financial self-sufficiency. The 
capacity to expand outreach and attain financial sustainability is therefore dependent on the 
ability to find innovative ways to provide financial services at lower costs. 
 The semi-formal schemes are on the other side. Except from the credit schemes under 
National Programs, semi-formal schemes such as those run by NGOs and SOs are not 
regulated by the banking laws and able to set interest rates that cover their operating costs. Of 
the various social organizations and government programs involved in microfinance activities, 
the Vietnam Women Unions (VWU) and the Vietnam Farmers Union (VFU) have been, so 
far, the most experienced. VWU has, through its own Saving & Credit (S&C) schemes, 
provided loans to 100,000 households and assisted around 641,307 members in accessing 
credit at VBARD or VBP. VFU is thought to have somewhat less in the way of numbers but 
still an appreciable loan outreach. A further 67,000 people have had the opportunity to borrow 
and/or save through the 60 or so NGO/INGO C&S schemes that have operated in Vietnam 
(Dao, 2001, 2002).   
 However, the major constraint for semi-formal MFIs to expand outreach and attain 
sustainability is that they are not considered to be financial institutions so that they are not 
allowed to participate in financial intermediation in real terms, such as savings mobilization. 
Furthermore, the banking law issued in late 1998 has made it obligatory that they must 
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comply with certain requirements (including capitalization) in order to conduct banking 
activities. As a result, they cannot expand their activities on a large scale and in most cases 
they are funded or subsidized from government or donor’s funds. This indicates that semi-
formal schemes are not sustainable are also cannot be able to increase their capacity to 
outreach significantly if there is no change in the banking laws. 
4.6 Towards a sustainable microfinance 
 The above analysis reveals that the formal financial sector has been the leader in 
microfinance markets in Vietnam and that in general microfinance in Vietnam has been far 
from sustainability. In order to attain a sustainable microfinance and contribute to the poverty 
reduction and economic development, there are some major changes that should be made. 
These changes should focus on the issues of government policies, business strategies, lending 
methods and capacity of MFIs. The major constraint, which governs all the above issues, is 
the perception of microfinance (see Chapter 3). The main concern therefore should be what is 
the appropriate approach to microfinance in Vietnam and how can we realize that approach?
 We suggest that the mixed approach, which is proposed in Chapter 3, could be more 
appropriate for Vietnam at this period. The foremost concern in following this approach is the 
balance between financial and social goal and it is obviously not easy to know where the 
balance should lie. However, we may have acknowledged that the current microfinance 
framework is not good for a sustainable microfinance and that subsidised microfinance has 
lowered the financial sustainability of MFIs on a permanent basis. Our recommendations 
below are therefore based on the view that changes should be made gradually to remove 
subsidy and, instead, the government should make more supports in terms of creating a sound 
financial infrastructure specified for microfinance and investing more in social and 
informational intermediation. 
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 4.6.1 Changing approach to microfinance 
 Literature shows that microfinance under poverty reduction approach which 
concentrates on reducing poverty reduction through subsidized credit programs cannot reach 
the poor households on a sustainable basis (Gonzalez Vega, 2003; Robinson, 2001). The 
application of pure financial systems approach which emphasizes the financial sustainability 
may also result in the limited development of microfinance i.e. the exclusion of the very poor. 
We therefore suggest that a mixed approach to microfinance could be a good option and 
recommend that the Vietnamese government and participating MFIs should change their 
perception in order to attain a sustainable microfinance.  Following this approach, 
microfinance institutions are encouraged to follow the financial systems approach i.e. to 
become commercial microfinance institutions while the government and donor supports are 
used to create a sound financial infrastructure and informational intermediation and to 
promote social intermediation to the poor households.  
  However, we believe that changing perception of microfinance in general is not an 
easy thought and it is a time-consuming process. First, the general financial infrastructure 
should be enhanced and informational intermediation should be developed. The Asian 
Development Bank has been advising that MFIs can develop sustainable commercial services 
on a permanent basis and expand their scope of operations and outreach only if they operate 
within an appropriate financial infrastructure, such as information systems and training 
facilities (Ashok, 2001). The legal framework and supervision and regulation of MFIs, 
including self-regulation and performance standards for MFIs, therefore need to be set up to 
facilitate sound growth and improve the capacity of MFIs to leverage funds in the market and 
provide competition. Legal barriers preventing banks from establishing business relationships 
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with informal or semiformal bodies, such as community-based organizations or self-help 
groups, will need to be removed. 
 Second, commitment to providing cheap credit to poor households should be removed. 
The literature review has shown that the poor can pay high interest rates (Chapter 3). The case 
of BRI Indonesia is a very good example to learn about how MFI can be profitable while it 
improves its outreach. Hence, a change in interest rate policy in microfinance should be made. 
The current commitment to providing cheap credit to the poor households has not allowed 
formal MFIs to cover all costs including market cost of capital, operational costs, inflation, 
loan losses and a reasonable profit. The government should loosen this commitment by letting 
the formal MFIs to determine their own interest rates, as the normal commercial financial 
institutions do, in lending to poor households. 
 Third, a legal framework should be set up to recognise the role of various kinds of 
MFIs, especially the semi-formal MFIs. The lack of a specific legal framework has made it 
unattractive for MFIs to provide their services in effective and efficient ways. Most semi-
MFIs long for a policy that specifies their allowed financial activities. Also, the legal status of 
“borrowing group” is not specified in legislation. MFIs are therefore not allowed to lend to 
households through groups as one legal entity. The government should promptly issue 
separate regulations dedicated solely to microfinance, creating a sound legal framework for 
the operation of microfinance institutions and, because the most used collateral in 
microfinance is the Land Use Certificate, the government should aggressively promote the 
process of land-use certificate (LUCs) issuance so that more LIHs can use LUCs to get access 
to MFIs. 
 Forth, as in normal markets, microfinance markets should be competitive. As shown 
in the above section, the Philippines has encouraged competition in the banking industry and 
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has been seen to create a fair playing field for financial institutions. The government should 
therefore encourage competition in the provision of rural financial services to improve the 
quality of delivery. By simplifying registration and lowering capital requirements, more semi-
formal S&C schemes could become credit cooperatives.  
 Fifth, viability is also critical for expanding outreach in order to achieve the primary 
objective of poverty reduction. The institutional development support from the government, 
to ensure viability, needs to encompass (i) ownership and governance, (ii) diversified products 
and services, (iii) management information systems and accounting policies and practices, (iv) 
management of portfolio quality and growth, (v) systems and procedures and financial 
technology for reducing transaction costs, and (vi) training facilities (Ashok, 2001). This is 
essential to Vietnam since the residual of the central planning economy remains imprinted on 
the economy.  
 Finally, microfinance services cannot become effective either as a tool for poverty 
reduction and hunger alleviation or as a financial intermediation, without social investment or 
intermediation. This is also regarded as a better solution to subsidised microfinance since it is 
seen as giving the poor “a row, not a fish”. So, the government should find ways and means to 
strengthen the capacity of rural households in general and LIHs in particular. SOs and 
extension services of various government ministries are mandated to do this and more 
financial support from the government would enable them to intensify their efforts. 
Experience from many countries has suggested systemic and regular training for both MFIs 
staff and borrowers; the establishment of SME promoting organizations etc should be done in 
the first period. 
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4.6.2 Commercialization of microfinance institutions 
 Analysis in Chapter 3 shows that in order to provide financial services to the poor on a 
sustainable basis, microfinance institutions should develop towards commercial microfinance 
institutions. The progress of commercialization (see Chapter 3) requires each MFI, at first, to 
apply commercial finance principles in microfinance. Currently most formal MFIs provide 
financial services to the poor on subsidised basis which makes them unable to be self-
sufficiency. Thus, the priory action for MFIs should be to provide financial services in a way 
that covers all operating costs. Lessons from the success of NGOs should be learnt (see Box 
4.2 and 4.3). This however is highly dependent on the policy environment, especially 
financial infrastructure.  
 A wide national network of branches has been the strength of formal MFIs, but it 
covers only at district level and thus this should be further developed. The extension of branch 
network at commune and village level, in forms of village and commune banking networks 
with a wider scope, as learnt from the case of BRI Indonesia and initial success from the 
VBARD mobile banking model (see Box 4.1), is necessary to ensure sustainable outreach and 
development. Besides, the coordination or partnership with social organizations and Local 
People Committee should be maintained and strengthened, as they are necessary in a group 
lending setting and in mobile banking system. 
 As a result of the high transaction fixed costs persistent in microfinance, strategies 
towards specialisation in microfinance could be a solution to increase profitability. MFIs 
should also be aware of the necessity of intensification and innovation in providing 
microfinance services. Besides, the strategies that emphasise community development should 
be employed, as they are more appropriate to the poor, especially in rural areas. Social 
intermediation could also be conducted by MFIs via government and donor supports (but 
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should be separated from financial intermediation) to enable LIHs to benefit from financial 
services. 
Box 4.2 – The Mobile Banking Model at VBARD 
VBARD’s Mobile Banking Model 
 
The concept of mobile banking implies an extension of branch network to commune and village level. 
However, mobile banking does not require an establishment of a physical branch but instead it requires 
each credit officer to travel and work on behalf of the bank at commune and village level. The mobile 
banking reduces the cost of access for rural poor households, especially who live in the far and remote 
areas. The mobile banking model at VBARD is integrated with group lending and with supports from 
the SOS and the LPCs. 
 
After the first four month of use, the mobile banking system has shown some achievements. For 
example, the number of loans disbursed has been increased at the average rate of 551 loans per month; 
the number of loans collected has increased at the average rate of 512 loans per month; number of 
savings, on average, has increased at 206 savings per months. Overall, mobile banking system has made 
an important contribution to improve the outreach of VBARD to its clients. The use of mobile banking 
system also improves the financial results for the VBARD’s branches. The net income that each mobile 
banking unit contributes to the branch is at VND 2.43 million per month.      
 
Criteria  Unit Averaged increase 
01 mobile vehicle /month 
I. Saving Mobilization   
1.1. Number of mobilised savings  savings 206 
1.2. Total amount of savings  million VND 1,440 
1.3. Total points of mobilising savings  point 3 
II. Disbursement & loan collection    
2.1. Number of loans disbursed  loan 551 
2.2. Total amount disbursed   million VND 4,234 
2.3. Number of loans collected  loan 512 
2.4. Total amount collected  million VND 2,925 
2.5. Total points for disbursement/collection of loans  point 28 
III. Financial results   
3.1. Total income/month million VND 15.58 
3.2. Total expenditure/month million VND 13.15 
Net income million VND 2.43 
Source: VBARD’s report on Four Month Operation of Mobile Banking Vehicles, Dao (2001)  
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  Lending technology 
 We recognise that currently there is no clear distinction between individual lending 
and group lending technology in Vietnam. However, in our ideas, the important thing should 
be to find an efficient and effective way to expand outreach to the poor. In this sense, the 
cooperation with LPC and SOs is a good way to exploit local information on the potential 
borrowers, but MFIs should ensure to reduce any unnecessary non-financial costs relating to 
this process. The cooperation with NGOs could be also a good option because it can exploit 
the wide network of formal financial sector and the experience of NGOs in dealing with poor 
households (see Box 4.2 and 4.3).     
 With respect to group lending technology, it is clear that the group lending method 
should be applied relevant to the best international practices in group lending around the 
world to enhance the role of joint-liability in order to benefit from the economies of scale and 
risk reduction. By doing so, it ensures that the group lending in Vietnam benefits MFIS in two 
ways: (i) it exploit information on potential borrowers at lower costs and (ii) it ensures peer 
selection, peer monitoring and peer pressure (see Chapter 2; Box 4.2 and 4.3).  
 MFIs should also learn from experience that the lending method of regular instalments 
with prior small savings or compensating balance (see Chapter 2; Box 4.2 and 4.3) could be 
of help. This method is especially useful when an integrated loan repayment incentive 
mechanism is initiated. Research in lending to the poor in regional countries, for example 
through NGO schemes, shows that the poor repay better in instalments rather than in a full 
lump-sum amount at the end. Repayment rates using an instalment schedule are usually very 
high at around 95%. However, it should be noted that the incentive of getting larger loans in 
the next periods may result in moral hazard problem if failed borrowers borrow “hot money”, 
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repay and get higher loan which can pay for the “hot money” loan and make some profit. This 
may cause a serious problem of delinquency. 
 Coupled with the lending method is the innovation in methods of saving mobilization, 
which ensures the other side of sustainable microfinance. Incentives for savers such as 
lotteries and prizes have been very successful in increasing savings in other developing 
countries and should be considered. The lotteries could be structured in a way to promote 
demand deposits as well as longer-term deposits. Savings mobilization efforts must be 
supported by publicity with emphasis on the ease of access, simplicity, security of deposited 
sums, ease of withdrawal when needed and lotteries. 
Other resources 
 Sustainable microfinance cannot be achieved without the strengthened capacity of 
MFIs. The most important feature of capacity is human resources, with professional skills and 
knowledge of microfinance borrowers. Credit officers and management should be sensitized 
to microfinance, best international practices in general, and more specifically to the fact that 
microfinance borrowers can save, borrow and repay well. Factual data and real life experience 
needs to be shared in order to change the lack of faith in dealing with LIH, a fact clearly 
demonstrated during the research.  
 MFIs also should have a priority in developing an information system which helps not 
only the MFIs to work more efficiently at the operational level, but would also gives more 
confidence and a much better understanding to donors and external consultants.  With 
increased transparency, more practical and applicable recommendations can be made and the 
future development of MFIs could be enhanced. The subsidy of government and donors could 
be of help on these resources. 
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Box 4.3 – Joint Liability Lending through Partnership with Compulsory Savings 
 
  
The project 
 
The Forest Protection and Water Resource Management (FPWRM) project in Nghe An province, which 
is financially supported by the Demark Government has been successful in developing the Community 
Credit and Savings Fund (CCSF). The purpose of this project is to establish the sustainable CCSFs at 
the village level to help poor households and women enhance their living conditions. The project seeks 
partnership between the Policy Bank, the Local People Committee and the Women Union.  
 
Establishment of CCSF 
 
Groups of 10-15 women are established and certified by the Women Union and the Local People 
Committee. The Policy Bank uses funds from the project and lend to these self-managed groups but 
these funds are at first managed by the Fund Management Unit (FMU) at commune level. Each group 
then develops itself as a CCSF. Each member is required to save a small amount (VND5000 i.e. 
US$0.3) before the fund starts. 
 
Group lending and saving technology 
 
 Each group votes for a group leader who is responsible for collecting loan applications from 
the group and sending these applications to the FMU. The FMU then lends directly to the 
members of group. The group leader is also responsible to collect repayment and savings and 
send to the FMU. 
 Each group member can borrow at a certain time either a short-term (6 month) loan of 
VND650,000 (US$40) or a medium-term (24 month) loan of 3,050,000 (US$180). The interest 
rate is charged on the basis of full-cost recovery and at 0.7% a month for both kinds of loans. 
However, this interest rate does not consider the market-rate of fund (i.e. subsidy). 
 Short-loan repayment of interests and principal is at the end of the period. Medium loan 
payment of interests is paid monthly and the principal is at the end of the period. 
 In case of defaults, all group members are required to lend to (rather than to pay for) the 
defaulted members to repay to the FMU. 
 Each member is required to provide a monthly compulsory saving of VND5000 during the 
period of loan without interest rate. The voluntary savings are encouraged and the interest rate 
is paid at 0.4% a month. If the accumulated savings reach the amount of VND200,000, the 
excess amount will be considered as voluntary savings. 
 Group members are required to attend monthly meeting and trainings. 
 
Results 
 
All the CCSFs are reported to have a 100% repayment rate. 100% members report that loans have 
helped them to enhance their lives in various ways such as investing in small businesses, education for 
children and smoothing consumption. Especially, all members are satisfy with the saving scheme which 
helps them to establish a saving habit and get a “lump-sum” money when they need it. 
 
Source: Interviews with Ms. Dinh Thi Minh Thai – Project Coordinator and Credit Officers from Policy 
Bank during a Microfinance Training Course organized by the Bourne Griffith (Vietnam) in July 2004 
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Box 4.4 – Joint Liability Lending with Compulsory Savings  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have analysed the performance of microfinance in rural Vietnam. 
We emphasize that microfinance has been seen as important to the strategy of poverty 
reduction and economic growth by the Vietnamese Government. The performance review has 
shown that, although it has achieved major success in outreaching to the poor, microfinance 
The project 
The Integrated Child Nutrition Project (ICNP) aims at increasing family’s income through credit 
activities; enhancing knowledge, working experience, managing capability and saving conscious in 
families; and enhancing managing capability of  Women Union at all levels. 
Group lending and saving technology 
 Groups of 5 women are formed voluntarily and certified by the Women Union and Local 
People Committee. Group leader is voted by group members and is responsible for monitoring 
and supporting group members in repayment, group meeting and reporting to the project 
management board at commune level. All groups are required to attend the periodic group 
meetings. 
 Loans and savings schemes are implemented through group and the whole group must acts as 
an identity. No further loans for the whole group if any of the group members fails to meet the 
project requirements. 
 In first round, only 3 group members are provided with loan while the other 2 members wait 
for the next reimbursement (using collected loan repayment). 
 Loans must be used for investment production activities and income generation. 
 The loan size for the first borrowing period depends on the needs but at maximum of 
VND700,000 (US$42). From the second loan borrowing period, the loan size increases to 
VND 1,500,000 at maximum conditional on the previous success of repayment. 
 Duration: Maximum 12 months 
 The loan repayment is on instalment basis which includes payment of principal and interest. 
Interest must be paid monthly and principal is paid quarterly. The repayment is on flat basis of 
the initial loan capital 
 The interest rate is charged at 1.5% per month and covers all the necessary costs including the 
market adjusted cost of funds. 
 Compulsory savings of VND 5,000 a month are required before a member can start borrowing 
and this saving is required during the period of borrowing. 
 Voluntary savings are encouraged and paid at the interest rate of 0.8% per month. 
Results 
The repayment rate is reported at 100% and all groups members benefit from the credit and savings 
services through income generation activities, business skills and income management. 
Source: Interview with Mr. Nguyen Xuan Canh – Project Microfinance Expert 
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has not been sustainable. The lack of a legal framework which prevents formal MFIs from 
being financially self-sufficient and semi-formal MFIs from participating more in 
microfinance has been the main constraint to a sustainable microfinance. The other constraints 
include the lending technologies which are not relevant to the best practices in microfinance 
around the world and the limited institutional network which cannot reach the poor at the 
grassroots levels.  
 In order to attain a sustainable microfinance, we suggest that a perception towards a 
mixed approach in providing financial services to the poor should be targeted. The 
government and donors should remove any direct subsidy to financial services, but instead 
provide supports in creating a sound financial infrastructure and investing more in social and 
informational intermediation. Specifically, the government may establish supporting agencies 
such as the credit rating office, credit scoring, credit bureaus .etc which are currently absent. 
The government and donors may support to improve roads, deliver health care and education 
services, and so on, which help to increase the poor’ ability to gain access and make use of 
financial services.  
 Another aspect of changing approach to microfinance requires a commercialization of 
microfinance institutions. By doing so, microfinance institutions in Vietnam should apply 
market principles in proving financial services to the poor in order to be self-sufficient at the 
first stage. In this context, innovations in financial technologies are necessary. More 
specifically, successful experiences from the village model banking in BRI and group lending 
model from NGOs in Vietnam should be learnt. Besides, cooperation or partnership with SOs 
and LPC is also a good option to reduce the costs of reaching the poor.  
 Our recommendation of changing towards a mixed approach is however constrained 
by the aim of reaching the very poor and the impact of credit on poverty reduction. If the 
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poverty reduction approach can effectively reach the very poor (i.e. the LIHs) and the impact 
is found significantly positive, one may think that the poverty reduction approach is 
acceptable at the cost of microfinance institutions which are not sustainable. Hence, further 
analyses of credit allocation and the impact of credit on poverty reduction are necessary to 
attain a sufficient condition for our recommendation.  
 In the next chapters, we will show that the better-off households, rather than the 
poorer households, are those who receive formal credit (Chapter 5). Also, the impact of credit 
on household poverty reduction is significantly positive but small (Chapter 6, 7). These 
results suggest that poverty reduction approach which aims at the poorest of the poor fails to 
realize its target in rural Vietnam. Furthermore, the small degree of impact implies that cheap 
credit cannot be the only solution if the government commits to improving the life of the rural 
poor. These findings strengthen our belief that the poverty reduction approach should be 
replaced. 
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CHAPTER 5 
WHO GETS FORMAL CREDIT IN RURAL VIETNAM? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Is the poverty reduction approach that the government has been following appropriate 
and successful in reaching the poor in rural Vietnam? The answer to this question is important 
because it reveals the effectiveness of the subsidy policy in the strategy of rural development 
and poverty reduction. The analysis in the previous chapter has shown that the current 
framework has not encouraged microfinance institutions to attain sustainability and thus if the 
answer to the above question is negative, it is more reliable to conclude that the poverty 
reduction approach should be removed. Our view is clear that if the target of reaching the very 
poor cannot be achieved, it is the time to reconsider the poverty reduction approach. 
 The main purpose of this chapter is therefore to investigate how credit is distributed to 
the poor households in rural areas by the formal sector. By doing so, we look at the 
determinants of household borrowing and the determinants of credit rationing by the formal 
sector. Briefly, we find that education, savings, the area devoted to farming and the 
availability of formal credit are important determinants of both household borrowing from the 
formal sector and credit rationing by the formal sector. All of these factors, to some extend, 
reveal that the better-off households in rural Vietnam are more likely to receive credit from 
the formal sector. Our findings therefore support the view that poverty reduction approach has 
failed to expand outreach to the poorest of the poor in rural Vietnam. Or at the least, the 
findings provide some suggestions in order to help the government and formal financial 
institutions improve their outreach to the poor. 
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly review 
the literature that is relevant to this study. In section 5.3, we present the econometric model 
and the hypotheses. Section 5.4 discusses the characteristics of the household survey data that 
we use in this chapter. The results of the estimation and testing are presented in section 5.5, 
along with an analysis of the results. The final section concludes with a summary of findings 
and draws policy conclusion. 
5.2 Review of relevant literature 
 A considerable amount of research has been devoted to understanding the functioning 
of credit markets, credit market imperfections and credit rationing ( see Chapter 2 and also: 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; de Meza and Webb, 1987; Bester, 1985, 1987; Swank, 1996; 
Amano, 1999; Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). Credit rationing is broadly regarded as an excess 
demand for bank loans caused by the asymmetry of information on investment projects 
between banks and borrowers. Credit rationing occurs if some borrowers have limited access 
to credit. It thus affects the number of borrowers who receive credit. The other form of 
rationing occurs when some borrowers are rationed in the amount of credit i.e. receive less 
than the amount of credit they demanded.  
 There has also been a focus on the analysis of rural credit markets (Meyer and 
Nagarajan, 1992, 2000) which are widely believed to be characterised by high lending 
transaction costs and lack of collateral when farmers do not own their own land; resulting in 
high interest rates being charged to borrowers. A combination of the above raises a very 
interesting research question: How do lenders in rural credit markets select borrowers and 
how much do they lend?  
A number of recent papers have analysed such questions (Kochar, 1997; Zeller, 1994; 
Pham and Izumita, 2002, Ranjula, 2002). Their approaches and findings vary and differ, 
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largely due to inadequate data. Zeller (1994) sees credit rationing as a function of access to 
the market conditional on the demand function of borrowers and finds that both formal and 
informal lenders ration loan supply. They look at total household wealth and the leverage ratio 
of households. Pham and Izumita (2002) assume an excess demand for credit in the rural 
markets and thus see credit rationing as a function of access to the market or external credit 
rationing. They find that reputation, the dependence ratio and the amount of credit demanded 
are determinants of credit rationing. Their results imply that poorer households are more 
likely to be rationed. 
Another question that one may also pose is: what determines the amount of credit that 
a representative household receives? Theoretically, the demand and supply of credit 
determines the amount of credit and thus the demand and supply functions need to be 
separately identified (Yadav et all., 1992; Pitt and Khandker, 1996). The problem of 
simultaneous functions leaves the construction of variables a critical issue for the consistent 
estimate of the household credit functions. Various approaches have been proposed to resolve 
this issue. For example, based on household and province attributes, Pham and Izumita (2002) 
construct variables that proxy for both demand and supply. They find that farming area and 
total value of livestock are decisive determinants of household borrowing from the formal 
sector. Others, such as Pitt and Khander (1996), Khandker (2003) and Khandker and Faraqee 
(2003), consider household characteristics (such as age and education), village fixed effects 
(such as prices of selected products) and the competition characteristics (such as 
characteristics of competitor villages) as the factors of household borrowing and find 
education and land owned are the core factors. 
In the context of rural Vietnam, there has been a relatively little work (Pham and 
Izumita, 2002) on the issues above: determinants of household credit access and determinants 
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of household borrowing. This chapter therefore expects to contribute to the literature by 
providing an empirical analysis of the rural credit market in Vietnam. The chapter 
concentrates on formal credit10, as this plays a dominant role in Vietnam (Dao, 2002). The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyse: (i) the determinants of formal credit access in rural 
Vietnam and (ii) why and how formal lenders ration credit.  
5.3 The model 
 Consider three sets of agents in the rural credit market: households (potential 
borrowers), formal lenders (such as VBARD) and informal lenders (such as money lenders, 
relatives, friends and ROSCAs). Of the households, there are borrowing and non-borrowing 
households. Households may borrow from formal lenders, informal lenders or both in order to 
finance their economic activities11. Households have a demand for credit and apply for loans. 
The demand for credit depends on household attributes and the village characteristics in 
which households are living in. Lenders then screen the applications and decide to whom to 
offer loans and how much to offer (as interest rate is fixed). As credit rationing is typical in 
credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), especially under financial repression, some 
applicants receive loans, the others are rejected, and yet others receive smaller loans than they 
desire. There are thus two major questions that need to be answered: (i) What are the 
                                                
10 Typically, formal and semi-formal financial sectors in Vietnam provide credit to rural households for the 
specific purposes of rural development and/or poverty reduction at cheaper interest rates. Thus, these sectors 
basically employ their own criteria in selecting and screening borrowers who are eligible to receive loans from 
them. For this reason, we include the semi-formal sector into the formal sector in our study of credit exclusion. 
Thus the so-called formal sector in this chapter and in chapters 6, 7 includes banks, credit and savings 
institutions, microfinance programs by NGOs, national programs etc.  
11 We imply both production and consumption. However, we assume that formal credit is mainly for the 
purpose of small business and farm production. 
 161 
determinants of the credit supply to households?; and (ii) What are the determinants of credit 
rationing in the rural credit market?; 
5.3.1 The determinants of credit 
 If we consider only households with loans as those who have a demand for credit, it 
may lead to sample selection bias because it is possible that households without loans may 
have a demand for credit but have been excluded. However, we ignore the problem that some 
households receive less credit than they demanded at the pre-set interest rate i.e. they were 
also rationed but not in the form of exclusion. In other words, to control for sample selection 
bias, we adopt the financial exclusion form of credit rationing. Furthermore, the amount of 
credit supplied to a household, which a researcher can observe, is the result of the interaction 
between demand and supply. The difficulty is that the factors, which are likely to affect 
household demand for credit, also are likely to affect supply of credit. For example, 
ownership of farming land may positively affect household demand for credit while it may 
also positively affect the supply of credit if the lenders regard it to be collateral in rural market 
(e.g. in the case of VBARD). This implies that credit supply and demand curves cannot be 
easily identified. Thus, the determinants of a credit model, rather than demand and supply 
separately, are estimated as follows using Tobit regression: 
 


≤
*
i i i*
i *
i
f(x ,z )      if y > 0
y = y = 
0                if y 0     (5.1) 
where yi represents the amount of credit that one household receives from source i which 
equals f(xi) if household has loans and 0 otherwise  ( i = source of credit such as formal, 
informal or total credit etc); xi is a vector of explanatory variables which reflect household 
and local market characteristics; and zi is a vector of additional explanatory variables proxied 
for supply side of credit. Household characteristics include natural attributes (e.g. gender and 
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age .etc) and capital assets (e.g. education years, land ownership and savings .etc). Location 
characteristics represent distance-comparative-effects and comprise of socio-economic factors 
such as prices of selected common goods and services (e.g. rice, pork and sewing .etc), the 
mean of local household characteristics (e.g. average of education years in commune). 
 One may question whether the household’s income/expenditure may be good to proxy 
for household’s wealth, which is very likely to affect the amount of credit that a household 
may receive. This question is reasonable but we do not have the data to analyze this. What we 
observe as the household’s income or expenditure is actually at the end of the period i.e. after 
the borrowing/supplying decision has been made. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to 
proxy for the household’s wealth at the time of borrowing. 
The supply of credit depends on the terms of loan contracts, the availability of credit 
and competition for loans among borrowers. Given an excess demand for formal credit, as a 
result of financial repression, and the lack of liquid collateral, we propose that what could 
actually determine the supply of credit is the availability of credit. We consider the 
availability of credit at three levels: province, commune and village. Availability of credit 
from source i is proxied by the total credit from source i. How lenders allocate credit depends 
on the competition between households at commune and village levels (Khandker and 
Faruqee, 2003). Competition is dependent on household and local characteristics, which are 
included in xi and on the number of potential borrowers (proxied by the number of households 
in commune). Moreover, as various sources of credit are substitutes (in terms of use) and 
demand for one source of credit (such as informal credit) may depend on the supply of 
another source (such as formal credit), we also include the variable proxy for the supply of 
credit from a substitute source in zi. Thus, zi includes variables that proxy for the availability 
of credit, number of competitors and the supply of credit from substitute source. 
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5.3.2 Determinants of credit rationing 
 Equation (5.1) shown above is used to explain factors that affect the amount of credit 
supplied to a household. It does not specify why some households receive loans while the 
others are excluded or receive less than the mount demanded. In other words, we may see 
credit rationing in rural market, but how do lenders ration credit? Clearly, borrowing is a 
function of demand for credit and access to the market. What a researcher can observe as the 
outcome of this process is the amount of credit supplied and the outcome of applications. As 
the decision to offer loans is conditional on the decision to apply for loans, it is necessary to 
separate these two stages: first households decide whether to apply for loans and then lenders 
decide whether to offer or reject the applications. We employ the Heckman approach (see 
Heckman, 1974, 1976, 1979 and 1980) in which the probability of a household receiving a 
loan depends first on that whether they have a demand for credit and then on that whether 
their application is accepted by the lender (see similar framework, for example: Zeller, 1994). 
The first-stage model takes the form below: 
 )i iP(y ) = f(x      (5.2) 
where yi equals 1 if household has demand for credit from source i and 0 otherwise; xi is a 
vector of explanatory variables which are similar to xi in (1), and then: 
 iξi i iP(y ) = f(x ,z , )      (5.3) 
where yi equals 1 if a household receives loans from source i; xi and zi are vectors of 
explanatory variables. ξi is the Mill’s ratio (see Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2003 for details) 
computed from (5.2), which controls for sample selection bias. Vector xi in (5.3) represents 
the household and local characteristics that lender may use to screen applicants such as age, 
education, savings, land use etc. Vector zi again represents the supply side of credit, which 
 164 
include proxy variables for the availability of credit and competition between communes (e.g. 
poverty incidence in commune and province, and average education in commune).  
5.4 Data and measurement 
 Our data are drawn from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey - VLSS 1997/1998. 
The survey was conducted in 1997/1998 by the General Statistical Office. The survey was 
funded by the UNDP and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). The 
survey is a part of the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys 
conducted in a number of developing countries with technical assistance from the World 
Bank. The survey covers a sample of 5,999 households, 194 communes and 388 villages. The 
proportion of rural households is 71.2% (4,269 households) and there are 38.9% of rural 
households borrowing from all sources. However, after adjusting for missing data, we select a 
sample of 4,101 rural households, of which there are 2,108 borrowing households. Of the 
borrowing households, 1,246 households borrow from formal sources; 1,213 households 
borrowing from informal sources, resulting in a number of 351 households having loans from 
both sources. The informal sources of credit include money lenders, relatives and friends; 
ROSCAs and other individuals. If we exclude all households with zero-interest rate loans 
from informal sources (most of them have loans from friends and relatives), the sample of 
borrowing households reduces to 1,645 households. Table 5.1 shows a brief description of the 
sample and Table 5.2 provides a statistical description of the key variables. Further analysis of 
variables is undertaken in the following sections. 
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Table 5.1 - Summary of borrowing households 
 
 Households Percentage Average 
loan size 
(VND1,000) 
Monthly 
interest 
rate 
Borrowing households 2,108    
Formal source 1,246 100% 3,209 1.26% 
 Private banks and cooperatives  4.4% 2,230 1.59% 
 Government banks  82.2% 3,512 1.27% 
 Government programs and others  13.4% 1,547 0.87% 
Informal source 1,213 100% 1,752 3.95% 
 Money lenders  19% 2,141 4.56% 
 Relatives  48% 1,861 2.63% 
 ROSCAs and other individuals  33% 1,366 3.69% 
Non-borrowing households 1,993    
Total 4,101    
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5.5 Empirical results 
5.5.1 Determinants of formal credit 
 We conduct two separate tests to estimate determinants of household formal credit 
allocation. The first test (Test 5.1.1) is based on the whole sample of rural households with 
4101 observations, of which 1246 households have formal loans. The second (Test 5.1.2), 
which looks at those who receive formal credit, uses the sample of borrowing households 
with 2108 observations. The dependent variable is the log of household formal credit 
extended by time of interview12. The explanatory variables include household and location 
characteristics, the availability of credit and the variables that proxy for competition at 
commune and village levels. We also use the proxy variable for the availability of informal 
credit at village level for the reason that this source of credit may affect household demand for 
formal credit, as explained in the Model section. Table 5.3 presents the Tobit regression of the 
household borrowing equation (5.1). 
At the 95% confidence level, we find that the age of the head of household (AGE98) is 
positively and significantly related to the amount of formal credit supplied to households. The 
significance of the squared age indicates that middle-aged households receive the largest 
amount of formal credit. The amount of credit is therefore a nonlinear function of the age of 
the head of household. Education of households (EDUCYR98) is significant, implying that 
more educated households receive more formal credit. Farm households (FARM98) are seen 
to receive more credit, indicating that in rural Vietnam, farm households are the preferred 
clients. Formal credit extension is also dependent on the size of household (HHSIZE), 
                                                
12 Including outstanding loans and loans already paid within 12 months. 
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possibly implying that households with more members either demand more credit or formal 
lenders provide more credit to them because of their high earning capacity.  
The total farming area of households (LGLAND980) is seen as an indicator of both 
collateral and the size of farm production and is positively and significantly related to the 
formal credit extended. This indicates that households owning more farming land demand 
more credit and formal lenders in fact offer more credit to those households.  
Household financial and non-financial savings (LGFISA980 and LGNFSA980) are 
significantly related to formal credit, but with negative signs in the first test and positive sign 
in the second test. It is possible that households with high savings demand less credit and thus 
they receive less. But it is also possible that (in the second test) when we control for only 
households who are clearly revealed to be demanding credit, the positive sign of financial 
savings indicates that households with more financial savings are seen to be more 
creditworthy by formal lenders, and thus receive more credit. 
We find that the availability of formal credit at commune level (LOGCFO980) and at 
village level (LGVIFO980) are positively and significantly related to the formal credit 
extended to households. However, at province level (LGPRFO980), the availability of credit 
is found negatively and significantly related in the second test. This implies that the 
availability of formal credit is an important determinant of the amount of formal credit that 
one household may receive, but either there is an inequality in allocation of formal credit 
between communes or there are two many communes within a province. Specifically, some 
communes may receive less credit than the others in the same province, and thus households 
living in these communes may receive less credit, compared to other households living in 
other provinces. The availability of informal credit at village level (LGVIIN980) is negatively 
and significantly related to household formal credit at the 90% confidence level in the first 
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test and at the 95% level in second test implying that where there is an excess demand for 
formal credit i.e. formal sector does not meet the demand of credit by households, there exists 
a market for informal credit.  
Of the proxy variables for location (fixed) effects, we find that the mean of education 
in the commune (EDUYR98C), the mean of farming area in commune (LGLAN98C) and the 
price index of the province (RCPIGS98) are negatively and significantly related to household 
formal credit, especially in the second test. A possible explanation of this result is that 
because households in “better” communes often demand more credit, the amount of formal 
credit that any one household receives is less (but the number of households receiving credit 
might be higher). This may imply the fact that there is rationing in the amount of credit as 
well as the financial exclusion. 
In short, we have found that total farming area, financial and non-financial savings and 
availability of formal credit are significant determinants of household formal credit. 
Households owning more farming land demand more credit and formal lenders are more 
likely to offer larger amounts of credit since LUCs can be used as collateral in rural Vietnam. 
Households with higher savings may demand less credit. However, if they have higher 
financial savings and do have demand, they may receive more generous formal credit 
allocating. The availability of formal credit at village and commune levels is important to the 
amount of formal credit that one household receives. The results also show that there is an 
inequality in allocation of credit within a province or across communes within a province.  
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Table 5.3 - Results from Tobit regression: Determinants of formal credit 
 
 Test 5.1.1 Test 5.1.2 
 Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient z-Statistic 
AGE98 3.758498 4.829326* 2.196420 3.872094* 
AGE98*AGE98 -0.456323 -5.265458* -0.214564 -3.333159* 
EDUCYR98 0.185905 3.453552* 0.148874 3.690984* 
FARM98 0.730163 1.612231 0.714636 2.130596* 
GENDER98 0.476951 1.058321 0.314248 0.930317 
HHSIZE 0.616284 6.420827* 0.222580 3.107933* 
LGLAND980 0.465386 7.175849* 0.241026 5.013996* 
LGFISA980 -0.165587 -2.211143* 0.135384 2.503009* 
LGNFSA980 -0.261559 -5.118806* 0.042807 1.115107 
LGDETE98 0.508889 0.954907 0.382457 0.969152 
LGFSOU98 -1.488011 -3.492921* -0.351738 -1.137395 
LGNOO98 2.226429 1.672403** 0.622205 0.636572 
LGPORK98 -0.996639 -0.658557 0.754390 0.667149 
LGRICE98 -3.169625 -2.175630* -2.563133 -2.367508* 
LGSEW98 1.991168 2.920890* 0.618908 1.263769 
EDUYR98C -0.192808 -1.480780 -0.166986 -1.731353** 
LGLAN98C -0.747076 -2.058645* -0.706285 -2.671740* 
RCPIGS98 -2.380690 -0.505146 -5.937609 -1.725125** 
LGVIIN980 -0.111652 -1.697568** -0.420104 -8.006437* 
NOHHS98 -0.000263 -0.552376 -0.000449 -1.278521 
LGPRFO980 -0.052588 -0.231004 -0.388116 -2.359462* 
LOGCFO980 0.728956 1.867763* 0.571618 1.984287* 
LGVIFO980 2.872957 9.253923* 1.964455 8.633500* 
C -37.16056 -5.882620* -10.25352 -2.220564* 
Log likelihood -5598.107 -4424.520 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196636 0.270345 
Total observations 4101 2108 
Positive observations 1246 1246 
* Significant at 5% level   
** Significant at 10% level   
 
5.5.2 Determinants of credit rationing by the formal sector 
 In this section, we test two forms of credit rationing: credit exclusion and rationing in 
amount of credit. In the first stage of testing, we use equation (5.2) and conduct tests on 
whether households have a demand for formal credit. We use the sample of 4101 households, 
of which 2108 households demand both formal and informal loans. Given that formal credit is 
a cheaper source and that it dominates rural credit market in rural Vietnam as discussed 
above, we assume that if households demand loans, they first seek formal loans and thus the 
dependent variable equals 1 for those who have either formal or informal loans. However, for 
a more reasonable assumption, we exclude households with zero-interest informal loans in the 
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second test for the reason that non-zero interest borrowers are most likely to demand for loans 
from the cheaper (than interest charging informal lenders) formal sector. There are 1645 
households with non-zero interest loans. Thus, the two alternative tests are presented in Table 
5.4a, namely (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) respectively.  
In the second stage, we use equation (5.3) and conduct the tests on how formal lender 
decides to offer loans. The sample we use for these tests is those households who have loans, 
i.e. 2108 and 1645 households respectively. There are two possibilities: (i) credit exclusion if 
a household does not receive any formal loans and (ii) rationing in the amount of credit if a 
household have both formal and informal loans.  
For the test of credit exclusion, if households have formal loans (1246 households), 
the dependent variable takes value of 1, and otherwise 0. The inverse Mill’s ratios, which are 
computed from the first stage, are included as explanatory variable in second stage. Table 
5.4b represents the second stage tests, (Test 5.3.1) and (Test 5.3.2). The significance of Mill’s 
ratios and high percentage of correct prediction (71.96% and 78.12%) indicate that the two-
stage regressions are more appropriate. 
For the test of rationing in amount of credit, we conduct two types of tests: (i) if 
households have informal loans (1213 and 750 households for the first and second samples 
respectively), the dependent variable takes the value of 1, otherwise 0. The purpose of these 
tests is to see why households are being rationed either being excluded or rationed in amount 
of credit. Table 5.5a represents the test results (Test 5.3.3 and Test 5.3.4 for samples 1 and 2 
respectively) and the significance of Mill’s ratios indicates that the two stage regressions are 
appropriate; and (ii) if households have both formal and informal loans (351 households for 
both samples), the dependent variable takes the value of 1, and otherwise 0. The purpose of 
this test is to see why households are being rationed in amount of credit. Table 5.5b represents 
 172 
the results (Test 5.3.5 and Test 5.3.6). The Mill’s ratios are not significant in this test, and 
thus, the two stage regression is not necessary. 
Table 5.4a - Results from Probit regression: Probability of applying for formal credit 
 
 Test 5.2.1 Test 5.2.2 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient z-Statistic 
AGE98 0.166910 1.847101** 0.404057 4.265932* 
AGE98*AGE98 -0.031483 -3.183275* -0.054266 -5.170551* 
EDUCYR98 0.010287 1.553428 0.010036 1.491136 
FARM98 -0.061831 -1.130932 0.067442 1.202834 
GENDER98 0.035150 0.649202 0.020321 0.364873 
HHSIZE 0.096402 8.065885* 0.091849 7.588738* 
LGLAND980 0.024723 3.170051* 0.014459 1.818839** 
LGFISA980 -0.049451 -5.241171* -0.032069 -3.388112* 
LGNFSA980 -0.052710 -8.623011* -0.048846 -7.782064* 
LGDETE98 0.056098 0.882392 0.037159 0.573068 
LGFSOU98 -0.279683 -5.383893* -0.312052 -5.939800* 
LGNOO98 0.467778 2.768203* 0.308479 1.820298** 
LGPORK98 0.241978 1.389808 0.503740 2.853129* 
LGRICE98 -0.392533 -2.223284* -0.750968 -4.203524* 
LGSEW98 0.462954 5.742108* 0.526625 6.459547* 
EDUYR98C 0.050313 3.379183* 0.051269 3.390795* 
LGLAN98C 0.113579 2.501985* 0.194549 4.240019* 
RCPIGS98 -0.075613 -0.133571 1.203721 2.119201* 
C -2.701407 -3.646798* -5.985611 -7.964278* 
Log likelihood -2609.430 -2526.231 
R-squared 0.081505 0.085321 
LR statistic 463.1079 471.2892 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000 0.000000 
Total observations 4101 4101 
Dependent variable =1 2108 1645 
Percentage correct prediction 63.35% 64.81% 
* Significant at 5% level   
** Significant at 10% level   
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Table 5.4b - Results from Probit regression: Probability of being granted credit 
 
 Test 5.3.1 Test 5.3.2 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient z-Statistic 
AGE98 0.407103 2.809102* 0.106084 3.322559* 
AGE98*AGE98 -0.032640 -1.914274**   
EDUCYR98 0.030897 3.025259* 0.041918 3.416101* 
FARM98 0.259537 3.145633* 0.144148 1.476160 
GENDER98 0.005030 0.060198 0.032832 0.339170 
LGFISA980 0.046000 3.105118* 0.029831 1.808339** 
LGNFSA980 0.029256 2.663487* 0.050780 4.029634* 
EDUYR98C -0.052447 -2.231807* -0.045546 -1.641288 
LGLAN98C -0.234607 -3.469965* -0.393176 -4.731628* 
PORU98 -0.000670 -0.267192 -0.000686 -0.233648 
NOHHS98 -0.000263 -3.230685* -0.000290 -3.033580* 
NOFPOR98 -0.000159 -1.073828 -0.000515 -2.950293* 
LGPRO980 0.055014 4.108307* 0.057827 3.756366* 
LGPRFO980 -0.128837 -3.329671* -0.180923 -3.506067* 
LOGCFO980 0.160149 2.407301* 0.007671 0.095329 
LGVIFO980 0.371513 6.937432* 0.347980 5.416588* 
MILLS (1 and 2) -0.822340 -3.867150* -0.735897 -3.894671* 
C -1.958554 -2.049839* 3.075123 2.701524* 
Log likelihood -1155.080 -792.9777 
R-squared 0.189976 0.129876 
LR statistic 541.8052 236.7214 
Probability (LR stat) 0.000000 0.000000 
Total observations 2108 1645 
Dependent variable =1 1246 1246 
Percentage correct prediction 71.96% 78.12% 
* Significant at 5% level   
** Significant at 10% level   
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Table 5.5a - Probability of being excluded from the formal sector 
 
 Test 5.3.3 Test 5.3.4 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient z-Statistic 
AGE98 -0.172633 -1.217220 -0.047822 -1.654851*** 
AGE98*AGE98 0.010842 0.651303   
EDUCYR98 -0.025805 -2.627402* -0.025915 -2.392328** 
FARM98 -0.223021 -2.764176* -0.132880 -1.493275 
GENDER98 0.011265 0.138057 -0.018445 -0.209019 
LGFISA980 -0.066026 -4.600638* -0.059837 -4.065854* 
LGNFSA980 -0.036795 -3.501435* -0.051019 -4.566935 
EDUYR98C 0.022214 1.010183 0.010843 0.447920 
LGLAN98C 0.136742 2.134553** 0.199247 2.720781* 
PORU98 0.003735 1.582073 0.004931 1.909509*** 
NOHHS98 0.000436 5.354588* 0.000493 5.462981* 
NOFPOR98 0.000135 0.938981 0.000374 2.364500** 
LGPRO980 -0.033255 -2.593995* -0.024726 -1.781610*** 
LGPRFO980 0.211338 5.691731* 0.301982 6.379988* 
LOGCFO980 -0.228339 -3.597153* -0.149362 -2.041934** 
LGVIFO980 -0.219530 -4.569855* -0.137358 -2.508216** 
MILLS (1 and 2) 0.653818 3.248622* 0.554439 3.278574* 
C 0.700191 0.816742 -3.538992 -3.387448* 
Log likelihood -1251.282 -1034.956 
R-squared 0.129286 0.087202 
LR statistic 371.5890 197.7450 
Probability (LR stat) 0.000000 0.000000 
Total observations 2108 1645 
Dependent variable =1 1213 750 
* Significant at 1% level   
**Significant at 5% level   
***Significant at 10% level   
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Table 5.5b - Probability of being rationed in amount of credit 
 
 Test 5.3.5 Test 5.3.6 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Coefficient z-Statistic 
AGE98 0.381049 2.386669** 0.049810 1.589881 
AGE98*AGE98 -0.037446 -2.080031**   
EDUCYR98 0.007475 0.666501 0.009271 0.789857 
FARM98 0.004259 0.046046 -0.026075 -0.266399 
GENDER98 0.025261 0.277560 0.005615 0.058386 
LGFISA980 -0.043559 -2.987450* -0.051701 -3.337208* 
LGNFSA980 -0.020256 -1.882536*** -0.017048 -1.492603 
EDUYR98C -0.006331 -0.249587 -0.014025 -0.528158 
LGLAN98C -0.076753 -1.116748 -0.129386 -1.801081** 
PORU98 0.004244 1.567901 0.004838 1.712917 
NOHHS98 0.000264 2.940412* 0.000332 3.457073* 
NOFPOR98 9.84E-05 0.584729 -8.28E-07 -0.004688 
LGPRO980 0.034881 2.372414** 0.033052 2.161167** 
LGPRFO980 0.136843 3.011024* 0.181051 3.590752* 
LOGCFO980 -0.088627 -1.179738 -0.197566 -2.461886** 
LGVIFO980 0.254907 3.913084* 0.241596 3.472660* 
C -5.175718 -5.462623* -3.274568 -3.466064* 
Log likelihood -894.8133 -822.5585 
R-squared 0.057343 0.035411 
LR statistic 108.8660 60.39470 
Probability (LR stat) 7.77E-16 2.16E-07 
Total observations 2108 1645 
Dependent variable =1 351 351 
* Significant at 1% level   
**Significant at 5% level   
***Significant at 10% level   
 
Who receive formal credit or who are excluded? 
As shown in Table 5.4b, of the household attributes, we find that the age of head of household 
(AGE98) is positively and significantly related to the probability of applying for formal loans 
and the probability of being offered. Education (EDUYR98) is not significantly related to the 
probability of applying, but is to the probability of being offered, implying that formal lenders 
screen applications by using education levels. More interestingly, household savings 
(LGFISA980, LGNFSA980) reduce the probability of applying for credit, but increase the 
probability of being offered credit it. This indicates that if households have savings, they are 
less likely to demand loans, but if they apply, they are more likely to be successful. In other 
words, banks are most willing to lend to those that least need to borrow. The productivity of 
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farming land (LGPRO980), which is a proxy for the value of collateral, is also found to be 
positively and significantly related to the probability of being offered a loan.   
As a proxy for competition among households within one location, the number of 
households in commune (NOHHS98) reduces the probability of receiving formal loans. This 
may be because there are more applicants for loans from large communes and thus the 
probability of success for each applicant is small. Similarly, the number of poor households in 
a commune (NOFPOR98) is negatively significant in the second sample (Test 5.3.2). This 
implies either that more applicants reduce the probability of success or that formal lenders 
may be discouraged from offering loans where there are more poor households. The mean of 
productivity of the farming area in a commune (LGPRO98C) reduces the probability of being 
offered. The possible reason is that in communes with high productivity, there are more 
households applying for loans and thus the probability of success for each household is low. 
This might imply a quota system of credit allocation by the formal lenders.  
Availability of credit at province, commune and village level is found to be 
significantly related to the probability that one household is offered a loan. At province level 
(LGPR980) it is found to be negatively significant, but at commune level (LOGCFO980) and 
village level (LGVIFO980) it is positively related. The different signs at different levels are 
not surprising as they imply inequalities in distribution of formal credit between communes 
and villages within a province. However, the implication is that if formal credit is more 
available at village and commune levels, an applicant household has more probability of 
receiving loans. 
The results thus show that age of the household head, education, savings, availability 
of credit and competition among households are the determinants of credit rationing in rural 
credit market. Household savings may increase the probability of being offered loans as 
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savings are seen either as collateral or an indicator of household wealth. The availability of 
credit at village and commune level also increases the probability of being offered as it 
narrows the gap between demand and supply. However, the number of households and 
number of poor households in the commune are variables which reduce the probability of 
being offered loans from formal lenders.  
Who face credit rationing? 
 The above results have shown why some households receive loans from the formal 
sector while the others do not. As an attribute of the probit model, the results also indicate 
(with adverse signs of the coefficients) that households who do not receive any formal loans 
are those who are completely excluded from the formal sector. Looking further at those who 
are excluded from the formal sector, we conduct further tests to see why they are excluded 
and the difference, if any, between completely excluded and partly excluded households.  
As shown in Table 5.5a, most of the key coefficients are with the adverse signs, 
compared to those resulted from the tests of households who have loans from the formal 
sector. This strengthens our above finding and once again indicates that the level of household 
education, the level of household savings and the availability of formal credit at commune and 
village reduces the probability of being excluded. 
However, when we look at those who are being rationed in amount of credit i.e. who 
receive both loans from formal and informal sector, the results are interesting. As seen in 
Table 5.5b, we do not find clear evidence on the effect of age and education level of 
household head on the probability of being rationed in amount of credit. The number of 
households in a commune increases the probability of being rationed in amount of credit from 
formal sector at 1% level of significance in both samples, indicating that there may be a quota 
system in credit allocation.  
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The level of financial savings is found to be negatively and significantly related to the 
probability of being rationed in amount of credit at the 99% level of confidence, again 
indicating that household financial savings reduce the probability of being excluded and being 
rationed in amount of credit. The level of non-financial savings is negatively and significantly 
related to the probability of being partly excluded at 95% level of confidence and for the 
second sample only. 
Surprisingly, at 99% level of confidence, the availability of formal credit at province 
and village level is positively and significantly related to the probability of being rationed in 
amount of credit from formal credit for both samples, while the availability of formal credit at 
commune level is negatively and significantly related to the probability of being partly 
excluded at 5% of significance and for the second sample. The positive effect of the 
availability of credit at village level indicates that demanding households may have high 
probability of getting formal loans in the village where formal credit is available, but the 
amount of loans is insufficient, and thus they have to borrow from the informal sector. This 
seems to prove the case of VBARD which usually grants 50% of the loan amount requested 
and meets only 14% of the effective demand13 for loans from the low income households in 
rural Vietnam (Dao, 2002).   
The result thus suggests that the key reason explaining why households are being 
rationed in the amount of credit is the quota system in credit allocation by formal lenders 
(mainly VBARD). It also indicates that household savings are the important factors that 
influencing the amount of credit being granted in rural Vietnam.  
                                                
13 Calculated as a ratio of (total low-income households receiving loans * amount of loan granted) over (total 
low income households*amount of loan requested) (Dao, 2002). 
 
 179 
5.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have attempted to analyse how credit is distributed by the formal 
sector in rural Vietnam. A study by Dao (2001) indicates that if households demand credit, 
they first apply for loans from the formal sector (e.g. government banks), largely because of 
interest rates are subsidized and thus lower than the informal sector. However, for many 
reasons, households choose to borrow from the informal sector at much higher interest rates. 
They are either who are completely excluded from the formal sector or being rationed in the 
amount of credit. A number of households borrow from their relatives and friends at zero-
interest rates, but we exclude these households from our analysis of credit rationing by the 
formal lenders. 
 For those who receive loans from formal sources, the amount of credit that they may 
receive is affected by various factors, of which education, household savings, the availability 
of credit and the area devoted to farming are important. Apart from the availability of credit, 
education, household savings and farming area all represent the wealth of households. The 
results thus indicate that formal lenders tend to provide more credit to households who are 
better off. Similarly, we found that households with higher education, higher savings and 
higher productivity of land use are more likely to receive loans. This again strengthens our 
hypothesis that formal credit is for better off rural households and that formal lenders are most 
willing to grant loans to those who are better off (see also: Pham and Izumita, 2002). 
Interestingly, we have found that for households who are being rationed in amount of credit, 
the quota system in credit allocation is the key factor and this seems to prove the case of 
VBARD (see Chapter 4 for VBARD’s lending technology). 
Since the government of Vietnam is committed to providing credit to rural households 
as a key component of its strategy for rural development and poverty reduction (Dao, 2002), 
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the policy implications drawn from findings in this chapter are as follows: first, given the 
effect of farming area and its productivity on household formal credit, Land Reform should be 
accelerated. Many provinces have not yet finished the issuance of LUCs (Dao, 2002) and thus 
rural households may find it hard to gain access to formal credit as LUCs can be used as 
collateral. Second, the importance of the availability of credit at village and commune level 
indicates that the government should encourage the expansion of bank branch network. 
Although interest rates in the banking sector are gradually being liberalised, the requirement 
to charge prior or cheap interest rates (Dao, 2002)) remains a constraint on banks’ ability to 
cover lending costs and develop lending at risk-premium based rates (Chapter 4). Thus, a 
further liberalisation of interest rates could create more incentives for banks (VBARD, VBP) 
and induce more efficient lending. Third, better-off households seem to benefit more from 
formal credit. In order to ensure poorer households gain access to formal credit, the applicant-
screening process should not be based on criteria representing household’s wealth. More 
emphasis should for example be placed on business plans and pre and post loan training and 
group borrowing. And the last but not least, employing local information obtained from 
NGOs and other social organizations through partnership strategy could be a good policy. 
Overall, the findings suggest that the poverty reduction approach that the government 
followed has failed in achieving its goals: the poorer households are most likely to be 
excluded while the financial self-insufficiency (as analyzed in Chapter 4) has limited the 
capacity of formal financial sector to expand outreach at the commune and village level. In 
the next chapters, we will analyze the impact of credit on poverty reduction in order to 
conclude a comprehensive assessment of whether or not the poverty reduction approach 
should be replaced.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACT OF ACCESS TO CREDIT ON HOUSEHOLD POVERTY 
REDUCTION IN RURAL VIETNAM: A CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As we have pointed out in the conclusion section of Chapter 4, an assessment of 
impact of access to credit on poverty reduction is important to conclude the recommendation 
on the approach to microfinance. This chapter and the next chapter focus on this purpose. 
Literature has shown that access to credit has ambiguous impact on poverty reduction and it 
depends on certain circumstances (Gonzalez Vega, 2003). However, many studies have 
revealed the positive but small impact (Morduch and Haley, 2002). Hence, our main interest 
is that whether the access to micro credit has any impact on poverty reduction and if yes, how 
much does it contribute to poverty reduction in rural Vietnam? 
To answer this question, in this chapter, we develop an econometric framework to 
analyse the effect of household credit on the economic welfare of households and use cross-
sectional data from the two households surveys undertaken in 1992/1993 and 1997/1998 to 
derive empirical evidence. Our findings confirm that household credit contributes positively 
and significantly to the economic welfare of households in terms of per capita expenditure, 
per capita food expenditure and per capita non-food expenditure. The positive effect of credit 
on household economic welfare is regardless of whether they are poor or better-off 
households. We also find that credit has a greater positive effect on the economic welfare of 
poorer households and find that the age of the household head, the household size, land 
ownership, savings and the availability of credit at village level are key factors that affect 
household borrowing.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 6.2 represents a brief 
review of the relevant literature. In section 6.3, we develop the econometric framework and 
discuss the characteristics of data we used in section 6.4. In the following section, we present 
and discuss our test results. The concluding section summarizes the main findings of the 
chapter and draws policy conclusions. 
6.2 Review of relevant literature 
Many researchers have postulated that the provision of financial services to the poor, 
or microfinance, is a powerful means of providing low income households with the chance to 
escape from poverty and to transform their lives. It is also evident that there is a strong 
demand for small-scale commercial financial services – both credit and savings – from low-
income households (Robinson, 2001). The strong demand for financial services by low 
income households, together with the evidence that access to credit reduces household 
poverty, provides clear incentives for policy markers to develop a framework for providing 
financial services to low-income households (Chapter 3).  
As many studies have shown, by providing low-income households with access to 
financial services, the service providers help them improve their productivity and 
management skills, create jobs, smooth income and consumption flows, enlarge and diversify 
their businesses, and increase their income and other benefits, such as health care and 
education. The various evidence supporting this assertion can be found from the papers by 
Morduch, 1995; Gulli, 1998; Khandker, 1998; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Zeller, 2000; ADB, 
2000a; Parker and Nagarajan, 2001; Robinson, 2001; Khandker, 2001; Khandker and 
Faruque, 2001; Coleman, 2002; Morduch and Haley, 2002;  Pitt and Khandker, 2002; 
Khandker, 2003; .etc.  
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Recent empirical findings show that access to credit has a positive impact on 
household economic welfare (Khandker, 1998; Panjaitan, Drioadisuryo and Kathleen, 1999; 
Remenyi and Benjamin, 2000; Wright, 2000; Khandker, 2001a; Khandker and Faraque, 
2001b; Coleman, 2002; Pitt and Khandker, 2002; Khandker, 2003; .etc).  Moreover, the 
literature also shows that most microfinance programs do not serve the poorest, but when they 
do so, the poorest can benefit from microfinance through increased income and reduced 
vulnerability (Morduch and Haley, 2002). There is also some evidence that the degree of 
poverty may affect the response. Better-off poor households have a larger positive response 
than the very poor (Remenyi and Benjamin, 2000; Coleman, 2002). 
 Paramount among the limitations of the existing studies is the absence of a coherent 
econometric methodology that would make empirical findings easily comparable.  
Differences in research methodology seem to account for differences in research findings.  
Moreover, the empirical studies seem to focus on a subset of countries and tend to exclude 
some of the countries where the supply of microcredit has been actively developed – Vietnam, 
for example.  
The most relevant studies that assess the impact of credit on rural households were 
conducted recently by the Microfinance Resource Centre of Vietnam (MFRC) (Dao, 2000, 
2001b) and Pham and Izumita, 2002). Dao (2000) assessed the socio-economic impact of the 
rural credit funded by Asian Development Bank. One of the project objectives is to increase 
the living standards of poor rural households. This project is disbursed through the network of 
VBARD. Dao (2001b) also assessed the socio-economic impacts of the rural finance project 
funded by the World Bank. The only difference is that WB project is disbursed through the 
network of VBARD as well as PCFs. Some other research (McCarty, 2001; Dao, 2002) 
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focused on studying the outreach of rural financial system, rather than its role on household 
living standards. 
 Dao (2000, 2001b) concluded that the impacts of credit on household living standards 
in Vietnam were positive. According to Dao (2001b), of 1,883 interviewed borrowing 
households, 99.07% agreed that the project had positive impact on their living standard, of 
which 88.76% stated that borrowing from project increased individual benefit (having 
additional capital for business production investment), and 93.29% said that borrowing 
increased family economic benefit as a whole. With higher incomes, expenditures for family 
consumption increased as a result, especially expenditure for better schooling. The diversity 
of income activities remains limited: cultivation and animal husbandry remain two major 
sources of incomes. With loans obtained from the projects, households have the opportunities 
to expand and diversify their businesses, to change from traditionally single crop and small-
scale production patterns to a larger scale and scope, but these changes are not very large.  
 The objectives of this chapter are two-fold. First, we propose and implement an 
econometric framework which seeks to overcome the shortcomings of the research 
methodology employed in previous studies. Second, we seek to obtain evidence on the impact 
of credit on household economic welfare in Vietnam. Specifically, the chapter addresses two 
questions: (i) What determine household borrowings in rural Vietnam?; and (ii) How much 
does household borrowing contribute to household economic welfare and to poverty 
reduction?  
6.3 The model 
We consider a simple two-period economy14 in which there are two sets of actors, 
households and the lenders. We assume that households finance their economic activities by 
                                                
14 We, however, consider two separate points of time at the end of each period in this paper 
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borrowing from the lenders. The impact of borrowing during the period is expected to occur 
at the end of the period and to affect household economic welfare15. For simplicity, we look at 
household i in location j at time t. During the period from t-1 to t, this household would have 
a demand for credit Cdijt. However, household demand for credit is constrained by the supply 
of credit Csijt. While the demand depends on household characteristics, the supply of credit 
depends on the availability of funds and the lender’s characteristics16. The household 
borrowing function17 is jointly determined by demand and supply functions, denoted as Cijk. 
During the period from t-1 to t, the household generates its economic welfare, which is 
observed at time t and denoted as Yijt. The figure below illustrates our approach. 
… t-1 t 
 
Demand function Cdijt-1 
Supply function Csijt-1 
Borrowing function Cijt-1 
At t-1:  
Observed economic welfare Yijt-1  
Observed borrowing Cijt-1 
From t-1 to t: 
Demand function Cdijt 
Supply function Csijt 
Borrowing function Cijt 
At t: 
Economic welfare Yijt 
Observed borrowing Cijt 
For the purpose of assessing the impact of credit on household economic welfare, an 
output supply function is employed in which we introduce credit as a separate explanatory 
variable in the welfare function. Household welfare may be reflected in income and 
expenditure indicators, etc. At the household level, the welfare is most likely to be affected by 
the household characteristics such as the age of household head, the education of household 
head, total farming area, etc. At village and commune levels, household welfare is possibly 
                                                
15 The term “household welfare” is used generally here for the purpose of modelling. The selection of testing 
welfare variables such as income, expenditure and savings etc will be discussed in testing practice section. 
16 We use the term characteristics to imply all the realised attributes of households and the lenders, which for 
the purpose of modelling we do not specify here in this section but in the testing practice section. 
17 We imply the function of amount of credit that a household receives. 
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affected by the characteristics of the village and commune in which the households live. For 
example, the prices of selected goods and services in the village and commune may affect 
household expenditure or income. We recognise those characteristics as the local market 
characteristics. Household welfare is also affected by household and local market 
characteristics that we cannot observe or measure. For instance, households exerting more 
effort may generate higher income. The controlling variables therefore include household 
characteristics, local market characteristics and unobservable characteristics. The household 
welfare function takes the structural form, as follows 
ijtwijcijtijtijtijt WCXXY εβββββ +++++= ''' 2211     (6.1) 
where X1, X2 and W are vectors of household characteristics, local market 
characteristics and unobservable characteristics, respectively. Y and C represent household 
welfare and total household borrowing. The estimation of parameter βc would show the effect 
of credit on the household welfare.  
There are, however, some concerns about the equation (6.1). Firstly, is it appropriate 
to use the total household borrowing? If C represents borrowing from a specific source (e.g. 
controlled program18 or borrowings from one type of lenders), the parameter βc may not be 
consistent. Specifically, a household may borrow from a bank and from a moneylender or 
whatever. Then, if we consider the effect of bank loans on household welfare and find βc, it is 
less convincing to conclude that βc shows solely the effect of bank borrowings since it is 
possible that household welfare results from the borrowings from the moneylender. Therefore, 
the use of total household borrowings should be better than the use of borrowings from a 
specific source. 
                                                
18 i.e. one credit program or source of interest only; the others are ignored. 
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Second, is the total household borrowing an exogenous variable in equation (6.1)? To 
answer this question, we consider a function of household borrowing which results from the 
interaction between demand and supply functions. Note that the econometric literature on the 
identification problem (see Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2003; Manski, 1995; for examples) 
shows that identifying separate demand and supply functions of household credit from a 
sample of households is impossible without further information about either demand or 
supply. However, this is not our purpose in this chapter. We consider neither the demand nor 
the supply of household credit, but the function of household borrowing for a representative 
household. One may think of our approach as identifying the factors that determine the 
quantity of credit that a typical household may receive. Consequently, the understanding and 
interpretation of determinants of household borrowing should take into account both the 
demand and the supply side. 
The household demand for credit depends on a number of observable factors, such as: 
household characteristics, local market characteristics, etc. Examples of household 
characteristics may include the gender of household head, the education of household head, 
the ownership of farm land, the initial endowment, etc. Local market characteristics may 
include the prices of selected goods and services, average education levels, farm landowning 
levels etc. It is also likely that the unobservable characteristics of household and local market 
affect household demand for credit. These types of variables may include the human effort 
and dedication etc. Hence, the demand function takes the general form: 
ijtddwijd
d
ijt
d
ijt
d
ijtd WXXC εββββ ++++= ''' 2211      (6.2) 
where X1 is a vector of household characteristics; X2 is a vector of local market 
characteristics; and Wd is a vector of unobservable characteristics of households and the local 
market. 
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Similarly, the supply of credit depends on the lenders’ characteristics, local market 
characteristics and some unobservable characteristics. The lenders’ characteristics may 
include the type of lender, such as formal or informal, the availability of funds, the allocation 
pattern of funds and the competition between lenders etc. Local market characteristics may be 
the same as in the credit demand function. The unobservable characteristics may include 
valuation of the lender based on, for example, the average effort and dedication to work by 
households in a specific market. The supply takes the form: 
ijtsswijs
s
ijt
s
ijt
s
ijts WXXC εββββ ++++= ''' 2233      (6.3) 
where X3 is a vector of lenders’ characteristics; X2 is a vector of local market 
characteristics; and Ws is a vector of unobservable characteristics of households and the local 
market which correlates with supply of credit.  
In theory, the demand and supply of credit would determine the amount and price of 
credit granted to a representative household. However, the credit market is special. The 
existence of asymmetric information may lead lenders into the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard (Alkelof, 1970). One solution to these problems is for the lenders to tailor 
their loan contract covenants, which may act as a screening device to distinguish borrowers 
(Bester, 1985; Bester, 1987). Another solution is for the lenders to ration credit (Stiglitz, 
1981). For these reasons, the function of household borrowing may result not only from pure 
demand and supply functions but also from variables controlling for asymmetric information 
problems, such as collateral, interest rates, availability of funds and competition amongst 
borrowers etc19. The reduced form of household borrowing function therefore should be 
estimated as follows:  
ijkccwijc
c
ijk
c
ijk
c
ijk
c
ijk WXXXC εβββββ +++++= '''' 3322110    (6.4) 
                                                
19 Khandker (2001,2003) discusses this issue but our setup is slightly different. 
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where X1 is a vector of household characteristics; X2 is a vector of local market 
characteristics; X3 is a vector of lender’s characteristics and Wc is a vector of unobservable 
variables. 
Now we look at the equations (6.1) and (6.4). We may see that with cross sectional 
data i.e. households are observed at only one point of time (i.e. at the end of the observed 
period), it is likely that the unobservable characteristics of household and local markets, Wc in 
equation (6.4) and W in equation (6.1), are correlated, so that the estimate of Y based on (6.1) 
could result in biased coefficients. More specifically, because of unobservable characteristics 
of households and the local market, such as a household’s special effort and dedication, and 
the natural comparative advantages of the local market etc, it is possible that an increase in a 
household’s welfare is not the result of household borrowings but because of that the 
household has invested more effort or they live in a better location for farming, for example. 
Alternatively, the lenders may screen households using their characteristics. As a result, 
better-off households receive loans but better-off households may also be able to generate 
higher welfare outcomes. Therefore, the estimation of βc based simply on the welfare 
equation (6.1) may not be consistent. 
Econometrically, the solution to the issue of endogeneity of credit is to employ 
instrumental variables and two-stage regression method (see details of this method: Greene, 
2003; Wooldridge, 2003, for examples). We first estimate the determinants of household 
credit, which include instrumental variables that will not be included in Equation (6.1), but 
can be used to predict the amount of household credit that does not depend on household 
characteristics. Selecting appropriate instrumental variables is therefore a crucial task as the 
instruments must not be correlated with household welfare but must be closely correlated with 
the amount of credit borrowed. Given the existence of credit rationing in the market, the high 
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demand and limited supply of credit in rural areas, what actually matters is the supply of 
credit. The instrumental variables must therefore be those which well describe the 
characteristics of the lender.  
From the Equation (6.4), there are two sets of observable variables, of which we can 
see that the lender’s characteristics may serve as the instrumental variables. The lender 
characteristics influence the supply of credit and they do not directly affect household 
welfare. But which of these characteristics should be chosen? One may think the lending 
interest rate could be a good instrument as it describes the response of supply i.e. the amount 
of credit supplied. However, in rural Vietnam, because of the government restrictions on the 
lending interest rates, the “interest rate” can not serve as an instrument as it does not vary very 
much across the sample. The instrumental variables that we select include: the availability of 
funds; the credit allocation pattern; and the competition between lenders at commune and 
village levels. 
Hence, in the first stage, the household borrowing is estimated based on Equation (6.4) 
where lenders’ characteristics play the role of instrumental variables. The predicted values of 
household credit that are obtained from Equation (6.4) are then used, instead of actual values, 
in the second stage (i.e. Equation 6.1) to correct for the problem endogeneity of credit. The 
alternative option is to include both the actual values and the predicted residuals computed 
from the first stage (Equation 6.1) into the second stage regression (Equation 6.2). The 
coefficient of the predicted residuals in the second stage regression shows the Durbin- Wu –
Hausman test (see more about this test in Greene, 2003), which indicates that whether or not 
the endogeneity of credit is significant and that the two-stage regression is appropriate. 
Having solved the problem of the endogeneity of credit, our next concern is about the 
selection of the sample. From a household survey, we can observe that there are a number of 
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households who borrow and other households who do not. For a number of reasons, including 
credit rationing by the lenders, the non-borrowing households cannot get loans even they wish 
to do so. The allocation of credit therefore is not a random process. If we select only 
borrowing households and estimate the effect of credit on household welfare, the estimation 
may be biased. For example, the lenders select households because they are more credit- 
worthy, but credit-worthy households may achieve higher welfare outcomes. Hence, the effect 
of credit on household welfare is not consistent. 
To control for sample selection bias, the whole sample, which includes both 
borrowing and non-borrowing households, should be used. The first stage regression using 
Equations (6.4) is then reconsidered as follows. For the purpose of convenience, we denote 
vector X = (X1, X2, X3) i.e. X includes household characteristics, local market characteristics 
and lender’s characteristics. The structural form of household credit function (6.4) therefore 
becomes: 
* '
i i iC X β ε= +  with 2~ (0, )i iX Nε σ  
Econometrically, if we observe (Yi,Xi) for a random sample, the estimation of the 
coefficients  using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression produces a consistent estimation 
of β, i.e.  
1 *ˆ ( ' ) ( ' )X X X Cβ −=  
However, as we can observe only borrowing households, resulting in a random sample 
conditional on Ci* >0, the least squares regression may not be appropriate. The reason is as 
follows. Consider the following credit equation for every observation: 
[ , 0]i i iE c x c > = ' '[ ]i i i ix E xβ ε ε β+ > −
'
' [ ]ii
x
x E ε ε ββ σ
σ σ σ
= + > −  
We assumed 2~ (0, )i iX Nε σ , so we can arrange this equation for: 
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Equation (6.5) implies that a marginal effect of x’i on ci differs from β which results 
from the OLS regression, which is therefore not appropriate. A number of studies have 
proposed different methods to solve this problem using log likelihood function maximisation. 
We follow Tobin’s (1958) approach, which is then called the Tobit model, as follows: 
Consider the distribution of C given X conditional on C>0: 
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We then arrange for the distribution of the observed dependent variable:  
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The log likelihood function is then constituted as a function of logarithm of sum of 
distribution function of all observed dependent variables with respect to  and σ. 
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The Tobit model is used to estimate the consistent parameters β and σ by maximizing 
this log likelihood function by differentiating the above equation with respect to β and σ and 
setting the derivatives equal to zero.  
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6.4. Data and measurement 
Our data are drawn from two surveys on living standards in Vietnam, namely Vietnam 
Living Standards Surveys - VLSS 1992/1993 and VLSS 1997/1998. The first survey was 
conducted in 1992/1993 by the State Planning Committee, known now as the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment and the General Statistical Office (GSO). The second was conducted 
by the GSO in 1997/1998. Both surveys were funded by UNDP and Swedish International 
Development Authority (SIDA). The surveys were parts of the Living Standards 
Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys conducted in a number of developing 
countries with technical assistance from the World Bank.  
VLSS 1992/1993 covers a sample of 4,799 households, 150 communes and 300 
villages over the country. In which, there are 3,839 rural households, accounting for 80% of 
the overall sample. Of the rural households, there are 1,985 households (41.4%) being 
indebted from various sources. VLSS 1997/1998 was designed to provide an up-to-date 
source of data on households. It covers a sample of 5,999 households, 194 communes and 388 
villages, including all households surveyed in 1992/1993. The proportion of rural households 
is 71.2% (4,269 households). There are 38.9% of rural households borrowing from all 
sources. The timing of this VLSS approximately five years after the first allows analysis of 
medium term trends in living standards. 
The construction of variables plays an important part in our study. A descriptive 
statistics of variables and correlation matrices are presented in Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. The 
dependent variables, which proxy for household welfares, include per capita expenditure, per 
capita food expenditure and per capita non-food expenditure. The variable of total household 
credit is constructed by summing all loans from the formal and informal sources such as bank 
loans and ROSCA loans. The household characteristics include variables measuring natural 
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attributes such as age, gender of household head; variables measuring household assets, such 
as savings and farm-land owning. Local market characteristic variables include: the prices of 
selected goods and services; the averaged household characteristics in a commune, such as 
averaged education, averaged farm-land owning. The construction of variables measuring 
local market characteristics is mainly for the purpose of controlling for the location fixed 
effects, rather than for comparison. The lender characteristics include proxy variables of the 
availability of funds at province, commune and village levels and the competition between 
lenders. Further discussion of variables is in Section 6.5. 
6.5. Econometric procedures and results 
In this section, we implement the tests and report the empirical evidence on the effect 
of household credit on household welfare. The first stage regression estimates the 
determinants of household borrowing. The question that we want to answer in this stage is: 
what are the determinants of household borrowing? In other words, we are interested in 
exploring: (i) whether or not the natural attributes of a household affect its amount of 
borrowing; (ii) how the household’s endowment affects its borrowings?; and (iii) does the 
supply of loans by the lenders play any role on household borrowing?  
In the second stage, the predicted residuals resulting from the first stage are included 
as an explanatory variable to control for the endogeneity of credit in the estimation of 
household welfare. The questions that we will answer in this stage, are as follows: (i) is the 
household credit endogenous and is the two-stage regression appropriate?; (ii) what is the 
effect of household credit on household welfare?; and, (iii) is there any difference in the 
degree of effects between 1992/1993 and 1997/1998?.  
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6.5.1 Determinants of household borrowing 
In the first stage, we use the Equation (6.4) and implement tests using the Tobit model. 
We select and implement the tests separately for two samples of rural households in 
1992/1993 and 1997/1998. After adjusting for missing data, the 1997/1998 sample includes 
4101 rural household houses, of which 2108 households are borrowing households. The 
1992/1993 sample includes 3264 rural households, of which 1733 households borrowed. The 
test results of are reported in Table 6.4. 
(Insert Table 6.4 about here) 
The 1997/1998 sample 
Considering the test results for the 1997/1998 sample from Table 6.4, we find that, of 
the natural attributes of households, the age of household head and the size of household are 
significantly related to total household borrowing at 1% level of significance. In 1997/1998 
survey, the middle-aged households tend to borrow more than the other households. The 
household size is positively and significantly related to household borrowing, indicating either 
that larger-size households demand more loans, or that the lenders allocate more credit to 
households with more labourers. The gender of the household head and the dummy variable 
of whether a household is a farm household are not significantly related to household 
borrowing. This result indicates that in rural areas there is no distinction between genders and 
type of households in demanding loans and the allocation of credit. 
The proxy variables for household assets are found to be significantly related to 
household borrowing. At the 5% level of significance, the education of the household head is 
positively and significantly related to household borrowing, implying that more educated 
households tend to borrow more than others. At the 1% level of significance, we find that the 
ownership of farming land positively and significantly affects the amount of household 
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borrowing. This indicates either that the ownership of land is very important for gaining 
access to loans since the formal lenders normally require land use certificates as collateral for 
loans, or that households owning more farming land borrow more i.e. bigger farm need more 
money. Financial savings and non-financial savings are negatively and significantly related to 
household borrowings, at the 1% level of significance. This shows that the households with 
smaller endowments tend to demand more and borrow more. 
Our next concern is about whether or not the availability of funds (or the supply of 
credit) plays any role in household borrowings. To proxy for the availability of funds, we 
calculate the sum of all household borrowings by source at village, commune and province 
level. We then consider the availability of formal funds at village, commune and province 
level and the availability of informal funds at village level. At the 1% level of significance, we 
find that the availability of informal funds at village level, the availability of formal funds at 
village level and the availability of formal funds at province level are positively and 
significantly related to household borrowings. However, the availability of formal funds at 
commune level is negatively and significantly related to household borrowing at the 5% level 
of significance. The opposite signs of the effect of formal sources of credit at different levels 
may imply that in order to help rural households gain access to formal sources of credit, the 
network of formal lenders must be extended at the village level. The negative effect of the 
availability of formal credit at commune level possibly implies that where formal credit 
supply is restricted households may borrow more from informal lenders. The effect of the 
availability of informal sources of funds at village level on household borrowing indicates 
that informal sources of credit remain important in rural credit markets.  
The 1992/1993 sample 
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The findings from the 1992/1993 sample, as shown in Table 6.4, are similar and 
confirm the main findings from 1997/1998 sample. We find the negative and significant effect 
of the age of household head on household borrowing at the 1% level of significance. This 
result also indicates older households tend to borrow less. Household size is again positively 
and significantly related to household borrowing at the 1% level of significance. The gender 
of the household head and farm household variable are not found to be significantly related to 
household borrowings. 
Of the proxy variables for household assets, the ownership of farming land, the value 
of financial savings and non-financial savings are all significantly related to the total 
household borrowing, but we do not find evidence for the influence of the education of the 
household head. At the 5% level of significance, the positive effect of the ownership of 
farming land on the amount of household borrowings confirms the implication that we found 
in 1997/1998 sample that households owning more land demand more loans for their 
production or that the lenders use land owning as a priority criteria for offering loans. At the 
1% level of significance, the negative effects of financial and non-financial savings are 
relevant to previous findings that better-off households borrow less. 
Regarding the availability of funds and competition between lenders, at the 1% level 
of significance, we find similar results as in 1997/1998 sample that the availability of 
informal funds and the availability of formal funds at village level are positively and 
significantly related to household borrowings. However, the availability of funds at the 
commune level is not significantly related to household borrowings. The findings again 
strengthen the view that for rural households to gain access to credit, its supply at the village 
level must be improved.  
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6.5.2 Impact of credit on household welfare 
In the second stage of regression, we use the Equation (6.1) and conduct tests using 
ordinary least squares method. The predicted residuals that are resulted from the first stage 
have included in the second stage to correct for sample selection bias and endogeneity of 
credit. We conduct separate tests for the 1997/1998 sample and the 1992/1993 sample. Table 
6.5 shows the Durbin-Hausman-Wu test which indicates whether or not the credit is 
endogenous and should the two stage regression is appropriate. Table 6.6 shows a summary of 
the tests of effect of credit on household welfares for the 1997/1997 and 1992/1993 sample, 
respectively. The test results are reported in Table 6.7 and 6.8. The dependent variables 
include the logarithm forms of per capita expenditure, per capita food expenditure and per 
capita non-food expenditure.  
(Insert tables 6.5 and 6.6 about here) 
From Table 6.5, at the 1% level of significance, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests show 
that the household credit is indeed endogenous for all dependent variables. Therefore, using 
instruments and analysing the role of credit on household welfares based on the two stage 
regression are appropriate. Briefly, at the 1% level of significance, we find that household 
borrowing is positively and significantly related to household welfares, in terms of per capita 
expenditure, per capita food expenditures and per capita non-food expenditure for both the 
1997/1998 and 1992/1993 samples, as shown in Table 6.6. We also find that in 1992/1993, 
household borrowing contributes more to household welfares than in 1997/199720. The effect 
of borrowing on non-food expenditure is found to be higher than on food expenditure in both 
                                                
20 Specifically, if household borrowing increases by x %, the per capita expenditure increases by (1+x).058897-1 
% in 1997/1998 and (1+x).069796-1 % in 1992/1993. The increases in per capita food expenditure and per capita 
non food expenditure are (1+x).03155-1 % and (1+x).114328-1 % in 1997/1998 and (1+x).051011-1 % and (1+x).124194-1 
% in 1992/1993 
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1997/1998 and 1992/1993 samples. The effects on food and non food expenditures are lower 
in 1997/1998.  
Although the findings show very small effects, they do reveal that household 
borrowing has a positive impact on household welfare. This result supports the view that 
providing credit to rural households may increase their welfares and reduce poverty. The 
greater effect of credit on non-food expenditure in both samples possibly implies that 
households need to borrow to finance other activities, such as production and trading 
business, rather than daily sustenance. However, further discussion and the correct policy 
assessment of the impact of credit needs to take into account cost and benefit analysis. 
6.5.3 The main implications 
In short, our findings reveal some important implications. First, a schematic picture of 
a typical household which borrows in the rural Vietnam is presented. A typical household 
owns an area of farming land and borrows to finance its production because it lacks an 
endowment (i.e savings). The middle-aged and larger sized households tend to borrow more. 
The gender of household head and the type of household (i.e. form or non-farm household) 
however do not affect the amount of household borrowing. This snapshot shows that the 
households who borrow are those who lack endowments, but have land and labour. They 
indeed need loans for production. However, the amount of household borrowing is influenced 
by the availability of funds at the village level. This implies an important policy conclusion: 
in order for rural households to gain access to credit, the formal/semiformal credit network 
must be extended to the village level. 
Second, the positive impact of household borrowing on household economic welfare 
indicates that the provision of credit to rural households is an effective tool for improving 
their living standards. However, the very small values of the estimated coefficients raise the 
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question of whether it is efficient to provide financial services to the rural households. The 
traditional view (see Chapter 2, 3 and Robinson, 2001) on rural finance emphases that 
providing credit to rural households involves high risk and/or high transaction costs. If the 
costs are too high, one may question: (i) whether providing credit to rural households is good 
policy, and if it is; (ii) how should we provide financial services to them? This returns us to 
the debate of whether we should follow a subsidized poverty reduction approach or a market 
risk related approach aimed at achieving sustainability of financial services provision, which 
is well discussed in Robinson (2001).  
6.6 Further considerations 
In the proceeding section, using the whole sample of households in 1992/1993 and 
1997/1998, we have shown that credit has a positive and significant impact on household 
welfare. How robust is this conclusion? Is there any difference in the results between points in 
time? Are the results consistent for the sub-samples of both poorer households and better-off 
households? 
The conduction of tests for two separate samples has shown the test of robustness in 
terms of variance in results between points in time. The test results have confirmed the 
positive impact of credit on household welfare. In this section, we look in detail at the role of 
the better-off households. It is likely that household borrowing may have positive and 
significant impact on the better-off households, rather than the poorer households, for the 
reason that better-off households basically know better how to use credit to generate 
household welfare. If this is found to be so, the above findings are also robust. Therefore, we 
implement two further sets of tests. For each sample, we divide it into two sub-samples of 
households: better off households and poorer households. To construct the sub-samples, rural 
households are classified into five groups from 1 to 5, in which the household group of 1 
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indicates the poorest households and the household group of 5 indicates the richest 
households. The better-off households include households of group 3 to 5 and the poorer 
households belong to groups 1 and 2.  
The sub-sample of better-off households in 1997/1998 includes 2377 households, of 
which 1163 households are borrowing households. These figures for the sub-sample of better-
off households in 1992/1993 are 1901 and 949, respectively. The sub-sample of poorer 
households in 1997/1998 includes 1724 households, of which 945 are borrowing households. 
The figures for sub-sample of poorer households in 1992/1993 are 1363 and 784 households. 
We then repeat the tests in the above section for all sub-samples. Tables 6.9 shows the first 
stage regression results for the sub-sample of better-off households and Table 6.10 shows the 
results for the sub-sample of poorer households in 1997/1998 and 1992/1993, respectively.  
(Insert Tables 6.9 and 6.10 about here) 
From Tables 6.9 and 6.10 we see that the results of the first stage-regression for the 
sub-samples are not much different from the first stage regression for the whole sample as in 
previous section in terms of the significant factors and the direction of effect. However, there 
are some changes in the degree of significance. For example, in 1992/1993 whole sample, the 
availability of formal funds at village level is found positively and significantly related to 
household borrowing at 1% level of significance, but in the sub-sample of poorer households, 
the effect is found at 5% level of significance (see Table 6.10).  
By comparing the results from the regressions on 6 samples: whole samples (2) and 
sub-samples (4), we find that the following variables have a significant effect on the 
household credit: age of household head, household size, financial savings, non-financial 
savings, the availability of informal funds and formal funds at village level. The owning of 
land is also found to be significant to household access to credit in most of the samples, 
 202 
except for the sub-sample of better-off households in 1992/1993. The significance of these 
variables in all samples implies that these variables are indeed the key determinants of 
household borrowing. 
Our main interest however is to test whether the results from the second stage 
regression alter our findings on the impact of credit from the previous section. Table 6.6 
shows the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests which indicate whether or not the instruments and the 
second stage are appropriate. The results reveal that the two-stage regression and the 
instruments are more appropriate for most of the dependent variables and the sub-samples, 
except for the per capita food expenditure in the sub-sample of better-off households in 
1992/1993. Therefore, we do an extra test using least squares regression for this case and the 
two-stage regressions for the rest. 
As before, the predicted residuals, which are calculated from the first-stage regression, 
are added as an explanatory variable in the regression. The extracts of the second stage test 
results are also reported in Table 6.6 for the sub-samples of better-off households and for the 
sub-samples of poorer households. The test results are reported in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 for the 
samples of better-off households and in Tables 6.13 and 6.14 for the samples of poorer 
households. The extra test of per capita food expenditure using least squares regression for the 
sample of better-off households in 1997/1998 is reported in Table 15.  
For all sub-samples, the results indeed confirm the findings of the previous section. 
The household borrowing is positively and significantly related to household welfares at 1% 
level of significance, except to the per capita food expenditure in the sub-sample of better-off 
households in 1997/1998 at 10% level of significance. The coefficients however are slightly 
different. For example, the effect of the same increase of x% in the total household credit in 
1997/1998 results in an increase of (1+x).058897 – 1% in per capita expenditure for the whole 
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sample, higher than an increase of (1+x).0261606-1% for the sub sample of better-off households 
and (1+x).051041 for the sub-sample of poorer households.  
This result is important for two reasons. First, it confirms that our findings in the 
section 5 pass the robustness tests and the conclusion that household borrowing is positively 
and significantly related to household welfare is consistent. Second, it indicates that 
household borrowing can contribute to household welfare regardless of whether the 
households are poorer or better off households. Moreover, we find that if the household 
borrowing increases by the same percentage, it contributes more to the welfares of poorer 
households, compared with better-off households. Specifically, an increase of x% in 
household borrowing increases (1+x).051041 – 1 % in per capita expenditure for poorer 
households but (1+x).026106 -1 % for better-off households. 
The final thing that we may be concerned with is about technical issues of 
econometrics. First, the coefficients that we report in this chapter are the un-standardized ones 
and they are not useful for comparison among variables. Second, the standard errors when 
using two separate stage regressions as discussed in Maddala (2001, pp. 360-363) need to be 
adjusted. As Maddala analyzes, although the two separate stages of regression may produce 
consistent coefficients, the standard errors may be incorrect since in the second stage, the 
predicted values are used instead of the actual values. If so, the interpretation of the test 
results may lead to different conclusions. Hence, we also conduct extra tests for these two 
purposes. The calculation of standardized coefficients which are useful for comparison among 
variables is presented in Appendix A1. The standard error problem is solved by using 2SLS 
estimator directly. The extra tests are reported in Appendix A2 and indeed they do not 
contradict our findings in this chapter. 
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6.7 Conclusions 
Although there has been substantial research on the relation between microfinance and 
household economic welfare, the research approach and methodology has been flawed. The 
main problems in the study of credit impact assessment include: the endogeneity of credit; 
and sample selection bias. In this chapter, we have: (i) proposed an econometric framework 
that aims at minimising the above problems; and (ii) provided the empirical evidence on the 
role of household credit on household economic welfares with the case of rural Vietnam. 
We have found that household borrowing is affected by various factors, of which the 
following are important: the age of the household head, the household size, the ownership of 
farming land, the value of financial savings, the value of non financial savings, the availability 
of informal funds and the availability of formal funds at village level. The positive effect of 
the ownership of farming land implies either that the households owning more farming land 
tend to borrow more or that the lenders lend more to those households. This possibly 
demonstrates that the formal/semiformal lenders require rural households to provide collateral 
in the form of land use certificates. The negative coefficient of the value of financial savings 
and the value of non financial savings on the amount of household borrowing indicates that 
households with insufficient endowments (i.e. low savings) tend to borrow more to finance 
their production. We also found that the availability of informal and formal/semiformal funds 
at village level increases the amount of household borrowing. This finding has a very 
important implication that in order to help rural households gain access to the formal sources 
of credit, the banking network must be extended to the villages. 
   The main purpose of this chapter is to assess the role of credit on household economic 
welfare. We have found that household borrowing is positively and significantly related to the 
household welfare in both 1992/1993 and 1997/1998 samples. The similarity of finding for 
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each of the two periods informally supports robustness tests. Although the effect is small, the 
finding implies that providing loans to rural households is a tool to help poor rural households 
escape from poverty. We also conducted other tests of robustness to control for the sample 
bias. These do not contradict our findings. Moreover, we found that household borrowing has 
a greater positive impact on poorer households, compared with better-off households. This 
strengthens the view that poorer households can potentially gain from access to 
formal/semiformal credit in particular, and financial services in general. The readers may also 
note that for the purpose of this chapter we have considered total household borrowing but it 
may be possible to follow the same approach and conduct further research on the role of 
formal and informal credit separately.   
However, we may be concerned about the very low impact of credit on household 
welfare. Given the high transaction costs of providing credit to rural households, the benefit, 
or the impact, may be lower than the cost, and hence the question is raised: should we provide 
credit on a risk-related, or a subsidized basis? The main case for subsidizing credit is to 
reduce poverty by supplying cheap credit, but, as we and many others have found (e.g. 
Khandker, 2003; Khandker and Faruque, 2001), credit has a very low impact on poverty 
reduction. Moreover, credit is not the only tool in a poverty reduction strategy (Chapter 3), so 
why do we need to commit a cheap credit? The risk related approach (i.e. the financial system 
approach), which aims at assuring sustainability of the providers, results in the supply of 
much more expensive credit to rural households and we may expect exclusion of the very 
poor households to result. We thus return to the debate of which is better: the risk oriented or 
the subsidized poverty alleviation approach? We will come back to this question in the 
conclusion section of the next chapter which assesses the long-term impact of access to credit 
on poverty reduction. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RURAL CREDIT AND HOUSEHOLD POVERTY REDUCTION IN VIETNAM: 
EVEDENCE USING PANEL DATA FROM HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the research question that has been proposed in the previous 
chapter. However, this chapter looks at the long-term impact of access to credit on household 
poverty reduction, using panel data from household surveys. We find that credit has a long-
term positive and significant impact on household welfare (per capita expenditure, per capita 
food expenditure, per capita non-food expenditure and the household poverty status). This 
finding confirms our previous finding using cross-sectional data and indicates that providing 
credit in particular and financial services in general to the poor leads to household poverty 
reduction. However, the impact of credit on household welfare is found to be very low. We 
also find that in order to help rural households gain more access to credit, the credit network 
must be extended to the village level which further raises the possibility that costs exceed 
benefits under poverty reduction approach.  
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.2, we review the relevant literature 
relating to long-term impact of access to financial services and poverty reduction. An 
econometric framework for panel data based analysis is then developed and presented in 
Section 7.3. Data characteristics and construction of variables are discussed is in Section 7.4. 
Section 7.5 presents the empirical results and considers their implications. The concluding 
remarks summarises the key findings of this chapter and draws policy recommendation. 
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7.2 Review of relevant literature 
 There is considerable evidence that financial development is associated with economic 
growth in developing countries (see DFID, 2004; Levine, 1997; Gertler, 1988; Pagano, 1993; 
Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 1999; Evans, Green and Murinde, 2002). Levine (1997) finds that 
a growing body of empirical analyses demonstrate a strong positive link between the 
functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth. One implication of these 
papers is that there is a positive relationship between finance and poverty reduction (see for 
example: Levince, 2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2004; DFID, 2004). However, 
the papers do not address the specific relationship between finance for the poor (mainly 
credit) and poverty reduction. Studies at macro level may reveal some positive contribution of 
finance to poverty reduction through economic growth, but they say little about whether or 
not finance for the poor may increase their living standards in long-term perspective. This 
chapter focuses on the impact of long-term access to credit (to some extent it implies the 
financial development) on poverty reduction. 
The relationship between access to credit and household poverty reduction has been 
explored in recent studies (see Chapter 3 and 6). However, most of the previous studies draw 
their findings from analysis of cross-section data obtained from household surveys. Such 
analysis does not tell us much about the long-term impact of access to credit on household 
welfare. It is possible that, if we consider a borrowing household at time t only, this 
household may generate higher economic welfare because at time t the economic condition is 
better, rather than because that access to credit has improved its welfare. In such a case, we 
are concerned that the perceived impact of access to credit on household welfare is temporary 
or spurious at time t and thus the conclusion of positive impact of access to credit on 
household welfare may not be persistent. 
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One of the few papers that look at the long-term impact of credit on household welfare 
is by Khandker (2003). It uses panel data obtained from household surveys in Bangladesh and 
finds that credit has a long-term positive impact on household welfare. Although the degree of 
impact is found to be small, it confirms the evidence from cross-section data and supports the 
widely held belief that credit can contribute positively to economic welfare of households.  
Regarding Vietnam, there are several papers addressing the role of credit on household 
welfare. For examples, Quach, Mullineux and Murinde (2003) use cross-section data based 
analysis and find a positive impact of credit on household poverty reduction in rural Vietnam 
(see also Chapter 6). Their findings are consistent between the household surveys, of 
1992/1993 and 1997/1998. Pham and Izumita (2002) also use a household survey and cross-
section data based analysis and conclude the positive impact of credit on household income. 
Others, such as Dao (2000, 2001), use questionnaires and statistical comparison analysis and 
find that 99 percent of interviewed households agree that they benefit from borrowing and 
that their income increases.  
 Although the above mentioned studies suggest a positive impact of credit on 
household welfare in rural Vietnam, they do not look at the long-term relationship. Thus, in 
order to draw a comprehensive conclusion on how much credit contribute to household 
welfare, a long-term assessment is necessary and that is the purpose of this paper. This 
chapter provides empirical evidence on the long-term impact of credit on household welfare 
in Vietnam, using a panel data based analysis. If we can confirm that a household which 
borrows in two consecutive periods, we can see the difference (or change) in the amount of 
borrowing and household welfare. If the change in household welfare is correlated with a 
change in household borrowing, there is a long-term relationship. The main difference 
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between cross-section data and panel data analysis is that the first shows the comparison 
across households while the second shows changes within households over time. 
7.3 The model 
We consider a household i in village j who borrows at both times, t and t+1. At a 
certain time t, denote cijt as the accumulative amount of credit that this household has 
borrowed by time t and yijt as an economic welfare that the household obtains at time t.  The 
reduced form of the household borrowing and household welfare function are as follows:  
c
ijt
c
wcij
c
ijt
c
ijt
c
ijt
c
ijt wxxxc εβββββ +++++= '3'32'21'10      (7.1) 
' ' '
0 1 1 2 2
y
ijt ijt ijt ij w ijty x x wβ β β β ε= + + + +       (7.2) 
where x1 is a vector of household characteristics; x2 is a vector of local market 
characteristics; and x3 is a vector of lender characteristics; w is a vector of unobservable 
characteristics of the household and local market that may affect cijt and yijt.. εcijt and εijt are 
mean-zero stochastic errors. The parameters of interest are βi (i = 0,1,2,3,c). 
The household characteristics include the natural attributes such as the age of 
household head, the gender of household head and the household endowment such as the 
education of the household head, the ownership of land and household savings. The local 
market characteristics include the proxy variables representing the local economy such as the 
prices of the selected goods and services or the competitive advantage of the local market 
such as the averaged-ownership of land, the averaged-education of household head. The 
lender characteristics include the type of lenders: formal and informal and the availability of 
formal and informal funds. 
7.3.1 Model of endogenous credit 
With cross-section data, the endogeneity of credit arises for a number of reasons. First, 
the non-random allocation of credit may lead to biased estimation of the impact of credit on 
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household welfare. The lenders may screen applicants based on their characteristics. It is 
likely that the credit is distributed to better-off households, but better-off households 
generally are considered to be able to generate higher welfare. Also, the lenders may allocate 
more credit to some targeted markets, for examples to poorer villages (e.g. lenders offer loans 
in compliance with a poverty reduction strategy or a regional development policy). It may be 
that borrowing households in poorer villages generate lower welfare than the non-borrowing 
households in better-off villages. Hence, the comparison of the credit impact on borrowing 
and non-borrowing households may be misleading.  
Second, the unobservable characteristics of households and local markets affect both 
the household borrowing, cijt, and the household welfare, yijt. In other words, the error terms, 
εcijk and εijk, are likely to be correlated. These unobservable characteristics may include 
preference heterogeneity, dedication and special effort exerted by households, or the 
competitive advantages of the local markets. It is possible that a household with greater 
preference, dedication or effort is more willing to borrow than the others, and then is more 
capable to generate higher welfare than the others. Now we may see that the generated 
economic welfare might not result from the increased borrowing, but from the fact that some 
households are more dedicated or hard-working than the others. The estimation of the impact 
of credit on household welfare is therefore inconsistent. The discussion of treatment for 
endogeneity of credit with cross-section data is well presented in Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
and Khandker and Faruque (2002). 
With panel data, households are observed at some points in time, e.g. at t and t+1. As 
a result, the problem of endogeneity of credit is reduced to some extent. If we consider the 
welfare function (7.2) at two points in time and take the difference, the unobserved 
characteristics are likely to be eliminated. The underlying assumption for this argument to be 
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true and also for the estimation to be consistent is that the unobservable characteristics are 
hardly to change from t to t+1. More specifically, it is expected that the preference 
heterogeneity, dedication and effort exerted by a household are constant over time. The 
reduced forms of the household borrowing and household welfare equations using panel data 
are as follows: 
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where ∆x1ijt = x1ijt-x1ijt-1; ∆x2ijt = x2ijt-x2ijt-1; ∆x3ijt = x3ijt-x3ijt-1; ∆cijt = citk-cijt-1  
Although the panel data may reduce the possibility of endogeneity of credit resulting 
from the unobservable characteristics of household and of the local market, it does not control 
for the non-random allocation of credit. It is still possible that credit is available and allocated 
more to households in poorer villages in both time t and t+1. We may think of the fact that 
such strategies as poverty reduction and regional development target the same markets in both 
times, t and t+1. The non-random allocation of credit causes the possibility of endogeineity of 
credit as it does with cross-section data. Moreover, we have assumed that unobservable 
characteristics of households and local markets are time invariant, but it may not always be 
the case. Therefore, the estimation of (7.4) using panel data is possibly biased, and resulting in 
inconsistent coefficients.  
The econometric solution to this problem is to use instrumental variables or 
instruments and the two-stage regression method (see Greene, 2003, Wooldridge, 2003). The 
idea of using instruments is that we find variables that are well-correlated with household 
borrowing cijt, but are not correlated with the household welfare yijt. In the first stage 
regression, the instruments are used to estimate the values of household borrowing that are 
not affected by the household characteristics. In the second stage, the estimated values are 
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used instead of household borrowing to correct for the endogeneity of credit. The equivalent 
is to use the estimated residuals together with household borrowing in the second stage. The 
significance of the estimated residuals indicates whether or not the instruments and the two-
stage regression are appropriate. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test can be used (see Greene, 
2003, Wooldridge, 2003). 
Selecting instrumental variables is not a trivial task. Pitt and Khandker (1998) use the 
exogenous loan eligibility criteria that a lender employs to select a borrower as the instrument. 
Such exogenous properties are appropriate for credit program assessment where they have 
specific selection criteria for the participants. Khandker (2003) uses the characteristics of the 
competitors as the instruments. His idea is that given a limited supply of funds, what matters 
is the allocation of funds by the lenders. The amount of credit that a household borrows 
depends not only on its own characteristics, but also on the characteristics of the competitors. 
The competitors may be at village level as well as district level where they influence the 
amount of credit that a particular household receives, but not the household welfare. 
We follow Khandker’s idea in the sense that the availability of funds is an important 
factor that affects the amount of credit that one household may receive, but not the household 
welfare. However, we consider the availability of funds and the competition between the 
informal and formal lenders in the village and commune which the households have access to, 
rather than in the village and commune of the competitors. The idea is that the amount of 
credit that one household can borrow is dependent on the amount of credit available in the 
village and commune. Moreover, if the households have access to both formal and informal 
sources of funds, the amount of household borrowing may be affected by the choice of where 
to borrow from since the households apparently choose between the two lenders. 
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Alternatively, the amount of credit that a lender allocates a borrower may depend on the 
availability of credit from its competitor. 
7.3.2 Model of sample selection 
 In order to gauge the impact of consecutive borrowing on household welfare, we are 
interested in the sample of households who borrow at time t. At time t+1, there are two sub-
samples: (i) households who borrow at both times, t and t+1; and (ii) households who borrow 
at t but not at t+1. For convenience, if a household borrows at both times t and t+1, they are 
called “participant household”; otherwise, they are called “non-participant household”.   
If we take the sample of participant households only and estimate the credit impact 
using the two-stage regression procedure, the results may suffer from sample selection bias. 
The reason is that the households who are non-participant households are possibly excluded 
for some reasons such as their self-selection or the exclusion by the lender, especially if the 
lender learns about a borrower’s credit worthiness during the first period. If so, the results are 
inconsistent or at least less interesting since we do not know what would happen to the 
welfare of the non-participant households if they had chosen to borrow. The micro 
econometric analysis below will show how the selection bias matters and how we control for 
it. For convenience, we denote: 
yi = ∆yijt;  
x1i = (∆x1ijt, ∆x1ijt);  
x2i = (∆x1ijt, ∆x2ijt,  ∆x2ijt);  
s
*
i = ∆cijt if a participant household; and s*i = g (constant, g < ∆cijt) otherwise.  
The equations (7.3) and (7.4) now become the following: 
iii xy 111 εβ +=          (7.5) 
iii xs 222
* εβ +=          (7.6) 
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Equation (7.5) represents the household welfare and equation (7.6) indicates the 
exclusion propensity. Thus, yi is the observed welfare for household i if it is a participant 
household and s*i is a latent variable that indicates the propensity to be a participant 
household. Vectors x1i and x2i are vectors of observed explanatory variables; ε1i and ε2i are 
mean-zero stochastic errors representing the influence of unobserved variables affecting yi 
and s*i . The parameters of interest are 1 and 2. 
Since the latent variable s*i is unobserved, we define a dummy variable: 
si = 1 if s*i > g     
si = 0 if otherwise.  
We thus observe the welfare of participant households only if si = 1, i.e., if the 
households borrow at both times, t and t+1. It is likely that the unobserved terms ε1i and ε2i 
are correlated: households with lower welfare, the poorer, given x1i and x2i, are more likely to 
want to be participant household. If so, the sample of participant households observed will not 
accurately represent the underlying population. Hence, inappropriate selection of sample of 
study generally produces inconsistent estimates of the parameters in the welfare equation. 
To solve the above problem, we follow Heckman (1974, 1976, 1979 and 1980) 
approach, which suggested a simple method to deal with this selection problem. The 
conditional mean of ε1i can be written as follows21: 
)()0( 2221*1 βεεε iiiii xEsE −>=>       (7.7) 
and hence 
)()1,( 22211111 βεεβ iiiiiii xExsxyE −>+==     (7.8) 
Equation (7.8) shows that the regression equation on the selected sample depends on 
both x1i and x2i. Omitting the conditional mean of ε1i biases the estimates of 1 unless ε1i and 
                                                
21 For simplicity, we include an intercept in x2 and hence we can normalize g to 0 
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ε2i are uncorrelated. Selection bias can thus be regarded as a standard problem of omitted-
variable bias. The solution is to find an empirical representation of the conditional mean of ε1i 
and include this variable in the welfare equation.  
Under the assumption that ε1i and ε2i are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution, 
we can derive the regression equation: 
iiiii xsxyE λρσβ 11111 )1,( +==       (7.9) 
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between ε1i and ε2i, σ1 is the standard deviation of ε1i, 
and λi is the inverse of Mill’s ratio (see Greene, 2003, Wooldridge, 2003), which is given by: 
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where φ and Φ are the density and distribution functions of the standard normal distribution 
and σ2 is the standard deviation of ε2i. 
The Heckman approach suggests estimation of (7.8) in a two-step procedure. The first 
step involves estimating the parameters in (7.6) by the Probit method (Greene, 2003, 
Wooldridge, 2003), using the entire sample. These estimates can then be used to compute λi 
for each household in the sample. Once λi is computed, we can estimate (7.5) over the sample 
of participant households by ordinary least squares regression, treating ρσ1 as the regression 
coefficient for λi. 
7.3.3 The integrated model 
Having paid attention to both the problem of endogenous credit and sample selection 
bias, the integrated model can be estimated as following. The first step involves estimating the 
parameters in (7.6) by the Probit method, using the entire sample. The inverse Mill’s ratio λi 
is then calculated for each household. The second step involves estimating the parameters in 
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(7.3) by least squares method, using the sample of participant households. The predicted value 
of credit and the predicted residual are then calculated for each household. The last step 
involves estimating the parameters in (7.4) by least squares method, using the participant 
households and the predicted value of credit instead of the true value. The predicted residual 
and the inverse Mill’s ratio are included as the explanatory variables to control for 
endogenous credit and sample selection bias.  
7.4 Data and construction of variables 
Our data are drawn from two surveys on living standards in Vietnam, the Vietnam 
Living Standards Surveys - VLSS 1992/1993 and VLSS 1997/1998, which have been 
discussed in Chapter 6. The construction of variables is an important and complicated part of 
our methodology. A descriptive statistics of variables and correlation matrix are presented in 
Table 7.1 and 7.2. As we have mentioned in the model section, we consider the change or 
time difference between values in 1997/1998 and 1992/1993. As a result, any variable should 
be understood as the difference estimator. For example, consider the simple equation: 
Yt+1= a + bXt+1 + c; where Yt+1 ≡ (yt+1- yt) and Xt+1≡ (xt+1-xt) 
Assuming b > 0, one may understand that if Xt+1 increases, it leads to an increase in 
Yk+1, and hence, an increase in the differenced variable of x (i.e. xk+1–xk) is associated with 
increase in the differenced variable of y (i.e. yk+1–yk). Note that higher differenced variable 
does not mean higher value of variable and that we cannot infer causality from such simple 
regression. 
Following this construction, the groups of variables are considered as follows. The 
dependent variables, which proxy for household welfare, include per capita expenditure, per 
capita food expenditure, per capita non-food expenditure and household poverty status. These 
variables are considered in the form of difference estimators. The household poverty status is 
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a dummy variable where if the household improves its poverty status, the dependent variable 
takes the value of 1, and otherwise 0. The explanatory variable of interest, total household 
borrowing, is constructed by summing all loans from the formal and informal sources, such as 
bank loans and ROSCA loans. The differenced variables are then computed by calculating the 
difference in borrowing between 1997/1998 and 1992/1993.  
The household characteristics include variables of natural attributes such as age, 
gender of household head, farm household; and variables of household assets such as savings 
and farm-land owning in differenced variable form. For the differenced variable of the age of 
the household head, we look at the age groups (i.e. the first digits of the actual age) and 
therefore we avoid the problem of the same differenced variables of age for every household 
head. The differenced variables of gender of the household head and the type of business are 
constructed as dummy variables. The dummy variable of gender takes the value of 1 if the 
household head is male in 1997/1998 but female in 1992/1993 (i.e. the household head died 
between two surveys), and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable of farm household takes the 
value of 1 if the household is a farm household in 1997/1998, but non-farm household in 
1992/1993 i.e. new farm household, and 0 otherwise. 
The local market characteristic variables include: the prices of selected goods and 
services; the averaged household characteristics in a commune, such as averaged education, 
and averaged farm-land owning. All are in the form of differenced variables. The construction 
of variables of local market characteristics is mainly for the purpose of controlling for the 
location fixed effects, rather than for comparison. The lender characteristics include proxy 
variables, in differenced variable form, of the availability of funds at commune and village 
levels and the competition between lenders. We consider the availability of both formal and 
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informal funds to control for the competition between these two sources of funds within the 
same location. 
7.5 Econometric procedures and results 
In this section we implement the tests and present the empirical evidence on the 
impact of household’s borrowing on household welfare, using the panel data. The first stage 
regression estimates the probability of becoming a participant household. We are interested in 
the question why some households who borrow in 1992/1993 become the participant 
households in 1997/1998, whereas others do not.  
Assuming asymmetric information is crucial in the market, the lender’s lending 
decision depends not only on the household characteristics and the availability of funds, but 
also on the information on borrowers’ credit worthiness that is gained by monitoring the use 
of loans in the first period and this, apparently, may affect their willingness to continue 
lending and how much they are willing to lend in the next period. Also, borrowers learn to 
manage and invest credit better as they gain experience (from training or advice, for 
examples) and become more credit worthiness.  
For these reasons, it is possible and important to assume further that bad borrowers 
may be either self-excluded or rationed by the lenders while the good borrowers may either 
continue borrowing or have grown to the point when they become bankable and can thus be 
passed on to mainstream banks. If this assumption is reasonable, we may think that, in the 
next period, the pool of applicants includes both good and bad borrowers but only good 
borrowers receive loans. The question then becomes that what are the factors that affect the 
lender’s decision to lend and the borrower’s decision to self-exclude? In other words, we look 
at how the changes in household attributes, in household’s endowment and in the availability 
of funds may affect the probability of a household being a participant household. 
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The second stage is to control for the endogenous credit by estimating the factors that 
affect the change in the amount of borrowing for the participant households. The questions 
that we want to answer in this stage include: (i) whether or not changes in the natural 
attributes of a household affect its change in amount of borrowing; (ii) how a change in 
household’s endowment affects a change in the amount of household borrowing? and (iii) 
does the change in the supply of credit by the lenders play any role on the change in 
household borrowing?  
In the third stage, the inverse Mill’s ratios and the predicted residuals, which result 
from the first stage and the second stage, are included as explanatory variables to control for 
the sample selection bias and the endogeneity of credit in the estimation of household welfare. 
The questions that we will answer in this stage include: (i) is the sample selection biased and 
is the household credit endogenous, and thus, is the three-stage regression appropriate? And 
(ii) what is the effect of repeated borrowing on household welfare? 
7.5.1 Probability of being a participant household 
We select the sample of rural households who were borrowing in 1992/1993 and are 
observed to be borrowing again in 1997/1998. After adjusting for missing data, the sample 
consists of 1,516 households, of which, there are 970 households continuing to borrow in 
1997/1998 i.e. they are the participant households. The regression takes the form of equation 
(7.6). The test results are reported in Table 7.3. 
Insert Table 7.3 about here 
Of the proxy variables for household characteristics, we find that an increase in age 
group of the household head reduces the probability of a household being a participant at the 
5% level of significance. This indicates that when the household head becomes older, the 
household borrows less. This is consistent with our previous finding using cross-section data 
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that young and middle-age households tend to borrow more (Quach, Mullineux and Murinde, 
2003). At the 10% level of significance, the probability of being a participant household is 
also lower for those who shift their business towards farm activities. This possibly implies 
that in rural Vietnam, borrowing seems to be specific and consistent to traditional farm 
households to expand their business or that the new (farm) businesses are riskier and thus the 
lenders are more reluctant to lend to them.    
Regarding the proxy variables of household endowments, we find that an increase in 
the value of financial savings and non-financial savings reduces the probability of being a 
participant household, at the 1% and 5% level of significance respectively. This indicates that 
if one household has a higher increase in savings within a period, it has lower probability of 
borrowing in the next period. This confirms our previous finding with cross-section data that 
households with higher endowment tend to borrow less (Quach, Mullineux, and Murinde, 
2003). However, we do not find that the change in education of the household head or the 
ownership of farming land has significant influence on the probability of household 
participation. 
The next concern is whether or not the change in the availability of funds (or the 
supply of credit) plays any role in household borrowing. As a proxy for the availability of 
funds, we calculate the sum of all household borrowings at village and commune level. 
Following that construction, we consider the availability of formal funds at village and 
commune levels and the availability of informal funds at the village level. At the 5% level of 
significance, we find that the increase in the availability of informal funds at village level is 
positively and significantly related to the probability of a household being a participant. This 
means that if household lives in a village where the increase of the availability of informal 
funds is greater, it has higher probability of being a participant household. However, we do 
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not find evidence on the role of the change in the availability of formal funds. This result 
suggests that the informal credit in the rural credit market is increasing its importance 
between the two periods. 
7.5.2 Factors affecting change in household borrowing 
 In the second stage, we use the sample of participant households who borrow in both 
1992/1993 and 1997/1998. After adjusting for missing data, this sample includes 970 
households. The regression is based on the equation (7.3). The test results are reported in 
Table 7.4. 
Insert Table (7.4) about here 
Table 7.4 shows that, at the 5% level of significance, the shift towards farming 
business is negatively and significantly related to the change in the  amount of household 
borrowing between 1997/1998 and 1992/1993. This means that if a household is a new farm 
household in 1997/1998, it has a smaller difference in the amount of borrowing, compared to 
other traditional farm households. We do not find evidence on the effect of age and gender of 
the household head on the change in household borrowing. However, at the 5% level of 
significance, we find the positive and significant effect of a change in household size on the 
change in household borrowing. This indicates that if a household has a greater change in 
household size, it has a greater change in its amount of borrowing. 
Of the proxy variables of household endowments, we find that, at the 5% level of 
significance, the change in education of household head is negatively and significantly related 
to the change in household borrowing. This indicates that within a period, if the household 
head receives more education, the change in household borrowing seems to be smaller. 
Possibly, more education may result in perceiving more business skills and hence getting 
higher income and therefore reduces the demand for household borrowing. At the 1% level of 
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significance, the change in value of financial savings is positively and significantly related to 
the change in the household borrowing. This implies that if a household has a bigger increase 
in financial savings, it has a greater increase in the amount of borrowing. This does not 
contradict our previous finding that households with more financial savings tend to borrow 
less, but it does reveal the fact that: households who have more savings tend to borrow less, 
but if they borrow, they receive more because the lenders screen borrowers by their assets and 
indeed provide more credit to better-off households (Sergio, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-
Vega and Rodriguez-Mega, 2000; Jennefer and Cohen, 2000; Anton, 2000; Wright, 2000; 
Hulme and Mosley, 1997; Rutherford, 1995; Khandker, 1998). We do not find the evidence 
that the change in the ownership of farming land and the value of non-financial savings affect 
borrowing. 
At the 1% level of significance, the change in the availability of formal funds and 
informal funds at village level is positively and significantly related to the change in 
household borrowing. Specifically, if a village has a greater change in the availability of 
funds, the change in the amount of borrowing of households who live in that village is higher 
than that of other households. We however do not find an effect of the availability of funds at 
commune level. This once again supports the idea that the availability of funds at village level 
is an important influence on household borrowing. 
7.5.3 Impact of household borrowing on household welfare 
Next, we implement the tests of the impact of household borrowing on household 
welfare using the regression equation (7.4). The inverse Mill’s ratios and the predicted 
residuals which are computed from the first and second stage are included as the explanatory 
variables. The test sample comprises of 970 participant households. The proxy variables for 
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the household welfare include: per capita expenditure, per capita food expenditure, the per 
capita non food expenditure and the household poverty status. 
Per capita expenditure 
Table (7.5) presents the test result for the impact of household borrowing on per capita 
expenditure. 
Insert Table 7.5 about here 
As shown in Table 7.5, the significance of the inverse Mill ratio at the 10% level of 
significance and of the predicted residual at the 1% level of significance indicate the 
possibility of sample selection bias and the endogeneity of credit. Thus, the three stage 
regression is necessary and appropriate. At the 1% level of significance, we find that the 
change in household borrowing is positively and significantly related to the change in per 
capita expenditure. More specifically, if we consider two households which borrowed the 
same amount and had the same per capita expenditure in 1992/1993, then if one of them 
borrows more in 1997/1998, it has higher per capita expenditure in 1997/1998. For example, 
if two household borrow the same amount (m) and had the same per capita expenditure (p) in 
1992/1993, then in 1997/1998 if the first household borrows m1, its per capita expenditure 
will be p1 = p(m1/m).276427. But if the second borrows m2 > m1, its per capita expenditure will 
be p2 = p(m2/m).276427, which is higher than p(m1/m).276427. 
Per capita food expenditure 
Table (7.6) shows the result of the third stage regression test. At the 5% level of 
significance, the predicted residual is significantly related to the per capita food expenditure. 
This implies the possibility of endogeneity of credit and indicates that the use of instruments 
is appropriate. However, the inverse Mill’s ratio is not found to be significant. Thus, the 
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sample selection bias is not important for the test of per capita food expenditure. We therefore 
exclude the inverse Mill’s ratio and retest. The result of this test is reported in Table 7.6a. 
Insert Tables 7.6 and 7.6a about here 
As Table 7.6a shows, at the 1% level of significance, the change in household 
borrowing is positively and significantly related to the change in per capita food expenditure. 
This implies that if a household has a greater increase in household borrowing, it has a higher 
increase in per capita food expenditure. For example, if two households borrow the same 
amount (m) and had the same per food capita expenditure (p) in 1992/1993 then in 1997/1998 
if the first household borrows m1, its per food capita expenditure will be p1 = p(m1/m).180393. 
But if the second borrows m2 > m1, its per capita expenditure will be p2 = p(m2/m).180393, 
which is higher than p(m1/m).180393. 
Per capita non-food expenditure 
The results of the test for credit impact on non food expenditure are represented in 
Table 7.7.  
Insert Table 7.7 about here 
As shown in Table 7.7, the Mill ratio (at the 5% level of significance) and the 
predicted residual (at the 1% level of significance) are both related to the dependent variable, 
implying that the sample selection bias and the endogeneity of credit are serious. Hence, our 
econometric procedure of three stage regression is necessary and appropriate. We find that the 
change in household borrowing is significantly and positively related to the change in per-
capita non-food expenditure at the 1% level of significance. If a participant household has a 
larger increase in household borrowing, it has a bigger increase in per capita non-food 
expenditure. As in Table 7.7, if two households are assumed to borrow the same amount (m) 
and have the same per non-food capita expenditure (p) in 1992/1993 then in 1997/1998, if the 
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first household borrows m1, its per non-food capita expenditure will be p1 = p(m1/m).392661. 
But if the second borrows m2 > m1, its per capita expenditure will be p2 = p(m2/m).392661, 
which is higher than p(m1/m).392661 
Poverty status 
The poverty status of a household indicates its poverty classification among all 
observed households including borrowing and non-borrowing households. All observed 
households are classified into five groups, in which group one indicates the poorest and group 
five indicates the richest. For an observed household, the poverty status may be different 
between 1992/1993 and 1997/1998. We define the change in poverty status (yi) as following: 
yi = 1 if the poverty status in 1997/1998 is greater than that in 1992/1993 
yi = 0 if otherwise 
Our first test follows the three-stage regression. The result of this test is reported in 
Table 7.8. We find that both the predicted residual and the inverse Mill ratio are not 
significantly related to the dependent variable. This implies that the sample selection bias and 
the endogeneity of credit are not serious. Therefore, we may exclude both these variables in 
our structural equation. However, for a rigorous test, we at first exclude the inverse Mill ratio 
but keep the predicted residual variable. The test result is in Table 7.8a. We again find that the 
predicted residual is insignificant. Hence, we exclude completely both inverse Mill ratio and 
predicted residual and conduct the final test. The result of the final test is reported in Table 
7.8b. 
Insert Tables 7.8, 7.8a, 7.8b about here 
From Table 7.8b, at the 1% level of significance, we find that the change in household 
borrowing is positively and significantly related to the change in household poverty status. 
Specifically, if one household has a higher increase in the amount of borrowing, it has a 
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higher probability of being ranked higher i.e. improving poverty status. For example, if we 
consider two households who borrow the same amount and have the same poverty status in 
1992/1993. If in 1997/1998, a household borrows more than another, it has a higher 
probability of getting a higher ranking compared with the other. This implies that credit has a 
positive and significant impact on household poverty status. 
7.5.4 The implications 
Why does a household become a participant household? Why does a household 
borrow at time t but not at time t+1? We have found that when the household head is getting 
older, the probability of repeated borrowing decreases. This indicates either that the younger 
households tend to borrow more, or that the lenders screen borrowers based on their age as 
age relates to the capacity of labour. The type of business is also relates to the probability of 
continuous borrowing. Farm households are also found to be more stable in their borrowing 
decision than those who are not. Hence, one may interpret this finding as showing that 
borrowing is consistent to farm households and that farm credit should be important in the 
rural areas.  
The households who have greater increase in financial savings and non-financial 
savings tend to have a lower probability of being a participant household. This indicates that 
better-off households tend to borrow less frequently and that poorer households borrow more 
frequently, because of lacking endowment. However, the probability of repeated borrowing 
also depends on the availability of funds, especially the availability of informal funds. It 
indicates that the informal financial sector such as money lenders and ROSCAs still play an 
important role in the rural financial market. 
If we look at participant households, what factors affect the amount of borrowing? It 
seems that more educated households borrow less compared with other participant 
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households. This is possibly because the more educated households often have a greater 
endowment and they demand less credit. The shift in type of business also affects the amount 
of borrowing. Households who shift from non-farm to farm households tend to have a smaller 
increase in the amount of borrowing, compared with farm households. The value of financial 
savings is possibly an important factor in screening applicants by the lenders. We have found 
that households with higher savings tend to borrow less, but if they borrow, they get larger 
amounts of credit. The availability of funds at village level again affects the amount of 
household borrowing. If the supply of formal and informal credit increases more in one 
village, the households who live in that village gets a greater increase in the amount of 
borrowing. This strengthens the view that in order to help rural households gaining access to 
credit, the credit network must be extended at village level. 
The last but most important implication in our study is that our findings confirm the 
positive impact of credit on household welfare. We find that the change in the amount of 
household borrowing is positively and significantly related to the change in household welfare 
as measured by per capita expenditure, per capita food expenditure, per capita non food 
expenditure and household poverty status, at a sufficiently small level of significance. One 
may interpret this finding to mean that the growth in household borrowing relates to the 
growth in household welfare, and thus reflects the long-run impact of credit on household 
welfare. The readers may also find it useful to consult our supplementary tests in Appendix 
A1 and A2 for further information on this conclusion. 
However, the coefficients of the relationship are found to be small. This again raises 
the issue of cost-benefit analysis. Taking into account the government strategy of providing 
cheap credit to rural households, one may wonder whether the benefit of gaining access to 
credit (i.e. the credit impact) is greater than the costs associated with the provision of it. The 
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traditional view (see: Robinson, 2001) of rural finance emphases that providing credit to rural 
households involves high risk and/or high transaction costs. If the cost is too high, one may 
question: (i) whether providing credit to rural households is good policy, and, if it is, (ii) how 
should we provide such services?  
7.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have presented an econometric framework for estimating the long-
term impact of credit on households, using panel data from household surveys. Our 
econometric procedure takes into account the problems of sample selection bias and 
endogenous credit. We employ a three stage regression: the first stage is to control for the 
sample selection bias; the second stage is to control for the endogeneity of credit; and the 
third stage is to estimate the credit impact on household welfare, where the inverse Mill’s 
ratio and the predicted residual, which are computed from the first and second stage, are 
included as explanatory variables. 
We find that credit has a long-term positive and significant impact on household 
welfare at the 1% level of significance, in terms of per capita expenditure, per capita food 
expenditure, per capita non-food expenditure and the household poverty status. This finding 
confirms our previous finding using cross-sectional data and indicates that providing credit in 
particular and financial services in general to the poor has a positive impact on household 
poverty reduction. We also conclude that in order to help rural households gain more access 
to credit, the credit network must be extended to the village level. However, as in previous 
chapter, further research may also be conducted to distinguish among different lenders i.e. the 
role of formal and informal credit separately. 
However, it should be noted that the positive impact that we have found in this and 
previous chapter is too small. Given the high costs of providing financial services to the poor, 
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it obviously raises the question that whether or not we should continue to follow the subsidy 
approach in provision of financial services to the poor? We believe that the small impact of 
credit on poverty reduction indicates that a wide range of supporting services, such as 
improvements in physical infrastructure, health care, education and skill trainings, rather than 
the emphasis on credit and financial services is necessary to help the poor get out of poverty. 
Even if we agree that a small positive impact is worth considering, we believe it would be 
better to expand outreach to the poor at large scale.  
Literature has shown that the poverty reduction approach has failed to expand its 
outreach on a sustainable basis (Chapter 2). The analysis in Chapter 4 has also suggested that 
the poverty reduction approach that the government followed has prevented formal financial 
institutions from attaining financial self-sufficiency and hence they are either reluctant or 
unable to expand their outreach at large scale. Moreover, findings from Chapter 5 indicate 
that even under the government supports, the very poor households are not those who are 
likely to receive cheap credit but the better off households are.  
All of these findings suggest us that the poverty reduction approach cannot reach the 
very poor households and under this approach formal MFIs cannot operate on a sustainable 
basis while the positive impact is found to be small. We therefore strongly recommend that a 
new perception of providing financial services to the poor in rural Vietnam should be 
initiated. We propose that the mixed approach that we have proposed in Chapter 2 and the 
necessary changes that we have suggested in Chapter 4 should be implemented as soon as 
possible. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, we summarise the main findings of our research. These findings are 
presented in the ways that show how they meet the objectives and hypotheses that we 
proposed at the beginning of the thesis. The policy conclusions are then proposed based on 
the findings. And finally, some proposals for further research are suggested.  
8.2 Main findings 
The superior aim of our research was to provide a deep analysis of how to attain a 
sustainable microfinance. Following this aim, the first objective was to explain why the poor 
and low-income are generally excluded from the financial sector. We have pursued this 
objective in Chapter 2 and found that it is important to aware that asymmetric information 
causes the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, which result in credit rationing in 
credit markets. The requirement of collateral can be used as a screening device and to insure 
the banks against credit risks. However, the credit markets for the low-income households are 
characterised by high costs, high risks and insufficient collateral. Hence, generally, banks are 
reluctant to make loans to low-income borrowers.  
Given the exclusion of the poor from financial sector, the second objective was to 
explore how financial institutions can use innovative financial technologies to enhance their 
outreach to the poor with a hypothesis that these innovative technologies can reduce the 
asymmetric information problems and associated costs. We indeed have proved this 
hypothesis, also in Chapter 2. Specifically, group lending may reduce the problem of adverse 
selection through peer-screening and joint liability while it may reduce moral hazard through 
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peer-monitoring and peer-pressure. By lending to a group, group lending also reduces the 
associated costs, as compared with traditional individual lending. However, group lending can 
also result in the thread of domino effect where one group member fails may lead the failure 
of the whole group and possible the whole group lending system.  
 In the context of constrained supply of financial services, the third objective of our 
research was to investigate whether or not the poor and low income households have demand 
for financial services. We have realized this objective in Chapter 3 and we have shown that 
the poor and low-income households do have demand for various financial services, 
especially they can save, and that there is an excess demand (Rutherford, 1998; Gibbson and 
Meehan, 2002; Morduch and Haley, 2002; ADB, 2000a). We have also found another reason 
for the low coverage that microfinance institutions are too small and unable to reach the poor 
on large scale and that they are not sustainable (Gibbson and Meehan, 2002). 
 With consideration of the constraints on supply and the excess demand, the analysis of 
approach to microfinance is important and it is the fourth objective of our thesis. We have 
shown in Chapter 3 that in attempts to meet the excessive demand for financial services from 
the poor, microfinance institutions and governments have followed two different approaches, 
namely poverty reduction approach and financial systems approach (Rhyne, 1998; Robinson, 
1999, 2001). The poverty reduction approach commits to providing cheap financial services 
(mainly credit) to the poor, especially the poorest of the poor, on subsidy basis while the 
financial system approach aims at building a financial intermediation system among the poor, 
especially the economically active poor, on a sustainable basis with an application of market 
principles into microfinance.  
 We propose that a mixed approach could be more appropriate. To support this 
hypothesis, we have analyzed and pointed out that both above approaches have their own 
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disadvantages. The poverty reduction approach has failed in attaining sustainability. The main 
constrain is the problem of cost-effectiveness and self-sufficiency which result from a suspect 
and small impact of credit on poverty reduction (Morduch and Meehan, 2002; Gonzalez 
Vega, 2003). It is also suspected that the target at the poorest of the poor may not be a right 
policy as for the extremely poor they need basic needs and are not able to make use of 
financial services (Robinson, 2001; Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002).  
 The financial systems approach proposes an application of market principles into 
microfinance, of which charging full costs on financial services provided is essential 
(Charitonenko and Rahman, 2002; Christen and Drake, 2001). However, it is possible that the 
commercial costs are much higher than the maximum cost that the households can afford, and 
thus commercial MFIs decide not to operate in the market at all. It is also possible that the 
extremely poor are excluded. These two possibilities imply that there should be a balance 
between social and financial goal in developing a microfinance sector (Charitonenko and 
Rahman, 2002).  
 The assessment of microfinance in rural Vietnam is then the next objective of our 
research and presented in Chapter 4. Although microfinance in rural Vietnam has achieved 
major success in outreaching to the poor, it has not been sustainable. The main constraints 
include the lack of a legal framework which does not allow formal MFIs to be financially 
self-sufficient and semi-formal MFIs to participate more in microfinance. The other 
constraints include the lending technologies which are not relevant to the best practices in 
microfinance around the world and the limited network which cannot reach the poor at the 
grassroots levels. All of these findings draw some policy conclusions. 
 In order to draw a comprehensive policy conclusion towards the right approach to 
microfinance, in Chapter 5 we follow the objective of exploring the factors that affect the 
 233 
access of rural households to formal financial services with a hypothesis that the poorer 
households are more likely to be excluded. Generally, we suggest that formal financial 
services in rural Vietnam are more preferable to the rural households largely because of 
subsidy policy (Dao, 2001). However, for many reasons, households are either completely 
excluded from the formal sector or being rationed in the amount of credit. The key factors that 
affect the possibility of receiving loans from formal sources and the amount received include 
education, household savings, the availability of credit and the area devoted to farming. Apart 
from the availability of credit, these factors represent the wealth of households and thus the 
results indicate that formal lenders tend to provide more credit to households who are better 
off. Interestingly, we have found that for households who are being rationed in amount of 
credit, the quota system in credit allocation is the key factor and this seems to prove the case 
of VBARD. 
The objective of assessing the impact of access to financial services on poverty 
reduction is realized in Chapter 6 and 7. The hypothesis we made was that the impact is 
significantly positive and small. We found that access to credit is positively and significantly 
related to the household poverty reduction, both in short-term (Chapter 6) and long-term 
(Chapter 7). Although the effect is small, the finding implies that providing loans to rural 
households is a tool to help poor rural households escape from poverty. Moreover, we found 
that household borrowing has a greater positive impact on poorer households, compared with 
better-off households. This strengthens the view that poorer households can potentially gain 
from access to formal/semiformal credit in particular, and financial services in general.  
8.3 Policy conclusions 
Based on the findings in this thesis, we have drawn some policy conclusions, which 
can be divided, but closely related, into two main sections as follows: 
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8.3.1 General policy conclusions 
First, given the persistent existence of asymmetric information, a direct intervention of 
government into the provision of financial services is not an optimal solution because the 
government faces the same problems of asymmetric information as the financial institutions 
do. Hence, to make the microfinance markets work, government and financial institutions 
should focus on the solutions to reduce the problem of asymmetric information and the costs 
associated with microfinance. For the financial institutions, it is essential to develop and 
employ the innovations in financial technologies such as tailored lending contracts (e.g. group 
lending) or partnership based lending (e.g. with credit rating, credit scoring agencies). For the 
government, it is important to enhance the development of financial infrastructure and the 
informational intermediation. 
 Second, it is necessary to perceive that microfinance can be sustainable. To attain a 
sustainable microfinance, the balance between social and financial goal in microfinance 
should be recognized. We propose that a mixed approach in microfinance should be initiated. 
Under this approach, we suggest that financial institutions should follow their objective of 
being a commercial microfinance institution i.e. follow financial system approach and the 
governments and donors should provide supports to this approach in two ways: (i) create an 
enabling financial infrastructure and informational intermediation to assist (but not subsidize) 
microfinance institutions to reduce costs; and (ii) to provide social intermediation, such as 
physical infrastructure, education , health, job creation and  business skills to the poor, 
extremely poor in order for them to be able to make use of financial services and gain access 
to financial system.  
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8.3.2 Policy conclusions for Vietnam 
 Given the positive impact of access to credit on poverty reduction and assuming that 
the government of Vietnam continues to commit to providing credit to rural households under 
the poverty reduction approach the policy implications drawn from findings in this thesis are 
as follows:  
 First, given the effect of farming area and its productivity on household formal credit, 
Land Reform should be accelerated. Many provinces have not yet finished the 
issuance of LUCs (Dao, 2002) and thus rural households may find it hard to gain 
access to formal credit as LUCs can be used as collateral.  
 Second, the importance of the availability of credit at village and commune level 
indicates that the government should encourage the expansion of bank branch 
network. Although interest rates in the banking sector are gradually being liberalised, 
the requirement to charge prior or cheap interest rates (Dao, 2002)) remains a 
constraint on banks’ ability to cover lending costs and develop lending at risk-
premium based rates. Thus, a further liberalisation of interest rates could create more 
incentives for banks (VBARD, VBP) and induce more efficient lending.  
 Third, better-off households seem to benefit more from formal credit. In order to 
ensure poorer households gain access to formal credit, the applicant-screening process 
should not be based on criteria representing household’s wealth. More emphasis 
should for example be placed on business plans and pre and post loan training and 
group borrowing. And the last but not least, employing local information obtained 
through partnership with NGOs and other social organizations could be a good policy. 
 However, it should be noted that the positive impact that we have found is too small. 
Taking into account the high costs of providing financial services to the poor, it obviously 
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raises the question that whether or not we should continue to follow the subsidy approach in 
provision of financial services to the poor? We believe that the small impact of credit on 
poverty reduction indicates that a wide range of supporting services, such as improvements in 
physical infrastructure, health care, education and skill trainings, rather than the emphasis on 
credit and financial services is necessary to help the poor get out of poverty. Even if we agree 
that a small positive impact is worth considering, we believe it would be better to expand 
outreach to the poor at large scale.  
Literature has shown that the poverty reduction approach has failed to expand its 
outreach on a sustainable basis (Robinson, 2001, Gonzalez Vega, 2003). The analysis in 
Chapter 4 has also suggested that the poverty reduction approach that the government 
followed has prevented formal financial institutions from attaining financial self-sufficiency 
and hence they are either reluctant or unable to expand their outreach at large scale. 
Moreover, findings from Chapter 5 indicate that even under the government supports, the very 
poor households are not those who are likely to receive cheap credit but the better off 
households are.  
All of these findings suggest us that the poverty reduction approach cannot reach the 
very poor households and under this approach formal MFIs cannot operate on a sustainable 
basis while the positive impact is found to be small. We suggest that a perception towards a 
mixed approach could be more appropriate. Following this approach, the government and 
donors should remove any direct subsidy to financial services, but instead provide supports in 
creating a sound financial infrastructure, developing informational intermediation and 
investing more in social intermediation. Specifically, the government may establish 
supporting agencies such as the credit rating office, credit bureaus .etc which are currently 
absent. The government and donors may support to improve roads, deliver health care and 
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education services, and so on, which help to increase the poor’ ability to gain access and make 
use of financial services.  
 Another aspect of changing the approach to microfinance requires a 
commercialization of microfinance institutions. Microfinance institutions in Vietnam should 
apply market principles in proving financial services to the poor in order to achieve self-
sufficiency at the outset. In this context, innovations in financial technologies are necessary. 
More specifically, successful experiences from the village model banking in BRI and group 
lending model from NGOs in Vietnam could be learnt. Besides, cooperation or partnership 
with SOs and LPC is also a good option to reduce the costs of reaching the poor.  
8.4 Further research 
 We believe that further research based on findings from our research is necessary. For 
example, although we have proposed that the mixed approach to microfinance could be more 
appropriate, we have not yet shown in detail the ways through which this mixed approach 
increases the probability of sustainability. How, for example, informational intermediation, 
such as credit rating and credit bureaus, work and help to increase information and reduce 
costs relating to the provision of financial services. How a sound financial infrastructure 
which encourages the competition between various participants increases the performance of 
the microfinance markets. How the new financial technologies can be created. How social 
intermediation can be developed and how it contributes to financial intermediation. Moreover, 
the mixed approach implies a balance between the social and financial goal, but where the 
balance should lie?  
  For the case of rural Vietnam, among the above suggestions, the finding that the 
availability of credit at the village level is significantly related to household access to credit 
suggests that further research could focus on the creation of sufficient and effective 
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mechanisms to achieve outreach to the poor and low income households at village level. 
Following this idea, the expansion of research on successful examples is necessary. Can, for 
example, the mobile/village banking model can be developed and more widely applied? Can 
cooperation or partnership between financial institutions and social/informational institutions 
be made to work? Subsequent research might also replicate our research with the new data in 
order to verify the consistency of its policy conclusions overtime and/or explore the role of 
the different lenders on household poverty reduction. 
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APPENDIX 
Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1 – Concept of poverty by Vietnamese Government 
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y 
ac
cu
ra
te
ly
 
th
e 
ac
tu
al
 
le
v
el
 
o
f 
po
v
er
ty
.
 
•
 
It 
is 
n
o
t a
pp
lic
ab
le
 
fo
r 
le
n
de
rs
 
to
 
id
en
tif
y 
ta
rg
et
 
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
 
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e 
lo
w
-
in
co
m
e 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s 
as
 
o
pp
o
se
d 
to
 
th
e 
po
o
r.
 
U
ND
P 
•
 
N
o
 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
cr
ite
rio
n
 
is 
m
en
tio
n
ed
.
 
 
•
 
In
st
ea
d,
 
th
e 
po
o
r 
ar
e 
de
fin
ed
 
as
 
th
o
se
 
th
at
 
”
la
ck
 
o
pp
o
rt
u
n
ity
 
to
 
ta
ke
 
pa
rt
 
in
 
th
e 
life
 
o
f 
th
e 
n
a
tio
n
, 
pa
rt
ic
u
la
rly
 
in
 
its
 
ec
o
n
o
m
y”
 
 
  
•
 
It 
fa
ils
 
to
 
be
 
a 
u
se
fu
l t
o
o
l f
o
r 
qu
an
tif
yi
n
g 
po
v
er
ty
 
de
gr
ee
s 
in
 
ru
ra
l a
re
as
.
 
•
 
It 
do
es
 
n
o
t h
el
p 
le
n
de
rs
 
in
 
id
en
tif
yi
n
g 
ta
rg
et
 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
o
r 
di
ffe
re
n
tia
tin
g 
th
e 
be
tte
r 
o
ff 
fro
m
 
th
e 
po
o
r 
at
 
gr
as
sr
o
o
ts
 
le
v
el
s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rn
a
tio
n
a
l N
G
O
s 
•
 
W
ea
lth
 
ra
tin
g 
te
ch
n
iq
u
e 
i.e
.
 
th
e 
co
m
bi
n
at
io
n
 
o
f f
o
o
d 
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
,
 
ho
u
sin
g 
co
n
di
tio
n
s,
 
an
im
al
 
tr
ac
tio
n
 
po
w
er
,
 
an
d 
v
al
u
ab
le
 
be
lo
n
gi
n
gs
 
is 
u
se
d 
by
 
N
G
O
s 
to
 
id
en
tif
y 
po
o
r 
an
d 
lo
w
-
in
co
m
e 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s.
 
•
 
Th
e 
po
o
r 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
su
ffe
rin
g 
fro
m
 
fo
o
d 
sh
o
rt
ag
e 
4-
6 
m
o
n
th
s 
pe
r 
ye
ar
,
 
ha
v
in
g 
n
o
 
bu
ffa
lo
 
o
r 
co
w
,
 
an
d 
w
ho
se
 
ho
u
se
s 
ar
e 
co
v
er
ed
 
by
 
th
at
ch
 
ro
o
fs
.
 
•
 
Th
is 
w
ea
lth
 
ra
tin
g 
te
ch
n
iq
u
e 
is 
m
ea
n
in
gf
u
l a
n
d 
pr
ac
tic
al
 
sin
ce
: 
•
 
V
ill
ag
er
s 
kn
o
w
 
th
e 
w
ea
lth
 
o
r 
po
v
er
ty
 
o
f t
he
ir 
n
ei
gh
bo
u
rs
 
v
er
y 
w
el
l. 
Th
u
s,
 
th
e
y 
ca
n
 
id
en
tif
y 
ta
rg
et
 
be
n
ef
ic
ia
rie
s 
am
o
n
g 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
be
tte
r 
th
an
 
o
u
ts
id
er
s 
•
 
It 
is 
v
isi
bl
e 
•
 
Co
m
pl
ic
at
ed
 
ca
lc
u
la
tio
n
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
n
ee
de
d.
 
•
 
Ea
sy
 
to
 
pu
t i
n
to
 
pr
ac
tic
e.
 
 
 
•
 
Th
e 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n
 
o
f L
IH
s 
m
ay
 
be
 
di
st
o
rt
ed
 
if 
jus
t a
 
sin
gl
e 
fa
ct
o
r 
in
 
th
e 
co
m
bi
n
at
io
n
 
is 
u
se
d.
 
Fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 
a 
w
o
rk
in
g 
po
o
r 
m
a
y 
ha
v
e 
a 
sh
ab
by
 
ho
u
se
 
bu
t a
bl
e 
to
 
im
pr
o
v
e 
it 
if 
he
 
ha
d 
ac
ce
ss
 
to
 
a 
cr
ed
it 
so
u
rc
e.
 
B
es
id
es
,
 
o
n
e 
m
ay
 
ha
v
e 
to
 
bu
y 
ric
e 
fo
r 
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
 
bu
t t
hi
s 
do
es
 
n
o
t n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
m
ea
n
 
th
at
 
he
 
is 
po
o
r 
sin
ce
 
he
 
m
a
y 
ha
v
e 
o
th
er
 
in
co
m
e 
so
u
rc
es
 
av
ai
la
bl
e.
 
•
 
Po
v
er
ty
 
lin
es
 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
re
la
tiv
e 
pe
rs
o
n
al
 
v
al
u
e 
jud
ge
m
en
t a
n
d 
th
er
ef
o
re
 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
co
m
pa
ra
bl
e 
am
o
n
g 
N
G
O
’
s 
S&
C 
sc
he
m
es
.
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n
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u
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…
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(…
co
n
tin
u
ed
) 
Vi
et
n
a
m
es
e 
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
•
 
Ru
ra
l a
re
as
: 
≤1
5k
g 
o
f r
ic
e 
(≤
52
50
0V
N
D
 
o
r 
≤3
.
5 
U
SD
 
pe
r 
m
o
n
th
 
•
 
Pl
ai
n
 
ar
ea
s:
 
≤2
0 
kg
 
o
f r
ic
e 
(≤
70
00
0V
N
D
 
o
r 
≤ 
 
4.
6 
U
SD
) p
er
 
m
o
n
th
.
 
•
 
U
rb
an
 
ar
ea
s:
 
≤2
5 
kg
 
o
f r
ic
e 
(≤
87
50
0V
N
D
 
o
r 
≤5
.
8 
U
SD
) p
er
 
m
o
n
th
.
 
 In
 
N
o
v
em
be
r 
20
00
,
 
th
e 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t i
n
tr
o
du
ce
d 
a 
n
ew
 
po
v
er
ty
 
lin
e 
to
 
re
pl
ac
e 
th
e 
o
ld
 
o
n
e,
 
n
o
w
 
in
 
ef
fe
ct
 
sin
ce
 
Ja
n
u
ar
y 
20
01
.
 
U
n
lik
e 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
u
s 
o
n
e,
 
it 
is 
ba
se
d 
o
n
ly
 
o
n
 
ca
sh
 
eq
u
iv
al
en
t i
n
co
m
e 
ra
th
er
 
th
an
 
pa
dd
y 
eq
u
iv
al
en
t. 
Th
e 
n
ew
 
po
v
er
ty
 
lin
es
 
ar
e 
as
 
fo
llo
w
s:
 
•
 
In
 
m
o
u
n
ta
in
o
u
s 
ar
ea
s:
 
<
 
V
N
D
 
80
,
00
0/
 
pe
rs
o
n
/ m
o
n
th
; 
•
 
In
 
ru
ra
l a
re
as
 
(pl
ai
n
) <
 
V
N
D
 
10
0,
00
0/
 
pe
rs
o
n
/ m
o
n
th
; 
•
 
In
 
u
rb
an
 
ar
ea
s:
 
<
 
V
N
D
 
15
0,
00
0/
 
pe
rs
o
n
/ 
m
o
n
th
; 
•
 
Th
es
e 
cr
ite
ria
 
ar
e 
u
se
fu
l t
o
 
m
ea
su
re
 
po
v
er
ty
 
 
 
in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f 
m
o
n
ey
 
v
al
u
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
o
se
 
o
f 
pr
ic
e 
co
m
pa
ris
o
n
.
 
 
•
 
It 
is 
n
o
t c
o
n
v
en
ie
n
t t
o
 
co
n
v
er
t d
iff
er
en
t s
o
u
rc
es
 
o
f 
in
co
m
e 
in
to
 
ric
e.
 
Fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 
it 
fa
ils
 
to
 
sp
ec
ify
 
ho
w
 
m
an
y 
ki
lo
gr
am
s 
o
f m
ai
ze
 
o
r 
ca
ss
av
a 
ar
e 
eq
u
al
 
to
 
1 
kg
.
 
o
f r
ic
e 
o
r 
ho
w
 
m
an
y 
ba
n
an
as
 
th
at
 
a 
fa
rm
er
 
ha
s 
ar
e 
eq
u
al
 
to
 
1 
kg
.
 
o
f r
ic
e 
•
 
It 
do
es
 
n
o
t a
cc
u
ra
te
ly
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
th
e 
po
v
er
ty
 
in
 
m
o
n
et
ar
y 
v
al
u
e.
 
 
Th
is 
ca
n
 
be
 
du
e 
to
 
th
e 
fa
ct
 
th
at
 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
di
ffe
re
n
t t
yp
es
 
o
f r
ic
e 
(br
o
ke
n
 
ric
e,
 
st
ic
ky
 
ric
e,
 
w
hi
te
 
ric
e 
an
d 
lo
n
g 
gr
ai
n
 
ric
e.
.
.
) a
n
d 
th
e 
pr
ic
e 
o
f r
ic
e 
flu
ct
u
at
es
 
•
 
It 
is 
n
o
t e
as
y 
to
 
ca
lc
u
la
te
 
al
l i
n
co
m
e 
ea
rn
ed
 
by
 
an
 
in
di
v
id
u
al
 
fa
rm
er
 
pe
r 
ye
ar
 
an
d 
is 
tim
e-
co
n
su
m
in
g.
 
A
cc
o
rd
in
gl
y,
 
le
n
de
rs
 
ca
n
n
o
t u
se
 
th
is 
m
et
ho
d 
to
 
cl
as
sif
y 
th
ei
r 
ta
rg
et
 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
as
 
lo
w
-
in
co
m
e 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s 
o
r 
hu
n
gr
y 
po
o
r.
 
•
 
Th
ey
 
ar
e 
n
o
t w
el
l-d
ef
in
ed
 
m
et
ho
ds
 
to
 
ca
lc
u
la
te
 
m
o
n
th
ly
 
pe
r-
ca
pi
ta
 
in
co
m
e 
ea
rn
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
ap
pl
yi
n
g 
fo
r 
cr
ed
it.
 
•
 
N
o
 
le
n
de
r 
in
 
V
ie
tn
am
 
ha
s 
u
se
d 
th
es
e 
po
v
er
ty
 
lin
es
 
in
 
ap
pr
o
v
in
g 
lo
an
s.
 
•
 
Th
es
e 
po
v
er
ty
 
lin
es
 
ha
v
e 
n
o
 
pr
ac
tic
al
 
u
se
 
in
 
ru
ra
l 
cr
ed
it 
sc
he
m
es
.
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Table 6.15 - Effect of credit on per capita food expenditure (1992/1993 –Better off Households without 
predicted residuals) 
 
 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
The age of household head 0.026384 0.005710 4.621038 0.0000 
Education of household head (years) 0.004525 0.002515 1.799338 0.0721 
Dummy variable: farm household =1; otherwise =0  -0.055831 0.019383 -2.880435 0.0040 
Dummy variable: gender of household head: male =1; female=0 -0.012332 0.019779 -0.623469 0.5331 
Household size (persons) -0.050274 0.004040 -12.44310 0.0000 
Farm land owned (Hectare, Logarithm) -0.003549 0.002718 -1.306063 0.1917 
Financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.015525 0.002799 5.547022 0.0000 
Non-financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.009068 0.002321 3.907405 0.0001 
Price of detergent in the village (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) -0.061161 0.024190 -2.528374 0.0115 
Price of fish source (VND1000/bottle, Logarithm) -0.031646 0.018939 -1.670963 0.0949 
Price of noodle (VND1000/pack, Logarithm) -0.133605 0.052427 -2.548387 0.0109 
Price of pork (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.130336 0.052691 2.473610 0.0135 
Price of normal rice (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.098917 0.059151 1.672285 0.0946 
Price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser, Logarithm) 0.005578 0.021340 0.261382 0.7938 
Averaged education in commune (years) -0.004639 0.006523 -0.711212 0.4770 
Averaged land owned in commune (Hectare, Logarithm) 0.002059 0.007211 0.285538 0.7753 
Price index in the region 0.247368 0.236690 1.045113 0.2961 
Total household credit (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.003979 0.002202 1.806958 0.0709 
C 6.321087 0.258988 24.40685 0.0000 
R-squared   0.147068 
Adjusted R-squared   0.138910 
F-statistic   18.02809 
Probability (F-statistic)   0.000000 
Observations   1901 
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Table 7.3 - Probability of being participant household 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 
Dependent Variable: Dummy: if household is a participant household 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head -0.082077 0.038387 -2.138169 0.0325 
Increase in education of household head (years) -0.001082 0.015931 -0.067941 0.9458 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.279612 0.143827 -1.944081 0.0519 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.031765 0.265893 0.119464 0.9049 
Increase in household size (persons) 0.016060 0.021635 0.742333 0.4579 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.007632 0.014350 0.531862 0.5948 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) -0.028600 0.011292 -2.532805 0.0113 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) -0.031903 0.008629 -3.697330 0.0002 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.067955 0.080345 0.845790 0.3977 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) -0.126614 0.067327 -1.880585 0.0600 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.208178 0.188254 1.105832 0.2688 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.221996 0.257408 0.862429 0.3885 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.489018 0.222030 -2.202483 0.0276 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.007040 0.092018 0.076510 0.9390 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) -0.001858 0.048711 -0.038137 0.9696 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.051199 0.033293 -1.537817 0.1241 
Increase in number of households in commune (households) -2.55E-05 5.17E-05 -0.493214 0.6219 
Increase in price index of the region -2.407694 1.022689 -2.354277 0.0186 
Increase in the availability of informal fund in village (VND1000) 0.039638 0.015938 2.487012 0.0129 
Increase in the availability of formal fund in village (VND1000) 0.012355 0.015512 0.796476 0.4258 
Increase in availability of formal funds in commune (VND1000) 0.012360 0.020653 0.598450 0.5495 
C 0.735368 0.241938 3.039490 0.0024 
Mean dependent var 0.639842 
McFadden R-squared 0.034713 
Log likelihood -956.3288 
LR statistic (21 df) 68.78238 
Probability(LR stat) 5.50E-07 
Total obs 1516 
Obs with Dep=1 970 
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Table 7.4 - Determinants of change in amount of household borrowing 
Method: Least Squares 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in total household borrowing 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head -0.035905 0.044620 -0.804680 0.4212 
Increase in education of household head (years) -0.044742 0.019603 -2.282449 0.0227 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.353820 0.194683 -1.817413 0.0695 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.170418 0.300307 0.567480 0.5705 
Increase in household size (persons) 0.052008 0.025930 2.005694 0.0452 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.007746 0.017079 -0.453572 0.6502 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.046507 0.013434 3.461918 0.0006 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) -0.002149 0.010657 -0.201687 0.8402 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.146300 0.100777 1.451724 0.1469 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.054203 0.079377 0.682861 0.4949 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.360164 0.232904 1.546406 0.1223 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.034437 0.309020 0.111440 0.9113 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.294298 0.270656 -1.087352 0.2772 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) -0.041748 0.114689 -0.364011 0.7159 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) -0.056421 0.059475 -0.948658 0.3430 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.029904 0.045627 -0.655411 0.5124 
Increase in number of households in commune (households) 0.000127 6.78E-05 1.877255 0.0608 
Increase in price index of the region -0.221518 1.263804 -0.175279 0.8609 
Increase in the availability of informal fund in village (VND1000) 0.061332 0.020611 2.975752 0.0030 
Increase in the availability of formal fund in village (VND1000) 0.073036 0.020792 3.512636 0.0005 
Increase in availability of formal funds in commune (VND1000) -0.026758 0.027173 -0.984729 0.3250 
C 1.218917 0.290951 4.189421 0.0000 
R-squared 0.066044 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045355 
F-statistic 3.192237 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002 
Log likelihood -1605.945 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.071620 
Number of observations 970 
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Table 7.5 - Impact of credit on per capita expenditure 
Method: Least Squares 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita expenditure 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.013132 0.016979 0.773420 0.4395 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.013310 0.006671 1.995201 0.0463 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.048351 0.065801 -0.734803 0.4626 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.010031 0.089769 -0.111742 0.9111 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.096559 0.008331 -11.59023 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.002394 0.005330 0.449165 0.6534 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) -0.004234 0.008135 -0.520448 0.6029 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.002929 0.005595 0.523526 0.6007 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.097721 0.030669 3.186287 0.0015 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.011340 0.031949 0.354925 0.7227 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.034844 0.074742 0.466191 0.6412 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.152356 0.099822 1.526267 0.1273 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.008588 0.094111 -0.091258 0.9273 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.184266 0.031990 5.760036 0.0000 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.039722 0.017833 2.227464 0.0262 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.007608 0.015291 0.497559 0.6189 
Increase in price index of the region -3.029959 0.531015 -5.705976 0.0000 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.276427 0.077050 3.587656 0.0004 
Predicted residuals -0.252881 0.077803 -3.250263 0.0012 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 0.539742 0.278686 1.936737 0.0531 
C -0.151590 0.196867 -0.770013 0.4415 
R-squared 0.265618 
Adjusted R-squared 0.250142 
F-statistic 17.16219 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Log likelihood -431.1583 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.957169 
Number of observations 970 
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Table 7.6 - Impact of credit on per capita food expenditure 
Method: Least Squares 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita food expenditure 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.030828 0.017491 1.762488 0.0783 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.009037 0.006872 1.314932 0.1889 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.008746 0.067787 0.129021 0.8974 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.130030 0.092479 1.406052 0.1600 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.091156 0.008583 -10.62107 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.006393 0.005490 1.164328 0.2446 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.006948 0.008381 0.829041 0.4073 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.008491 0.005764 1.473091 0.1411 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.094242 0.031595 2.982836 0.0029 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.014740 0.032913 0.447841 0.6544 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.016339 0.076998 -0.212204 0.8320 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) -0.009012 0.102835 -0.087637 0.9302 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.114984 0.096951 1.185998 0.2359 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.083859 0.032956 2.544583 0.0111 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.010347 0.018371 0.563235 0.5734 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.022213 0.015753 1.410127 0.1588 
Increase in price index of the region -1.769505 0.547041 -3.234682 0.0013 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.185761 0.079375 2.340301 0.0195 
Predicted residuals -0.178500 0.080151 -2.227034 0.0262 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 0.028143 0.287097 0.098025 0.9219 
C 0.205516 0.202808 1.013348 0.3112 
R-squared 0.195612 
Adjusted R-squared 0.178659 
F-statistic 11.53892 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Log likelihood -460.0005 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.832067 
Number of observations 970 
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Table 7.6.a - Impact of credit on per capita food expenditure (Mill’s ratio excluded) 
Method: Least Squares 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita food expenditure 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.031899 0.013657 2.335731 0.0197 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.008825 0.006522 1.353187 0.1763 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.011242 0.062792 0.179030 0.8580 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.130252 0.092403 1.409615 0.1590 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.091134 0.008575 -10.62772 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.006230 0.005232 1.190826 0.2340 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.007619 0.004829 1.577831 0.1149 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.008956 0.003281 2.729738 0.0065 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.093898 0.031383 2.992032 0.0028 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.016869 0.024722 0.682342 0.4952 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.017340 0.076278 -0.227333 0.8202 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) -0.013164 0.093660 -0.140549 0.8883 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.119913 0.082850 1.447343 0.1481 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.083558 0.032796 2.547847 0.0110 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.010043 0.018097 0.554936 0.5791 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.022923 0.013982 1.639442 0.1015 
Increase in price index of the region -1.731223 0.382860 -4.521817 0.0000 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.180393 0.057422 3.141537 0.0017 
Predicted residuals -0.173109 0.058278 -2.970382 0.0030 
C 0.222798 0.100189 2.223768 0.0264 
R-squared 0.195603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.179516 
F-statistic 12.15840 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Log likelihood -460.0054 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.832193 
Number of observations 970 
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Table 7.7 - Impact of credit on per capita non food expenditure 
Method: Least Squares 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita non food expenditure 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head -0.009119 0.027161 -0.335741 0.7371 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.019570 0.010672 1.833870 0.0670 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.123646 0.105262 -1.174648 0.2404 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.182082 0.143604 -1.267947 0.2051 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.091656 0.013327 -6.877365 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.001317 0.008526 0.154432 0.8773 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) -0.012961 0.013014 -0.995903 0.3196 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) -0.001580 0.008951 -0.176544 0.8599 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.100941 0.049062 2.057435 0.0399 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.025245 0.051109 0.493936 0.6215 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.090590 0.119565 0.757665 0.4488 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.389087 0.159686 2.436580 0.0150 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.068136 0.150549 -0.452584 0.6510 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.334511 0.051175 6.536592 0.0000 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.099338 0.028527 3.482210 0.0005 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.008087 0.024461 -0.330596 0.7410 
Increase in price index of the region -4.666223 0.849465 -5.493135 0.0000 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.392661 0.123256 3.185734 0.0015 
Predicted residuals -0.354573 0.124462 -2.848845 0.0045 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 1.021222 0.445814 2.290689 0.0222 
C -0.586386 0.314928 -1.861970 0.0629 
R-squared 0.191949   
Adjusted R-squared 0.174920   
F-statistic 11.27154   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
Log likelihood -886.8798   
Durbin-Watson stat 1.895583   
Number of observations 970   
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Table 7.8 - Impact of credit on household poverty status 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in household poverty status 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.039274 0.065796 0.596903 0.5506 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.052241 0.025342 2.061453 0.0393 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.025362 0.245891 0.103144 0.9178 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.032454 0.322896 -0.100509 0.9199 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.258864 0.032572 -7.947384 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.002053 0.020394 -0.100661 0.9198 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.010467 0.030521 0.342940 0.7316 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.017568 0.021114 0.832055 0.4054 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.352242 0.111197 3.167734 0.0015 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.044364 0.119564 0.371046 0.7106 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.254930 0.276635 -0.921540 0.3568 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.246562 0.379182 0.650248 0.5155 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.263163 0.349867 -0.752181 0.4519 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.569932 0.118278 4.818571 0.0000 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.067032 0.067013 1.000284 0.3172 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.072463 0.055594 1.303435 0.1924 
Increase in price index of the region -8.921348 1.997443 -4.466385 0.0000 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.568297 0.286950 1.980475 0.0477 
Predicted residuals -0.472964 0.288704 -1.638231 0.1014 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 0.836696 1.068854 0.782798 0.4337 
C -2.032957 0.755096 -2.692317 0.0071 
Mean dependent var 0.310309 
McFadden R-squared 0.160900 
Log likelihood -504.1041 
LR statistic (20 df) 193.3267 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000 
Total obs 970 
Obs with Dep=1 301 
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Table 7.8.a - Impact of credit on household poverty status (Mill’s ratio excluded) 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
   
Dependent Variable: Increase in household poverty status 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.071103 0.051675 1.375954 0.1688 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.045917 0.023981 1.914720 0.0555 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.099938 0.226876 0.440498 0.6596 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.027031 0.323079 -0.083667 0.9333 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.258019 0.032551 -7.926513 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.007064 0.019402 -0.364073 0.7158 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.030064 0.017407 1.727157 0.0841 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.031369 0.011619 2.699737 0.0069 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.342815 0.110430 3.104374 0.0019 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.105552 0.090346 1.168304 0.2427 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.288329 0.273721 -1.053370 0.2922 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.124645 0.344822 0.361476 0.7177 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.119042 0.298271 -0.399106 0.6898 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.560174 0.117469 4.768689 0.0000 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.059360 0.066344 0.894728 0.3709 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.093704 0.048487 1.932553 0.0533 
Increase in price index of the region -7.784587 1.368994 -5.686357 0.0000 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.411783 0.205122 2.007504 0.0447 
Predicted residuals -0.316372 0.207527 -1.524482 0.1274 
C -1.517460 0.364868 -4.158926 0.0000 
Mean dependent var 0.310309 
McFadden R-squared 0.160392 
Log likelihood -504.4090 
LR statistic (19 df) 192.7169 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000 
Total obs 970 
Obs with Dep=1 301 
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Table 7.8.b - Impact of credit on household poverty status (Mill’s ratio and Predicted Residuals excluded) 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in household poverty status 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.057815 0.051151 1.130271 0.2584 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.028134 0.021915 1.283794 0.1992 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.013247 0.212118 0.062451 0.9502 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.033397 0.320978 0.104049 0.9171 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.233516 0.029983 -7.788203 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.010628 0.019155 -0.554833 0.5790 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.043800 0.014888 2.941996 0.0033 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.030323 0.011387 2.662839 0.0077 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.405510 0.103875 3.903818 0.0001 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.145633 0.087692 1.660740 0.0968 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.155319 0.252177 -0.615913 0.5380 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.221028 0.340922 0.648323 0.5168 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.143502 0.294151 -0.487852 0.6257 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.571055 0.116511 4.901279 0.0000 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.033749 0.064921 0.519851 0.6032 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.080334 0.047736 1.682880 0.0924 
Increase in price index of the region -7.389553 1.292057 -5.719216 0.0000 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.098881 0.034775 2.843432 0.0045 
C -1.249388 0.298914 -4.179761 0.0000 
Mean dependent var 0.311475 
McFadden R-squared 0.153379 
Log likelihood -512.5357 
LR statistic (18 df) 185.7076 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000 
Total obs 976 
Obs with Dep=1 304 
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Appendix A1 – Standardized coefficients 
  
 In a multiple regression, the relative size of the coefficients is not important because 
the variables of interest may be measured in different units. Sometimes however we may be 
interested in the question of that which independent variable is the most important to the 
dependent variable. We will then be interested in making the variables become comparable to 
each other. Technically, this process is called transforming coefficients into standardized 
coefficients. The standardized coefficients are measured in the same scale with a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1. They are then comparable and the largest standardized 
coefficient indicates which independent variable has the greatest effect on the dependent 
variable. 
 In Chapters 6 and 7, our priority is not to identify which independent variables have 
the larger effect on the dependent variables. However, in order to provide the readers with a 
more comparable analysis of impact of access to credit on poverty reduction, we present the 
comparison of coefficients and standardized coefficients in this section. The coefficients and 
standardized coefficients are presented in the Tables attached to this section. For ease of 
interpretation, readers may find the correspondent Tables by adding “A1” to the end of the 
table number in Chapters 6 and 7. For example, Table 6.10 in Chapter 6 is related to Table 
6.10.A1 in this section. 
 The computation of standardized coefficients is simple. The following arrangements 
show how we get standardized coefficients from the un-standardized coefficients. 
 Consider the simple equation as follows: 
1 1 2 2y x xα α α ε= + + + . 
We then subtract both sides by the mean of the dependent variable y and get: 
- yy µ 1 1 2 2 - yx xα α α ε µ= + + + . 
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The right hand side then be arranged as follows: 
1 21 2 1 1 2 2
- - -y x x yx xµ α µ α µ α α ε µ= + + +  
1 21 1 2 2
( - ) ( - )x xx xα µ α µ ε= + +  
1 1
1 2
1 1
1 2
1 2
- -x x
x x
x x
x xµ µ
α σ α σ ε
σ σ
= + +  
 Now we divide both sides by the standard deviation of the dependent variable and get: 
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
( - ) ( - )- x x x xy
y y x y x y
x xy σ µ σ µµ ε
α α
σ σ σ σ σ σ
= + +  
 The reduced form can be written as follows, in which y’, x1’, x2’ are standardized. 
1 1 1 1' ' ' ' ' 'y x xα α ε= + +  
 Hence, the formula used to transform coefficients that we get from the regressions into 
standardized coefficients therefore is as follows: 
'
ix
i i
y
σ
α α
σ
=  
Where ’ is standardized coefficient,  is the coefficient, y is the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable and x is the standard deviation of the independent variable. 
 
 29
1 
C
ha
pt
er
 
6 
–
 
A
1 
 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
4.
A
1 
-
 
D
et
er
m
in
a
n
ts
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(97
/9
8 
a
n
d 
92
/9
3 
-
 
T
he
 
w
ho
le
 
sa
m
pl
es
 
-
 
Ex
tr
a
) 
Fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 
To
bi
t R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
 
D
ep
en
de
n
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
: 
To
ta
l h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
 
19
97
/1
99
8 
 
19
92
/1
99
3 
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
 
1.
34
92
38
 
0.
48
32
41
 
-
0.
53
46
80
 
-
0.
22
63
90
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
sq
u
ar
ed
 
-
0.
22
23
13
 
-
0.
74
37
44
 
 
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
07
44
26
 
0.
07
64
35
 
-
0.
00
40
59
 
-
0.
00
42
35
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
21
86
07
 
-
0.
02
37
14
 
-
0.
22
27
41
 
-
0.
02
53
92
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
0.
30
82
63
 
0.
03
22
75
 
0.
21
53
18
 
0.
02
49
50
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
0.
52
33
53
 
0.
25
71
60
 
0.
43
45
57
 
0.
26
29
97
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
23
15
62
 
0.
18
53
76
 
0.
09
23
18
 
0.
08
31
56
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
21
66
38
 
-
0.
13
10
35
 
-
0.
23
79
87
 
-
0.
18
30
90
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
31
32
94
 
-
0.
29
85
31
 
-
0.
22
18
18
 
-
0.
21
30
72
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
11
09
67
 
-
0.
00
92
18
 
-
0.
01
79
07
 
-
0.
00
18
10
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
1.
19
64
59
 
-
0.
12
35
06
 
-
0.
38
28
76
 
-
0.
04
69
80
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
2.
88
79
91
 
0.
09
17
47
 
0.
47
06
43
 
0.
02
36
95
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
79
82
56
 
0.
03
41
52
 
0.
08
15
13
 
0.
00
47
32
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
1.
20
96
99
 
-
0.
03
90
32
 
-
0.
22
60
98
 
-
0.
00
92
46
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
2.
16
60
07
 
0.
18
84
18
 
0.
31
01
68
 
0.
05
35
63
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
01
75
79
 
0.
00
87
00
 
-
0.
03
29
88
 
-
0.
01
56
66
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
24
83
41
 
-
0.
03
76
95
 
0.
15
17
92
 
0.
06
34
70
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
5.
12
17
24
 
0.
06
04
22
 
-
9.
18
62
47
 
-
0.
11
94
78
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f i
n
fo
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
39
13
35
 
0.
25
76
91
 
0.
88
10
74
 
0.
39
71
22
 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
s 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
0.
00
04
33
 
0.
04
65
87
 
-
0.
00
01
45
 
-
0.
03
84
11
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
pr
o
v
in
ce
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
29
29
53
 
0.
12
36
59
 
 
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
23
11
67
 
-
0.
12
94
56
 
0.
10
63
79
 
0.
06
13
30
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
66
78
61
 
0.
44
71
24
 
0.
27
25
37
 
0.
23
29
31
 
C 
-
22
.
05
98
70
 
 
 
-
0.
65
89
02
 
 
 
 29
2 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
7.
A
1 
-
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
of
 
cr
ed
it 
o
n
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
w
el
fa
re
s 
(97
/9
8 
–
 
T
he
 
w
ho
le
 
sa
m
pl
e 
-
 
Ex
tr
a
) 
Se
co
n
d 
st
ag
e 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
es
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
 
D
ep
en
de
n
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
n
o
n
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
 
0.
17
76
33
 
0.
51
29
75
 
0.
14
12
11
 
0.
50
44
17
 
0.
23
69
82
 
0.
44
81
24
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
sq
u
ar
ed
 
-
0.
01
19
68
 
-
0.
32
28
33
 
-
0.
01
07
93
 
-
0.
36
01
19
 
-
0.
01
39
62
 
-
0.
24
66
12
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
02
15
21
 
0.
17
82
08
 
0.
01
15
61
 
0.
11
84
16
 
0.
03
53
29
 
0.
19
15
61
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
02
39
68
 
-
0.
02
09
64
 
-
0.
02
46
22
 
-
0.
02
66
39
 
-
0.
02
13
34
 
-
0.
01
22
19
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
0.
00
16
98
 
0.
00
14
33
 
0.
04
23
84
 
0.
04
42
58
 
-
0.
05
70
59
 
-
0.
03
15
41
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
-
0.
10
20
83
 
-
0.
40
44
45
 
-
0.
09
50
99
 
-
0.
46
60
48
 
-
0.
11
59
73
 
-
0.
30
08
66
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
01
18
21
 
-
0.
07
63
02
 
-
0.
00
53
08
 
-
0.
04
23
80
 
-
0.
01
94
47
 
-
0.
08
21
95
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
05
87
29
 
0.
28
64
19
 
0.
04
14
36
 
0.
24
99
63
 
0.
08
63
00
 
0.
27
55
95
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
04
53
39
 
0.
34
83
42
 
0.
02
55
33
 
0.
24
26
53
 
0.
07
71
34
 
0.
38
80
53
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
00
50
53
 
0.
00
33
85
 
0.
02
55
55
 
0.
02
11
73
 
-
0.
03
23
65
 
-
0.
01
41
95
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
06
39
33
 
0.
05
32
12
 
0.
04
86
72
 
0.
05
01
09
 
0.
09
33
92
 
0.
05
08
99
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
08
16
08
 
0.
02
09
04
 
0.
10
11
11
 
0.
03
20
36
 
-
0.
04
27
54
 
-
0.
00
71
71
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
40
66
21
 
0.
14
02
70
 
0.
29
66
51
 
0.
12
65
81
 
0.
52
05
18
 
0.
11
75
76
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
21
02
25
 
0.
05
46
92
 
0.
24
76
43
 
0.
07
96
92
 
0.
20
49
24
 
0.
03
49
10
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
07
04
26
 
0.
04
93
96
 
0.
00
75
20
 
0.
00
65
24
 
0.
16
29
53
 
0.
07
48
40
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
01
13
97
 
0.
04
54
78
 
0.
01
09
79
 
0.
05
41
90
 
0.
02
04
41
 
0.
05
34
10
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
05
89
36
 
0.
07
21
30
 
0.
06
50
31
 
0.
09
84
48
 
0.
06
35
67
 
0.
05
09
42
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
-
1.
92
56
38
 
-
0.
18
31
69
 
-
1.
48
66
74
 
-
0.
17
49
21
 
-
2.
83
07
34
 
-
0.
17
63
14
 
To
ta
l h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
05
88
97
 
0.
47
48
87
 
0.
03
15
50
 
0.
31
46
62
 
0.
11
43
28
 
0.
60
36
16
 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
sid
u
al
s 
-
0.
05
15
99
 
-
0.
38
27
65
 
-
0.
02
95
87
 
-
0.
27
14
81
 
-
0.
09
87
80
 
-
0.
47
98
11
 
C 
6.
47
10
63
 
 
 
6.
22
44
08
 
 
 
5.
16
59
34
 
 
 
 
 29
3 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
8.
A
1 
-
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
o
f c
re
di
t o
n
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
w
el
fa
re
s 
(92
/9
3 
–
 
Th
e 
w
ho
le
 
sa
m
pl
e 
-
Ex
tr
a
) 
Se
co
n
d 
st
ag
e 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
es
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
 
D
ep
en
de
n
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
n
o
n
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
0.
09
05
27
 
0.
26
51
77
 
0.
06
85
99
 
0.
23
06
45
 
0.
13
73
27
 
0.
25
72
19
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
02
51
97
 
0.
18
18
88
 
0.
01
61
05
 
0.
13
34
40
 
0.
04
14
30
 
0.
19
12
32
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
15
02
73
 
-
0.
11
85
12
 
-
0.
09
80
88
 
-
0.
08
87
91
 
-
0.
23
40
73
 
-
0.
11
80
39
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
-
0.
02
16
96
 
-
0.
01
73
92
 
0.
01
82
06
 
0.
01
67
52
 
-
0.
09
55
32
 
-
0.
04
89
68
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
-
0.
07
82
90
 
-
0.
32
77
96
 
-
0.
07
49
83
 
-
0.
36
03
54
 
-
0.
08
88
68
 
-
0.
23
79
21
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
00
14
43
 
-
0.
00
89
92
 
0.
00
00
17
 
0.
00
01
18
 
0.
00
00
27
 
0.
00
01
08
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
04
07
29
 
0.
21
67
75
 
0.
03
24
91
 
0.
19
84
90
 
0.
05
80
51
 
0.
19
75
63
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
03
68
54
 
0.
24
49
11
 
0.
02
12
12
 
0.
16
17
98
 
0.
06
36
29
 
0.
27
03
77
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
11
15
03
 
-
0.
07
79
53
 
-
0.
09
68
06
 
-
0.
07
76
82
 
-
0.
12
69
94
 
-
0.
05
67
70
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
05
10
07
 
-
0.
04
32
99
 
-
0.
05
99
88
 
-
0.
05
84
50
 
-
0.
04
38
21
 
-
0.
02
37
86
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
23
80
41
 
-
0.
08
29
12
 
-
0.
16
64
72
 
-
0.
06
65
54
 
-
0.
42
62
46
 
-
0.
09
49
33
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
29
79
11
 
0.
11
96
50
 
0.
27
06
48
 
0.
12
47
66
 
0.
35
75
21
 
0.
09
18
16
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
08
24
61
 
0.
02
33
28
 
0.
22
20
24
 
0.
07
20
94
 
-
0.
11
98
33
 
-
0.
02
16
77
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
13
48
22
 
0.
16
10
73
 
0.
03
20
58
 
0.
04
39
61
 
0.
30
97
11
 
0.
23
65
97
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
01
77
38
 
0.
05
82
79
 
0.
01
63
84
 
0.
06
17
86
 
0.
02
39
28
 
0.
05
02
69
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
00
59
25
 
-
0.
01
71
40
 
-
0.
00
61
04
 
-
0.
02
02
67
 
-
0.
01
12
15
 
-
0.
02
07
45
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
1.
10
25
85
 
0.
09
92
10
 
0.
70
02
30
 
0.
07
23
19
 
1.
54
92
24
 
0.
08
91
35
 
To
ta
l h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
06
97
96
 
0.
48
28
64
 
0.
05
10
11
 
0.
40
50
66
 
0.
12
41
94
 
0.
54
93
95
 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
sid
u
al
s 
-
0.
06
42
54
 
-
0.
41
46
37
 
-
0.
04
75
26
 
-
0.
35
20
21
 
-
0.
11
72
99
 
-
0.
48
40
08
 
C 
4.
65
88
43
 
 
 
4.
90
32
42
 
 
 
2.
39
87
95
 
 
 
 29
4 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
9.
A
1 
-
 
D
et
er
m
in
a
n
ts
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(97
/9
8 
a
n
d 
92
/9
3 
-
 
Be
tt
er
 
o
ff
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s 
-
 
Ex
tr
a
) 
Fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 
To
bi
t R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
 
 
 
19
97
/1
99
8 
 
19
92
/1
99
3 
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
 
1.
48
24
29
 
0.
50
45
47
 
-
0.
57
91
46
 
-
0.
23
42
45
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
sq
u
ar
ed
 
-
0.
24
90
41
 
-
0.
80
31
47
 
 
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
00
78
77
 
0.
00
78
19
 
-
0.
05
10
62
 
-
0.
05
33
24
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
41
43
86
 
-
0.
04
57
57
 
-
0.
05
13
52
 
-
0.
00
62
75
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
0.
43
26
47
 
0.
04
46
26
 
0.
40
84
91
 
0.
04
58
34
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
0.
71
67
37
 
0.
32
11
43
 
0.
50
52
22
 
0.
28
88
45
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
20
44
41
 
0.
17
01
56
 
-
0.
01
06
55
 
-
0.
00
98
97
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
26
23
07
 
-
0.
14
48
64
 
-
0.
27
66
02
 
-
0.
22
31
55
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
37
59
04
 
-
0.
34
88
93
 
-
0.
21
70
89
 
-
0.
21
49
85
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
05
13
18
 
-
0.
00
40
99
 
-
0.
21
85
19
 
-
0.
01
99
03
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
1.
32
49
72
 
-
0.
13
31
91
 
-
0.
61
38
12
 
-
0.
07
23
18
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
2.
32
96
17
 
0.
07
46
18
 
1.
12
16
25
 
0.
05
17
65
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
95
73
36
 
-
0.
03
82
77
 
0.
45
41
89
 
0.
02
55
43
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
24
80
53
 
-
0.
00
76
89
 
-
0.
33
27
29
 
-
0.
01
26
33
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
1.
58
48
15
 
0.
12
34
04
 
0.
43
04
63
 
0.
07
15
91
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
-
0.
19
60
99
 
-
0.
08
58
40
 
-
0.
02
23
42
 
-
0.
01
07
16
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
38
62
83
 
-
0.
05
84
43
 
0.
29
77
31
 
0.
10
34
11
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
6.
26
96
49
 
0.
06
93
44
 
-
10
.
62
50
80
 
-
0.
13
79
06
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f i
n
fo
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
35
64
08
 
0.
21
73
08
 
1.
12
02
13
 
0.
44
68
51
 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
s 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
-
0.
00
00
41
 
-
0.
00
42
03
 
-
0.
00
01
61
 
-
0.
04
19
35
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
pr
o
v
in
ce
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
1.
12
98
12
 
0.
29
46
77
 
 
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
32
45
74
 
-
0.
16
03
65
 
0.
08
66
10
 
0.
04
65
85
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
49
49
74
 
0.
30
45
37
 
0.
35
15
59
 
0.
28
97
98
 
C 
-
23
.
94
43
70
 
 
 
-
2.
95
90
63
 
 
 
 
 29
5 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
10
.
A
1 
-
 
D
et
er
m
in
a
n
ts
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(97
/9
8 
a
n
d 
92
/9
3 
-
 
Po
o
re
r 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s 
-
 
Ex
tr
a
) 
Fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 
To
bi
t R
eg
re
ss
io
n
: 
 
 
19
97
/1
99
8 
 
19
92
/1
99
3 
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
 
1.
19
79
38
 
0.
45
40
91
 
-
0.
42
90
08
 
-
0.
18
92
22
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
sq
u
ar
ed
 
-
0.
19
34
98
 
-
0.
67
41
54
 
 
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
12
86
46
 
0.
13
72
81
 
0.
05
13
85
 
0.
05
32
47
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
16
12
31
 
-
0.
01
65
72
 
-
0.
51
39
89
 
-
0.
04
66
01
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
0.
27
45
98
 
0.
02
93
87
 
0.
02
48
57
 
0.
00
30
34
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
0.
43
81
37
 
0.
22
95
76
 
0.
33
29
37
 
0.
21
59
26
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
31
65
76
 
0.
23
17
36
 
0.
29
38
48
 
0.
24
85
18
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
27
47
73
 
-
0.
16
96
66
 
-
0.
19
22
96
 
-
0.
12
28
41
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
30
82
41
 
-
0.
26
04
25
 
-
0.
28
53
73
 
-
0.
24
49
99
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
27
69
65
 
-
0.
02
43
69
 
0.
53
26
88
 
0.
06
19
31
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
1.
35
01
83
 
-
0.
14
52
63
 
0.
06
82
29
 
0.
00
89
22
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
2.
52
32
47
 
0.
07
90
49
 
0.
24
82
90
 
0.
01
40
06
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
65
00
72
 
0.
02
98
22
 
0.
09
65
12
 
0.
00
54
43
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
2.
76
27
37
 
-
0.
09
36
97
 
-
0.
09
55
74
 
-
0.
00
43
50
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
2.
25
22
45
 
0.
22
15
22
 
-
0.
02
30
61
 
-
0.
00
39
32
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
11
82
62
 
0.
06
83
18
 
-
0.
02
92
07
 
-
0.
01
35
59
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
07
04
47
 
-
0.
01
07
48
 
-
0.
07
39
71
 
-
0.
03
81
87
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
3.
40
20
68
 
0.
04
34
10
 
-
8.
63
38
28
 
-
0.
10
91
56
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f i
n
fo
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
31
40
11
 
0.
22
77
12
 
0.
60
48
26
 
0.
31
23
96
 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
s 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
0.
00
10
36
 
0.
11
68
69
 
-
0.
00
00
87
 
-
0.
02
26
11
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
pr
o
v
in
ce
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
06
03
98
 
-
0.
03
58
55
 
 
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
13
08
97
 
-
0.
08
49
87
 
0.
14
76
32
 
0.
09
37
93
 
A
v
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
o
f f
o
rm
al
 
fu
n
ds
 
in
 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
72
23
38
 
0.
53
68
69
 
0.
16
33
39
 
0.
14
74
58
 
C 
-
15
.
98
47
20
 
 
 
1.
11
63
61
 
 
 
 
 29
6 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
11
.
A
1 
-
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
o
f c
re
di
t o
n
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
w
el
fa
re
s 
 
(97
/9
8 
–
 
Be
tt
er
 
o
ff 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s 
-
 
Ex
tr
a
) 
Se
co
n
d 
st
ag
e 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
es
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
 
D
ep
en
de
n
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
n
o
n
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
 
0.
10
52
39
 
0.
42
38
81
 
0.
08
01
54
 
0.
35
39
64
 
0.
15
06
28
 
0.
38
57
01
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
sq
u
ar
ed
 
-
0.
00
72
10
 
-
0.
27
51
69
 
-
0.
00
61
71
 
-
0.
25
82
18
 
-
0.
01
04
96
 
-
0.
25
46
63
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
01
59
54
 
0.
18
74
14
 
0.
00
69
13
 
0.
08
90
36
 
0.
02
70
94
 
0.
20
23
41
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
02
44
70
 
-
0.
03
19
76
 
-
0.
03
34
22
 
-
0.
04
78
84
 
-
0.
01
16
51
 
-
0.
00
96
79
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
-
0.
02
81
93
 
-
0.
03
44
14
 
0.
03
11
09
 
0.
04
16
34
 
-
0.
10
07
04
 
-
0.
07
81
48
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
-
0.
05
83
16
 
-
0.
30
92
19
 
-
0.
07
17
08
 
-
0.
41
68
81
 
-
0.
03
79
55
 
-
0.
12
79
45
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
01
23
73
 
-
0.
12
18
69
 
-
0.
00
76
64
 
-
0.
08
27
64
 
-
0.
01
44
41
 
-
0.
09
04
26
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
03
54
23
 
0.
23
15
13
 
0.
02
30
19
 
0.
16
49
46
 
0.
04
99
85
 
0.
20
76
86
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
02
49
78
 
0.
27
43
55
 
0.
01
21
15
 
0.
14
58
97
 
0.
04
14
58
 
0.
28
94
95
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
02
36
80
 
0.
02
23
82
 
0.
05
85
99
 
0.
06
07
25
 
-
0.
02
59
66
 
-
0.
01
56
02
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
03
15
32
 
0.
03
75
11
 
0.
03
22
20
 
0.
04
20
24
 
0.
02
59
38
 
0.
01
96
17
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
16
69
74
 
0.
06
32
92
 
0.
13
90
07
 
0.
05
77
70
 
0.
17
97
43
 
0.
04
33
14
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
35
85
20
 
0.
16
96
39
 
0.
29
93
30
 
0.
15
52
85
 
0.
42
43
01
 
0.
12
76
34
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
01
89
17
 
-
0.
00
69
39
 
0.
09
69
08
 
0.
03
89
75
 
-
0.
11
10
01
 
-
0.
02
58
86
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
05
98
63
 
0.
05
51
63
 
-
0.
02
11
46
 
-
0.
02
13
64
 
0.
16
17
64
 
0.
09
47
66
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
00
23
21
 
0.
01
20
23
 
0.
00
83
53
 
0.
04
74
42
 
-
0.
00
11
58
 
-
0.
00
38
14
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
03
43
88
 
0.
06
15
71
 
0.
06
10
16
 
0.
11
97
78
 
0.
00
80
81
 
0.
00
91
98
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
-
1.
26
35
75
 
-
0.
16
53
89
 
-
1.
29
40
24
 
-
0.
18
57
01
 
-
1.
32
78
17
 
-
0.
11
04
90
 
To
ta
l h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
02
61
06
 
0.
30
89
44
 
0.
01
59
26
 
0.
20
66
39
 
0.
03
93
19
 
0.
29
58
15
 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
sid
u
al
s 
-
0.
02
39
24
 
-
0.
25
85
17
 
-
0.
01
74
96
 
-
0.
20
72
82
 
-
0.
03
19
44
 
-
0.
21
94
43
 
C 
7.
12
08
72
 
 
 
6.
75
30
54
 
0.
00
00
00
 
5.
88
58
84
 
 
 
 
 29
7 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
12
.
A
1 
-
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
o
f c
re
di
t o
n
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
w
el
fa
re
s 
(97
/9
8 
-
 
Po
o
re
r 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
s 
-
 
Ex
tr
a
) 
Se
co
n
d 
st
ag
e 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
es
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
 
D
ep
en
de
n
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
n
o
n
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
 
0.
05
64
21
 
0.
29
75
53
 
0.
07
10
65
 
0.
38
57
14
 
0.
04
49
97
 
0.
12
67
70
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
sq
u
ar
ed
 
-
0.
00
17
46
 
-
0.
08
46
33
 
-
0.
00
54
77
 
-
0.
27
32
28
 
0.
00
39
13
 
0.
10
13
25
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
00
75
30
 
0.
11
17
96
 
0.
00
34
11
 
0.
05
21
19
 
0.
01
53
31
 
0.
12
15
94
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
03
08
52
 
-
0.
04
41
19
 
-
0.
02
42
58
 
-
0.
03
57
01
 
-
0.
04
40
75
 
-
0.
03
36
70
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
0.
00
73
81
 
0.
01
09
90
 
0.
03
13
61
 
0.
04
80
56
 
-
0.
03
56
19
 
-
0.
02
83
31
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
-
0.
05
04
71
 
-
0.
36
79
37
 
-
0.
05
34
60
 
-
0.
40
10
94
 
-
0.
05
10
43
 
-
0.
19
87
82
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
00
50
88
 
-
0.
05
18
18
 
0.
00
31
23
 
0.
03
27
33
 
-
0.
02
21
55
 
-
0.
12
05
34
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
03
37
40
 
0.
28
98
55
 
0.
02
70
61
 
0.
23
92
57
 
0.
05
27
82
 
0.
24
22
32
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
02
54
55
 
0.
29
92
13
 
0.
01
29
10
 
0.
15
61
78
 
0.
05
46
11
 
0.
34
29
23
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
03
78
14
 
-
0.
04
62
89
 
-
0.
03
54
64
 
-
0.
04
46
78
 
-
0.
05
59
83
 
-
0.
03
66
09
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
06
27
00
 
0.
09
38
52
 
0.
03
33
11
 
0.
05
13
16
 
0.
13
95
90
 
0.
11
16
20
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
13
40
74
 
-
0.
05
84
38
 
-
0.
03
85
47
 
-
0.
01
72
91
 
-
0.
39
04
20
 
-
0.
09
09
06
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
02
50
62
 
-
0.
01
59
96
 
-
0.
07
23
93
 
-
0.
04
75
52
 
-
0.
01
63
79
 
-
0.
00
55
85
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
26
28
49
 
0.
12
40
25
 
0.
26
21
20
 
0.
12
72
88
 
0.
33
88
16
 
0.
08
54
04
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
00
11
37
 
-
0.
00
15
56
 
-
0.
01
35
39
 
-
0.
01
90
67
 
0.
03
33
99
 
0.
02
44
15
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
00
96
53
 
0.
07
75
83
 
0.
00
70
00
 
0.
05
79
01
 
0.
02
16
43
 
0.
09
29
24
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
02
27
50
 
0.
04
82
92
 
0.
01
43
38
 
0.
03
13
24
 
0.
04
63
16
 
0.
05
25
22
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
-
0.
51
76
44
 
-
0.
09
18
94
 
-
0.
07
69
98
 
-
0.
01
40
68
 
-
1.
43
90
54
 
-
0.
13
64
72
 
To
ta
l h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
05
10
41
 
0.
71
01
24
 
0.
01
83
06
 
0.
26
21
16
 
0.
12
43
51
 
0.
92
42
17
 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
sid
u
al
s 
-
0.
04
65
97
 
-
0.
59
23
03
 
-
0.
01
78
80
 
-
0.
23
39
05
 
-
0.
11
18
24
 
-
0.
75
93
30
 
C 
6.
92
64
33
 
 
 
6.
50
42
83
 
 
 
5.
81
34
69
 
 
 
 
 29
8 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
13
.
A
1 
-
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
o
f c
re
di
t o
n
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
w
el
fa
re
s 
(92
/9
3 
–
 
Be
tt
er
 
o
ff
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s 
-
 
Ex
tr
a
) 
Se
co
n
d 
st
ag
e 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
es
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
 
D
ep
en
de
n
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
n
o
n
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
0.
04
13
44
 
0.
16
48
57
 
0.
02
98
77
 
0.
12
26
69
 
0.
06
43
50
 
0.
15
74
10
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
01
24
16
 
0.
12
78
26
 
0.
00
49
43
 
0.
05
24
00
 
0.
02
35
84
 
0.
14
89
51
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
09
01
85
 
-
0.
10
86
44
 
-
0.
05
56
46
 
-
0.
06
90
25
 
-
0.
14
05
24
 
-
0.
10
38
51
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
-
0.
06
45
86
 
-
0.
07
14
42
 
-
0.
01
47
24
 
-
0.
01
67
70
 
-
0.
14
72
89
 
-
0.
09
99
48
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
-
0.
04
69
38
 
-
0.
26
45
58
 
-
0.
05
35
27
 
-
0.
31
06
51
 
-
0.
03
61
58
 
-
0.
12
50
23
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
00
66
80
 
-
0.
06
11
69
 
-
0.
00
32
17
 
-
0.
03
03
32
 
-
0.
00
65
21
 
-
0.
03
66
32
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
01
95
49
 
0.
15
54
85
 
0.
01
70
05
 
0.
13
92
66
 
0.
02
63
95
 
0.
12
87
88
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
02
52
67
 
0.
24
66
81
 
0.
01
02
63
 
0.
10
31
72
 
0.
04
62
10
 
0.
27
67
63
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
06
84
84
 
-
0.
06
14
95
 
-
0.
06
36
28
 
-
0.
05
88
31
 
-
0.
06
69
88
 
-
0.
03
69
01
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
01
72
90
 
-
0.
02
00
83
 
-
0.
03
09
82
 
-
0.
03
70
54
 
-
0.
00
69
57
 
-
0.
00
49
57
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
12
93
67
 
-
0.
05
88
61
 
-
0.
14
59
47
 
-
0.
06
83
76
 
-
0.
16
86
73
 
-
0.
04
70
80
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
07
48
35
 
0.
04
14
91
 
0.
12
78
05
 
0.
07
29
62
 
-
0.
00
16
32
 
-
0.
00
05
55
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
10
66
13
 
-
0.
03
99
07
 
0.
10
72
55
 
0.
04
13
39
 
-
0.
39
32
01
 
-
0.
09
02
92
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
10
74
49
 
0.
17
61
72
 
-
0.
00
19
97
 
-
0.
00
33
71
 
0.
27
78
98
 
0.
27
95
17
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
-
0.
00
27
04
 
-
0.
01
27
85
 
-
0.
00
39
35
 
-
0.
01
91
58
 
0.
00
63
53
 
0.
01
84
28
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
00
09
14
 
0.
00
31
30
 
-
0.
00
02
05
 
-
0.
00
07
23
 
-
0.
00
32
46
 
-
0.
00
68
19
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
0.
55
43
54
 
0.
07
09
34
 
0.
30
96
43
 
0.
04
07
97
 
0.
84
12
29
 
0.
06
60
34
 
To
ta
l h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
02
22
10
 
0.
21
89
58
 
0.
01
40
53
 
0.
14
26
55
 
0.
04
52
79
 
0.
27
38
41
 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
sid
u
al
s 
-
0.
01
67
01
 
-
0.
15
17
15
 
-
0.
01
08
44
 
-
0.
10
14
33
 
-
0.
03
75
21
 
-
0.
20
90
97
 
C 
6.
48
42
79
 
 
 
6.
25
61
63
 
 
 
4.
96
29
27
 
 
 
 
 29
9 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
14
.
A
1 
-
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
o
f c
re
di
t o
n
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
w
el
fa
re
s 
(92
/9
3 
-
 
Po
o
re
r 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
s 
-
 
Ex
tr
a
) 
Se
co
n
d 
st
ag
e 
Le
as
t S
qu
ar
es
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
 
D
ep
en
de
n
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
n
o
n
 
fo
o
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
St
d.
 
Co
ef
.
 
Th
e 
ag
e 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
0.
02
67
01
 
0.
15
41
87
 
0.
01
16
97
 
0.
06
05
17
 
0.
07
10
63
 
0.
19
48
62
 
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
00
71
50
 
0.
09
70
01
 
0.
00
32
37
 
0.
03
93
46
 
0.
01
82
59
 
0.
11
76
28
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
fa
rm
 
ho
u
se
ho
ld
 
=
1;
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
=
0 
 
-
0.
00
78
79
 
-
0.
00
93
52
 
0.
01
88
23
 
0.
02
00
18
 
-
0.
06
64
60
 
-
0.
03
74
61
 
D
u
m
m
y 
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
ge
n
de
r 
o
f h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
he
ad
: 
m
al
e 
=
1;
 
fe
m
al
e=
0 
0.
02
47
95
 
0.
03
96
21
 
0.
05
07
90
 
0.
07
27
14
 
-
0.
03
57
83
 
-
0.
02
71
52
 
H
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
siz
e 
(pe
rs
o
n
s) 
-
0.
03
05
93
 
-
0.
25
97
64
 
-
0.
02
77
67
 
-
0.
21
12
38
 
-
0.
04
62
69
 
-
0.
18
65
56
 
Fa
rm
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
00
31
11
 
-
0.
03
44
47
 
-
0.
00
41
70
 
-
0.
04
13
69
 
-
0.
00
80
00
 
-
0.
04
20
63
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
01
98
58
 
0.
16
60
83
 
0.
01
17
93
 
0.
08
83
69
 
0.
03
90
96
 
0.
15
52
69
 
N
o
n
-
fin
an
ci
al
 
sa
v
in
gs
 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
01
68
87
 
0.
18
98
10
 
0.
00
56
54
 
0.
05
69
39
 
0.
05
02
53
 
0.
26
82
20
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f d
et
er
ge
n
t i
n
 
th
e 
v
ill
ag
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
05
29
44
 
-
0.
08
05
87
 
-
0.
04
55
02
 
-
0.
06
20
53
 
-
0.
08
16
26
 
-
0.
05
89
98
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f f
ish
 
so
u
rc
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/b
o
ttl
e,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
06
35
58
 
-
0.
10
88
09
 
-
0.
06
99
41
 
-
0.
10
72
78
 
-
0.
07
10
27
 
-
0.
05
77
41
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
o
dl
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/p
ac
k,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
08
48
72
 
-
0.
06
26
82
 
0.
03
57
93
 
0.
02
36
84
 
-
0.
37
77
34
 
-
0.
13
24
73
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f p
o
rk
 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
17
20
69
 
0.
12
70
57
 
0.
08
67
97
 
0.
05
74
23
 
0.
32
17
20
 
0.
11
28
07
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f n
o
rm
al
 
ric
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/k
g,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
10
52
05
 
0.
06
26
92
 
0.
19
78
88
 
0.
10
56
53
 
-
0.
05
66
52
 
-
0.
01
60
31
 
Pr
ic
e 
o
f s
ew
in
g 
se
rv
ic
e 
(V
N
D
10
00
/tr
o
u
se
r,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
00
90
28
 
0.
02
01
55
 
-
0.
04
30
14
 
-
0.
08
60
36
 
0.
12
65
53
 
0.
13
41
60
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
ed
u
ca
tio
n
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(ye
ar
s) 
0.
01
74
48
 
0.
10
60
52
 
0.
02
36
51
 
0.
12
87
97
 
0.
00
05
78
 
0.
00
16
68
 
A
v
er
ag
ed
 
la
n
d 
o
w
n
ed
 
in
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
(H
ec
ta
re
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
-
0.
00
63
12
 
-
0.
04
26
62
 
-
0.
00
41
98
 
-
0.
02
54
21
 
-
0.
00
83
53
 
-
0.
02
68
09
 
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
in
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
 
0.
65
42
25
 
0.
10
82
89
 
0.
11
40
78
 
0.
01
69
18
 
1.
27
86
59
 
0.
10
05
02
 
To
ta
l h
o
u
se
ho
ld
 
cr
ed
it 
(V
N
D
10
00
,
 
Lo
ga
rit
hm
) 
0.
04
90
39
 
0.
64
20
32
 
0.
02
71
71
 
0.
31
87
18
 
0.
13
27
83
 
0.
82
55
07
 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
sid
u
al
s 
-
0.
04
93
17
 
-
0.
60
58
72
 
-
0.
02
78
13
 
-
0.
30
61
38
 
-
0.
13
39
28
 
-
0.
78
13
02
 
C 
5.
30
89
13
 
 
 
5.
77
08
85
 
 
 
2.
77
90
27
 
 
 
 300 
Table 6.15.A1 - Effect of credit on per capita food expenditure (1992/1993 –Better off Households without 
predicted residuals - Extra) 
 
 
Explanatory variables Coefficients Std. Coef. 
The age of household head 0.026384 0.108328 
Education of household head (years) 0.004525 0.047969 
Dummy variable: farm household =1; otherwise =0  -0.055831 -0.069255 
Dummy variable: gender of household head: male =1; female=0 -0.012332 -0.014046 
Household size (persons) -0.050274 -0.291772 
Farm land owned (Hectare, Logarithm) -0.003549 -0.033463 
Financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.015525 0.127145 
Non-financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.009068 0.091159 
Price of detergent in the village (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) -0.061161 -0.056550 
Price of fish source (VND1000/bottle, Logarithm) -0.031646 -0.037848 
Price of noodle (VND1000/pack, Logarithm) -0.133605 -0.062594 
Price of pork (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.130336 0.074407 
Price of normal rice (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.098917 0.038126 
Price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser, Logarithm) 0.005578 0.009417 
Averaged education in commune (years) -0.004639 -0.022586 
Averaged land owned in commune (Hectare, Logarithm) 0.002059 0.007260 
Price index in the region 0.247368 0.032592 
Total household credit (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.003979 0.040392 
C 6.321087   
 
Chapter 7 – A1 
 
Table 7.3.A1 - Probability of being participant household (Extra) 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 
Dependent Variable: Dummy: if household is a participant household 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head -0.082077 -0.166962 
Increase in education of household head (years) -0.001082 -0.005256 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.279612 -0.133999 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.031765 0.009064 
Increase in household size (persons) 0.016060 0.052512 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.007632 0.041866 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) -0.028600 -0.185696 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) -0.031903 -0.269477 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.067955 0.064326 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) -0.126614 -0.144451 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.208178 0.083101 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.221996 0.064368 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.489018 -0.173131 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.007040 0.006050 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) -0.001858 -0.003036 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.051199 -0.119132 
Increase in number of households in commune (households) -0.000026 -0.036857 
Increase in price index of the region -2.407694 -0.180876 
Increase in the availability of informal fund in village (VND1000) 0.039638 0.195333 
Increase in the availability of formal fund in village (VND1000) 0.012355 0.086595 
Increase in availability of formal funds in commune (VND1000) 0.012360 0.065368 
C 0.735368   
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Table 7.4.A1 - Determinants of change in amount of household borrowing (Extra) 
Method: Least Squares 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in total household borrowing 
 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head -0.035905 -0.027713 
Increase in education of household head (years) -0.044742 -0.079503 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.353820 -0.057948 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.170418 0.018917 
Increase in household size (persons) 0.052008 0.063991 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.007746 -0.015769 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.046507 0.113188 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) -0.002149 -0.006595 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.146300 0.049862 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.054203 0.023643 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.360164 0.053163 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.034437 0.003737 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.294298 -0.038240 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) -0.041748 -0.013150 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) -0.056421 -0.033604 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.029904 -0.022931 
Increase in number of households in commune (households) 0.000127 0.064456 
Increase in price index of the region -0.221518 -0.006175 
Increase in the availability of informal fund in village (VND1000) 0.061332 0.107440 
Increase in the availability of formal fund in village (VND1000) 0.073036 0.180347 
Increase in availability of formal funds in commune (VND1000) -0.026758 -0.050684 
C 1.218917   
 
Table 7.5.A1 - Impact of credit on per capita expenditure (Extra) 
Method: Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita expenditure 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head 0.013132 0.030175 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.013310 0.070408 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.048351 -0.023574 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.010031 -0.003315 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.096559 -0.353688 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.002394 0.014509 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) -0.004234 -0.030677 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.002929 0.026758 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.097721 0.099150 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.011340 0.014725 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.034844 0.015312 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.152356 0.049217 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.008588 -0.003322 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.184266 0.172786 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.039722 0.070431 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.007608 0.017368 
Increase in price index of the region -3.029959 -0.251434 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.276427 0.822925 
Predicted residuals -0.252881 -0.727544 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 0.539742 0.182759 
C -0.151590   
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Table 7.6.A1 - Impact of credit on per capita food expenditure (Extra) 
Method: Least Squares 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita food expenditure 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head 0.030828 0.071964 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.009037 0.048566 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.008746 0.004332 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.130030 0.043655 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.091156 -0.339213 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.006393 0.039362 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.006948 0.051142 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.008491 0.078804 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.094242 0.097142 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.014740 0.019445 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.016339 -0.007294 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) -0.009012 -0.002958 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.114984 0.045186 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.083859 0.079886 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.010347 0.018638 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.022213 0.051516 
Increase in price index of the region -1.769505 -0.149175 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.185761 0.561815 
Predicted residuals -0.178500 -0.521723 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 0.028143 0.009681 
C 0.205516   
 
Table 7.6.a.A1 - Impact of credit on per capita food expenditure (Mill’s ratio excluded-Extra) 
Method: Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita food expenditure 
 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head 0.031899 0.074464 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.008825 0.047426 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.011242 0.005568 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.130252 0.043729 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.091134 -0.339131 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.006230 0.038358 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.007619 0.056081 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.008956 0.083119 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.093898 0.096788 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.016869 0.022254 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.017340 -0.007741 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) -0.013164 -0.004320 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.119913 0.047123 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.083558 0.079600 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.010043 0.018091 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.022923 0.053162 
Increase in price index of the region -1.731223 -0.145948 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.180393 0.545580 
Predicted residuals -0.173109 -0.505966 
C 0.222798   
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Table 7.7.A1 - Impact of credit on per capita non food expenditure (Extra) 
Method: Least Squares 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita non food expenditure 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head -0.009119 -0.013740 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.019570 0.067882 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.123646 -0.039531 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.182082 -0.039456 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.091656 -0.220145 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.001317 0.005234 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) -0.012961 -0.061577 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) -0.001580 -0.009465 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.100941 0.067157 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.025245 0.021495 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.090590 0.026103 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.389087 0.082418 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.068136 -0.017283 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.334511 0.205681 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.099338 0.115496 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) -0.008087 -0.012105 
Increase in price index of the region -4.666223 -0.253906 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.392661 0.766511 
Predicted residuals -0.354573 -0.668913 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 1.021222 0.226743 
C -0.586386   
 
Table 7.8.A1 - Impact of credit on household poverty status (Extra) 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in household poverty status 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head 0.039274 0.085908 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.052241 0.263073 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.025362 0.011772 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.032454 -0.010210 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.258864 -0.902647 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.002053 -0.011844 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.010467 0.072194 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.017568 0.152781 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.352242 0.340223 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.044364 0.054840 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.254930 -0.106643 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.246562 0.075823 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.263163 -0.096907 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.569932 0.508751 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.067032 0.113144 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.072463 0.157474 
Increase in price index of the region -8.921348 -0.704751 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.568297 1.610548 
Predicted residuals -0.472964 -1.295358 
Inverse Mill’s ratios 0.836696 0.269699 
C -2.032957   
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Table 7.8.a.A1 - Impact of credit on household poverty status (Mill’s ratio excluded-Extra) 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in household poverty status   
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head 0.071103 0.155531 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.045917 0.231227 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.099938 0.046386 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.027031 -0.008504 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.258019 -0.899701 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.007064 -0.040755 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.030064 0.207360 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.031369 0.272802 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.342815 0.331118 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.105552 0.130478 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.288329 -0.120614 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.124645 0.038331 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.119042 -0.043836 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.560174 0.500040 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.059360 0.100194 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.093704 0.203634 
Increase in price index of the region -7.784587 -0.614951 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.411783 1.166989 
Predicted residuals -0.316372 -0.866482 
C -1.517460   
 
Table 7.8.b.A1 - Impact of credit on household poverty status (Mill’s ratio and Predicted Residuals 
excluded -Extra) 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in household poverty status 
Variable Coefficients Std. Coef. 
Increase in age group of household head 0.057815 0.126465 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.028134 0.141676 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.013247 0.006149 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.033397 0.010506 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.233516 -0.814260 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.010628 -0.061317 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.043800 0.302102 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.030323 0.263706 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.405510 0.391674 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.145633 0.180024 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.155319 -0.064973 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.221028 0.067970 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) -0.143502 -0.052843 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.571055 0.509753 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.033749 0.056965 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.080334 0.174579 
Increase in price index of the region -7.389553 -0.583745 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.098881 0.280228 
C -1.249388   
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Appendix A2- The standard error problem in 2SLS  
  
 Maddala (2001) shows that in a two stage least square regression (2SLS), although the 
method is correct to produce consistent coefficients, the standard errors may not be correct 
(p.p. 360-363), and hence the interpretation of the results may be biased. The reason lies at the 
fact that in the second stage of the 2SLS the predicted values of explanatory variables, which 
are estimated from the first stage, are used instead of the actual ones. Specifically, the second 
stage ignores the fact that the explanatory variables of interests have been estimated in the 
first stage but the standard errors have not been taken into account in the second stage.  
 It is also noted that the in the second stage of the 2SLS, we may use either: (i) the 
predicted values; or (ii) the predicted residuals and the actual values. These alternatives 
however are identical and they do not correct the problem. Therefore, the 2SLS, if estimated 
by two separate LS stages, might result in incorrect interpretation of the results. Fortunately, 
the 2SLS estimator (in E-Views) is programmed to correct this problem and hence, we do the 
extra tests to check the conclusions that we have proposed in Chapter 6 and 7 regarding the 
impact of access to finance on poverty reduction.  
 Although this problem seems to be important, many papers have failed to recognise it. 
For examples, Khandker (2001, 2003), Khandker and Faruqee (2001), Pham and Izumita 
(2002) .etc also run the two separate stage regressions to find the effect of access to credit on 
poverty reduction, but they do not take into account of the standard error problem. However, 
it may be that, because they run two stage regressions with different methods at each stage 
(Pham and Izumita use probit model in the first stage and LS in the second, while Khandker 
uses Tobit in the first stage and LS in the second), so the interpretations of the standard errors 
become precarious. 
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 Having recognised the possibility of incorrect standard errors and because we follow 
the approach similar to Khandker’s, we find it better to do some extra tests to check for the 
robustness of our findings in the chapters 6 and 7 with the 2SLS estimator. One may also 
interpret this appendix as an alternative method for assessing the impact of access to credit on 
household poverty reduction. The test results are reported in the Tables attached to this 
section. The readers may find it easier to compare if they follow the original Tables in 
Chapters 6 and 7 and find the corresponding ones which are added with “A2” at after the 
number. For example, Table 6.10 in Chapter 6 will be related to Table 6.10.A2 in this section.  
 As we can see, the results from the extra tests with 2SLS estimator do not contradict 
the findings reported in chapters 6 and 7. The slight changes of the coefficients are the results 
of using the Tobit regressions for the first stage, rather than the LS as in the 2SLS estimator. 
However, most importantly, the conclusion that access to credit has a significant positive 
impact on household poverty reduction holds. This implies that the findings in chapters 6 and 
7 are consistent with those in this appendix. 
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Table 7.5.A2 – Impact of credit on per capita expenditure (Panel data - Extra) 
Method: 2SLS - Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=6) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita expenditure 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.033661 0.014345 2.346497 0.0192 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.009256 0.007504 1.233538 0.2177 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.000487 0.071882 -0.006780 0.9946 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.005767 0.122630 -0.047026 0.9625 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.096134 0.009493 -10.12717 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.000720 0.005840 -0.123272 0.9019 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.008640 0.005396 1.601326 0.1096 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.011837 0.003547 3.337111 0.0009 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.091119 0.034260 2.659642 0.0080 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.052162 0.037012 1.409313 0.1591 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.015643 0.096414 0.162245 0.8711 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.072732 0.132964 0.547009 0.5845 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.085941 0.107908 0.796422 0.4260 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.178497 0.039507 4.518134 0.0000 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.033885 0.019433 1.743687 0.0815 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.021222 0.013155 1.613259 0.1070 
Increase in price index of the region -2.295749 0.435659 -5.269601 0.0000 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.173461 0.065202 2.660377 0.0079 
C 0.179860 0.134832 1.333954 0.1825 
R-squared 0.077735 
Adjusted R-squared 0.060279 
S.E. of regression 0.427136 
F-statistic 14.77766 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Number of observations 970 
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Table 7.6.A2 – Impact of credit on per capita food expenditure (Panel data -Extra) 
Method: 2SLS - Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=6) 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita food expenditure 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.031899 0.015272 2.088776 0.0370 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.008825 0.007896 1.117692 0.2640 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household 0.011242 0.079332 0.141704 0.8873 
Dummy: if household head becomes male 0.130252 0.145249 0.896749 0.3701 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.091134 0.009913 -9.193113 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) 0.006230 0.006819 0.913725 0.3611 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.007619 0.005913 1.288505 0.1979 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.008956 0.003796 2.359340 0.0185 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.093898 0.039630 2.369390 0.0180 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.016869 0.037801 0.446252 0.6555 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) -0.017340 0.105443 -0.164452 0.8694 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) -0.013164 0.134106 -0.098160 0.9218 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.119913 0.113873 1.053041 0.2926 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.083558 0.040087 2.084431 0.0374 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.010043 0.020966 0.478996 0.6321 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.022923 0.014502 1.580641 0.1143 
Increase in price index of the region -1.731223 0.478473 -3.618223 0.0003 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.180393 0.075347 2.394154 0.0169 
C 0.222798 0.134602 1.655235 0.0982 
R-squared -0.060399 
Adjusted R-squared -0.080470 
S.E. of regression 0.450832 
F-statistic 9.723167 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Number of observations 970 
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Table 7.7.A2 – Impact of credit on per capita non-food expenditure (Panel data - Extra) 
Method: 2SLS - Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=6) 
 
Dependent Variable: Increase in per capita non-food expenditure 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Increase in age group of household head 0.029724 0.021812 1.362735 0.1733 
Increase in education of household head (years) 0.011900 0.010790 1.102874 0.2704 
Dummy: if household becomes farm household -0.033085 0.093943 -0.352185 0.7248 
Dummy: if household head becomes male -0.174014 0.176212 -0.987526 0.3236 
Increase in household size (persons) -0.090851 0.014907 -6.094617 0.0000 
Increase in ownership of farming land (hectare) -0.004575 0.009370 -0.488233 0.6255 
Increase in financial savings (VND1000) 0.011398 0.008253 1.381088 0.1676 
Increase in non-financial savings (VND1000) 0.015274 0.005319 2.871463 0.0042 
Increase in price of detergent (VND1000/kg) 0.088449 0.051140 1.729556 0.0840 
Increase in price of fish source (VND1000/bottle) 0.102483 0.053377 1.920002 0.0552 
Increase in price of noodle (VND1000/pack) 0.054260 0.142700 0.380238 0.7039 
Increase in price of pork (VND1000/kg) 0.238436 0.195477 1.219763 0.2229 
Increase in price of ordinary rice (VND1000/kg) 0.110718 0.152859 0.724312 0.4691 
Increase in price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser) 0.323596 0.059479 5.440509 0.0000 
Increase in averaged education of household head in commune (years) 0.088293 0.031510 2.802098 0.0052 
Increase in averaged ownership of farming land in commune (hectare) 0.017671 0.018135 0.974418 0.3301 
Increase in price index of the region -3.277058 0.660742 -4.959660 0.0000 
Increase in total household borrowing (VND1000) 0.197843 0.094683 2.089528 0.0369 
C 0.040736 0.202621 0.201045 0.8407 
R-squared 0.097556 
Adjusted R-squared 0.080475 
S.E. of regression 0.644360 
F-statistic 10.66094 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Number of observations 970 
 
 
